

## The Cultural Value Project Cultural Relations in 'Societies in Transition'



Joint Academic Report

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## Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures .....	4
Research Teams .....	5
Acknowledgements .....	8
Executive Summary .....	10
1 Introduction .....	15
2 Literature Review: Cultural Relations in <i>Societies in Transition</i> .....	18
2.1 Defining cultural relations? .....	19
2.2 Summary .....	25
3 Methodology.....	27
3.1 Researching international cultural relations: collaborative synergies .....	27
3.2 The Cultural Relations Diamond approach .....	27
3.3 The Cultural Value Model.....	32
3.4 Collaborative synergies .....	38
3.5 Conclusion.....	39
4 Findings Ukraine.....	41
4.1 Context .....	41
4.2 Case Studies.....	58
4.3 Summary of Findings and Implications: Ukraine.....	76
5 Findings Egypt.....	79
5.1 Context .....	79
5.2 Case Studies.....	98
5.3 Summary of Findings and Implications: Egypt.....	119
6 General findings and recommendations.....	121
6.1 How do cultural relations create value? .....	121
6.2 How can and do cultural relations contribute to strengthening security and civil society in <i>societies in transition</i> ? .....	125
6.3 What types of cultural relations works best?.....	128
6.4 General recommendations .....	129
6.5 Conclusion.....	131
7 References .....	133
Appendix 1: CRD Organisational Survey and Workshop Statistics.....	137
Appendix 2: Cultural relations maps .....	143
Cultural Relations Map: selected projects and events in Ukraine, 2015-17 .....	143
Cultural Relations Map: selected projects and events in Egypt, 2015-17 .....	144

Appendix 3: Hertie School of Governance Organisational Survey Questionnaire (Egypt, English) .....	145
Appendix 4: CRD Aggregation Codebook.....	156
Appendix 5: Data sources for CVM .....	167
Ukraine.....	167
Egypt.....	172
Template workshop 1 .....	176
Template workshop 2 .....	177
Appendix 6: CVM Survey Data: Components, Questions and Scores .....	179
Active Citizens .....	179
Luhanskøs ART & FACTs .....	183
Al-Azhar .....	187
Kulturakademie .....	192
Film Week.....	198
Appendix 7: Rich pictures .....	203
Active Citizens .....	203
Luhanskøs ART & FACTs .....	204
Al-Azhar .....	205
Kulturakademie MENA.....	206
Kulturakademie Egypt.....	207
Film Week.....	208

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# List of Tables and Figures

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## Tables

Table 1: CRD Dimensions and Subdimensions.....	32
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## Figures

Figure 1: CVM Constellation, blank .....	36
Figure 2: Example of a scored constellation (Active Citizens) .....	37
Figure 3. Cultural Actors in Ukraine .....	44
Figure 4: Cultural Relations Diamond: Ukraine.....	48
Figure 5: Benefits of cooperating with international cultural organisations, Ukraine .....	49
Figure 6. International cultural organisations (Ukraine) .....	51
Figure 7. Joint project outcomes, Ukraine .....	55
Figure 8. Constellation for Active Citizens .....	62
Figure 9: Constellation for Luhansk& ART & FACTs.....	70
Figure 10. Cultural Actors in Egypt.....	81
Figure 11: Cultural Relations Diamond: Egypt .....	87
Figure 12: Benefits of cooperating with international cultural organisations, Egypt .....	88
Figure 13. International cultural organisations (Egypt) .....	90
Figure 14. Joint project outcomes, Egypt.....	94
Figure 15: Constellations for Al-Azhar.....	101
Figure 16: Constellation for Kulturakademie MENA.....	108
Figure 17: Constellation for Kulturakademie Egypt.....	109
Figure 18: Constellation for Film Week .....	115
Figure 19: Rich Picture: Active Citizens.....	203
Figure 20: Rich picture: Luhank's ART & FACTs.....	204
Figure 21: Rich Picture: Al-Azhar .....	205
Figure 22: Rich Picture: KA MENA.....	206
Figure 23: Rich Picture: KA Egypt.....	207
Figure 24: Rich picture: Film Week .....	208

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We cannot mention several dozen people we interviewed in Kyiv and Cairo ó not least because they preferred to remain anonymous. The fields of cultural relations in Kyiv and Cairo are small and insecure so we are hugely grateful to those who took time to talk to us at length and deepen our understanding.

Last but not least, thanks are due to our fellow academic colleagues at the Hertie School of Governance.

The **Hertie School of Governance** research team would like to thank the many generous people and organisations that took the time to participate in CVP workshops, that responded to our anonymous organisational survey, and that provided contacts, insights and other support along the way. In particular, we would like to mention our local consultants Yaroslav Minkin in Ukraine and Bahia Shehab in Egypt, who went beyond the contractual deliverables to help us ground our work in local reality, as well as Oleskandr Butsenko, Director of the Ukrainian Centre for Cultural Studies, who helped review and disseminate the organisational survey questionnaire in Ukraine, and Nabil Famy, Dean of the American University in Cairo,

who provided advice and innumerable contacts in Egypt. In addition, we thank the leaders and teams at Mystetskyi Arsenal (Kyiv, Ukraine) and D-CAF (Downtown Contemporary Arts Festival, Cairo, Egypt) for their help in organising our focus group workshops in March 2018. We are also very grateful to our colleagues at the Goethe Institut Munich office, Cornelia Hörtner and Dr Stefan Dreyer, and at the Goethe Institut offices in Cairo, Alexandria, and Kyiv, for the time they invested in this enterprise and the valuable feedback they provided along the way. We must also mention Hannah Bauersachs, who while working at the Goethe Institut helped us get the research project started. Of course, our project partners at the Open University and the British Council were critical to the process and success of this joint endeavour. Though we cannot name all those who provided support and input of many kinds throughout, we can say that without them, this project would not have been possible.

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## Executive Summary

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The Cultural Value Project is a joint research project commissioned by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut and designed and conducted by the Open University (UK) and the Hertie School of Governance (Germany). The project aims to build a better understanding of the value of cultural relations in societies in transition, with a focus on cultural relations activities in Egypt and Ukraine. We conducted the research in Cairo and Kyiv between January 2017 and June 2018.

The project seeks to identify the difference cultural relations activities make to important international challenges, including reducing conflict, strengthening civil society and nurturing future leaders. The project aims to contribute to current political, policy and academic debates about the role of culture in conflict, diplomacy and development.

The Open University adapted the Cultural Value Model for this research – a participatory approach which brings together diverse perspectives on a programme and assesses its value according to expectations forged at the outset. The research involved five in-depth case studies of cultural relations programmes. The data gathering process included participatory workshops at British Council and Goethe-Institut offices in Cairo and Kyiv with beneficiaries of the programmes, the staff delivering the programmes, and the strategy and policy teams within those two organisations; stakeholder surveys; and in-depth expert interviews. The result provides a snail's-eye view of cultural relations in the two countries.

In Kyiv, our four workshops brought together 160 people involved in the case study programmes – mainly users and beneficiaries. The workshops informed the subsequent design of a questionnaire. We then conducted a survey with 179 people who had been directly involved in the case study programmes. The survey results were presented at a second workshop and findings were collaboratively debated and interpreted. To complement and widen the optic of the case studies, we also carried out expert interviews of one to two-hours duration with 25 people working in or highly knowledgeable about the cultural relations field (but not associated with either the British Council or the Goethe-Institut). The interviews allowed us to test emerging hypotheses and findings on a wider, well-informed group.

In Cairo, we conducted 6 workshops that brought together 131 people. In similar fashion, the workshops informed the design of the questionnaire. We then conducted a survey with 241 respondents. We also conducted in-depth interviews with 15 people with local expertise in cultural relations. In some cases, we interviewed a handful of people several times over one to two hours. It was much more difficult to get artists and cultural producers and entrepreneurs to speak to us in Egypt due to the difficult security situation.

To provide a bird's-eye view, the Hertie School applied the Cultural Relations Diamond approach, an adaptation of the Civil Society Diamond that was originally developed as a tool to assess the state of civil society in various locations. For each country, the approach combines subjective mappings of influential cultural actors, analysis of a subset of diverse cultural relations activities, an organisational survey of (mainly) cultural actors, expert workshops, and other data. The result is an overview of the status of the cultural scene and of

the opportunities for and constraints to engaging in cultural relations and, indeed, making a difference.

This joint methodological design brought into dialogue both approaches, their theoretical underpinnings and their diverse data sets for the purpose of the analysis to provide a comprehensive overview of processes, practices, outcomes that shed light on the value of cultural relations in Egypt and Ukraine. The research has much broader implications for cultural relations in *societies in transition* more generally, and their role in promoting conflict reduction and strengthening civil society.

### **The value of cultural relations**

- Cultural relations activities create different forms of value for users, organisations and funders, among other stakeholders. Often different forms of value involve trade-offs that have to be negotiated, for example, reach versus quality or visibility versus invisibility.
- Greater public interest and improved outreach are among the key benefits perceived by local cultural organisations involved in cultural relations activities. Extending audiences and increasing visibility in this way can contribute to their longer-term organisational sustainability.
- Also highly valued by local cultural organisations and users alike are the opportunities they bring in terms of funding, skills transfer, training and career development. In the case of organisations in particular, these benefits help build organisational capacity. In the case of users, short-term funding mechanisms were often considered insufficient to establish sustainability of effort or impact and the suitability of skills was questioned.
- Local cultural organisations as well as participants in the programmes covered by the case studies value the greater connectivity afforded through regional, national and transnational networking that opens up opportunities otherwise unavailable. Many programme participants called for further and more sustainable networking opportunities.
- Collaboration between local and foreign organisations was highly valued in general, but misalignment of goals and incentives between users, organisations, and funders on some projects created tensions and disappointment. Furthermore, local participants in some projects sensed a lack of reciprocity or mutuality, which was associated with feeling undervalued by the foreign partner organisation.
- There was some evidence of perceived exclusivity in terms of location, partners and types of beneficiaries in some projects. Even if the perception on the part of some stakeholders is specific to our research, it signals a potential image problem that could hinder the success of cultural relations activities more broadly.
- Local cultural brokers create value and play a key role in managing various trade-offs and tensions. They are essential to the work of good cultural relations, but they are often not rewarded with equal opportunities, recognition and pay. In addition, local cultural brokers can cause tensions or conflicts if personal interest and proprietorial behaviour trump cultural relations goals.

**Cultural relations create most value when there is:**

- a clear communication of goals and terms of engagement to avoid raising expectations and hopes which cannot be met through specific projects
- a strong emphasis on locally-initiated, user-centred projects that involve and take into account local or regional actors at every stage of development ó at conception, creation, design, implementation and assessment stages ó as well as some form of reciprocity, mutuality and/or cultural exchange
- post-programme support in some form, however limited, to ensure that, when seed corn funding is used, it works as it should and actually leads to some degree of local independence and autonomy
- investment in supporting already existing networks over time as well as creating and managing new ones
- a good balance of cooperation, complementarity and competition between organisations
- blended cultural relationsø(optimising best use of new technologies alongside the face-to-face activities) can foster closer personal ties across all sorts of boundaries
- a good balance between the intrinsic value of a project and its instrumental value for the local and foreign organisations alike, as well as the users and other stakeholders
- a cascading of skills via local, peer-to-peer support as, for example, when trainees later become trainers and transfer skills locally and regionally
- attention to issues of diversity and inclusivity, within specific activities when appropriate as well as among the foreign cultural organisationsøs entire portfolio of activities
- recognition and appropriate compensation for local cultural brokers, both staff and project intermediaries, as well as opportunity for them to enhance their own skills

## **Cultural relations: managing conflict and strengthening civil society and future leaders**

- Managing risks by avoiding conflict is not the best long-term solution but, in the short-term, it may be necessary to secure a strategic position or relations in the field.
- Cultural relations may not be able to resolve or reduce wider social and political conflicts directly but can contribute to doing so indirectly when certain conditions prevail. The very presence of cultural relations in societies in transition like Egypt and Ukraine is symbolically significant, because they offer a measure of security in that they can bear witness to the work of independent and activist artists and organisations; and because they create spaces of relative autonomy shielding cultural actors.
- Some cultural relations projects while modest are still very important. The simple opening up of small spaces of dialogue between conflicted groups may be a good achievement especially when well managed.
- Managing the relationship between the state and non-state cultural actors can be very challenging in societies in transition, involving difficult decisions about whether and how to support the state and/or independent cultural actors and organisations; a thoughtful pre-and post-project phase is necessary for detecting and managing actual and potential conflicts.
- A frequent source of conflict arises from the very position of the independent artist: they may challenge the status quo but also live in fear of the state and state sanctions. As artists, they seek visibility but this can endanger their lives and the possibilities of earning a living which is in any case very tough due to economic hardship. International cultural relations organisations play an essential role in offering safe spaces and opportunities for cultural actors, especially activists, to work and network independent of state oversight. The provision of secure places is hugely appreciated by activist artists and can enable sustainable dialogue to flourish and partnerships to develop that can certainly, in the long-term, help reduce conflict.
- Managing the visibility and invisibility of cultural relations as well as safeguarding the privacy and security of partners and beneficiaries is crucial for success of cultural relations.
- Foreign cultural organisations are caught in a double-bind. They try their best to respond to local needs but must not create tensions with the government of the day or with state organisations if they are to achieve long-term aspirations towards conflict reduction.
- Cultural relations can help strengthen civil society by promoting the development of the independent cultural sector and civil society through projects that offer funding, training, skills and opportunities otherwise not available locally.
- Cross-generational dynamics in societies in transition can hinder effective cooperation. Too much focus on youth in projects aimed at cultivating future leaders created tensions with older generations who saw themselves as equally capable of being future leaders.

**Cultural relations can help reduce conflict and strengthen civil society when**

- they are embedded in trusted partnerships with local state and non-state actors, and contribute to deepening and expanding them
- state and/or local independent cultural actors and organisations are supported without alienating one group or the other; funding allocation should not be seen as some zero-sum in supporting local groups
- bridge-building activities between opposing factions identify shared goals and common interests that are clearly communicated by skilled and trusted mediators
- a deep understanding of the local security and political context is shared by organisations and users
- the exposure of artists and/or their works is handled with care and diplomacy
- local cultural brokers have the skills and support to engage in conflict resolution, as well as recognition of their role
- civil society actors and potential leaders are equipped with skills that enable them to pursue change within and beyond their local communities

## 1 Introduction

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The Cultural Value Project (CVP) is a joint research project commissioned by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut (January 2017-June 2018). It aims to build a better understanding of the value of cultural relations (CR) in societies facing difficult challenges – in particular, in Egypt and Ukraine. The project seeks to identify the difference cultural relations activities make to important international challenges, including supporting stability and prosperity in societies going through substantial change. It aims to contribute to current political, policy and academic debates about the role of culture in conflict, diplomacy and development.

The British Council and Goethe-Institut wish to collaborate on this research in order to gain a better understanding of how different forms of cultural relations work in different contexts, and explore wider possibilities for partnerships in the field of cultural relations. This initiative occurs at a time when challenging transnational issues of conflict, security, migration, poverty and environmental degradation, beyond the control of any nation-state, make cooperation in international relations more difficult but more important than ever.

Although there is no agreed definition of cultural relations, as discussed in the next section of this report, for the purpose of this project the British Council and Goethe-Institut propose the following:

*Cultural relations are understood as reciprocal transnational interactions between two or more cultures, encompassing a range of activities conducted by state and non-state actors within the space of culture and civil society. The overall outcomes of cultural relations are greater connectivity, better mutual understanding, more and deeper relationships, mutually beneficial transactions and enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures, shaped through engagement and attraction rather than coercion.*

The Open University and the Hertie School of Governance bring together different methodological approaches and complementary foci of analysis into one shared analytical framework in order to examine the ways in which cultural relations work and the conditions and contexts under which cultural relations produce value (and indeed where it cannot). The relative strengths of different kinds of cultural relations activities and the value they create in diverse contexts are analysed via a series of strategically selected case studies. Using cutting-edge social scientific tools and forms of data analyses, our shared analytical framework aims to provide a better understanding of which particular cultural relations programmes and projects are suited to specific challenges. The result offers guidance to cultural relations organisations in and beyond the UK and Germany about the processes, outcomes and value of cultural relations activities. The project focuses primarily on the cultural relations activities of the UK and Germany but situates these in the wider national and international cultural ecologies in which they are embedded.

The CVP builds on the strengths of two robust and well-tested methods: the Open University's Cultural Value Model (CVM)<sup>1</sup> and the Hertie School of Governance's Civil Society Diamond (CSD).<sup>2</sup> By combining these two approaches, the methodological ambition of the CVP is to, on the one hand, scale up the Open University's CVM and, on the other, transform the Hertie School's CSD into a Cultural Relations Diamond (CRD). The collaborative synergies provide the CVP with a joint analytical and methodological framework to deliver a rich and contextualised picture of the value of cultural relations in these contexts for different stakeholders.

This research brings the benefits and unique strengths of both approaches into dialogue to find answers to our two research questions:

- i. What is the value of cultural relations? What forms of value are found and given priority by which stakeholders? How can we theorise how forms of value function and accrue? How can we evaluate the presence and impact of value?
- ii. How can cultural relations help prevent or ameliorate conflict and its damaging social and economic effects? How can cultural relations support stability and security? How can cultural relations contribute to the strengthening of future leaders and civil society organisations who can reduce conflict and increase stability?

The Cultural Value Project is based on the following principles that guide our joint research:

- 1) it uses mixed research methods that bring together **qualitative** and **quantitative** data. We have collaboratively created a new model of assessment that shifts the focus from impact to a richer understanding of value while maintaining a certain degree of comparability;
- 2) its unique approach combines **participatory** evaluation, where the components to be researched are established and assessed **cooperatively** (insider view), accompanied by an external analysis (outsider view) of the same phenomena;
- 3) it offers a **multi-perspective** approach that goes beyond the top-down and bottom-up dualities to consider all stakeholders, including those not directly involved in cultural relations, as legitimate interlocutors in a conversation about the value of cultural relations;
- 4) it offers a practice that can be owned by the participants and allow them to explore the meaning of their work. The CVP offers a **collective reflection** process; a self-reflective evaluation tool for organisations (CVM) that enables them to look at their work through the perspectives of all parties involved and to make changes according to new and often unexpected results. At the same time, the results of the bird's eye

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<sup>1</sup> The CVM originated in a project funded by the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council led by Prof Marie Gillespie and was a collaborative creation by team members who were granted unprecedented access to British Council data sources. CVM emerges out of three decades of work on cultural transnationalism and the creation of innovative methodologies by Professors Gillespie and Simon Bell combined with the expertise in data analysis of Colin Wilding, formerly Senior Analyst at BBC World Service's Audience Research section.

<sup>2</sup> Originally conceived by the Hertie School's Helmut K. Anheier and implemented by Civicus.

- view analysis (CRD) allow the institutions to better reflect upon their place within the national context and within the broader context of cultural relations;
- 5) it establishes the context for a **participatory form of research**, in which the theoretical and conceptual framework of researchers is tested by practice. Our subjects of study are **active participants** in the process; and
  - 6) it provides a visual tool that processes complex information into composite snapshots (constellations and diamonds).

## 2 Literature Review: Cultural Relations in ‘Societies in Transition’

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Cultural relations increasingly take place in a context of instability and/or conflict ó as is suggested by the use of the term «societies in transition» in the title of this project instigated by the British Council and Goethe-Institute. It is also reflected in their choice of Egypt and Ukraine as our key foci of research. The transformation process which took place prior to, during and after the uprisings in Egypt in 2011, EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine 2013, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 beg questions about how the dynamics of conflict arising as a result of those events can be managed and even resolved. For our project, it invites examination both of how cultural relations activities are impacted by challenging contexts as well as whether and how cultural relations activities can have value and impact in those contexts.

The term «societies in transition» is used in academic and policy worlds to refer to several different types of transitions. First, it refers to transition from one form of domestic institutions to another.<sup>3</sup> In post-Soviet countries like Ukraine, the term refers to societies transitioning from communist to non-communist socio-economic and political models, particularly efforts to introduce and stabilise both the institutions and cultures of democracy and markets (Pickles & Smith 1998; Semetko & Krasnoboka 2003). With Egypt in mind, in the academic study of Africa and in many NGO and policy papers from developing countries, the term «societies in transition» is, for some, deemed preferable to describing countries as «in development» or «low income» for reasons of national pride or rejecting neo-colonial labels. The most influential paper in this field notes, «by describing developing countries as societies in transition we are not suggesting that there is any teleological path that will eventually take them to a productive capitalism» (Khan 2010). «Transition» refers to structural transformation of the economy from smallholder agriculture to industrial and post-industrial models but, unlike linear conceptions of «development» or «modernisation» in the Twentieth Century, many find a welcome degree of openness underlying uses of the concept «societies in transition».

A second type of transition in both policy and academic literatures is that entailed by globalisation, a transition impacting on all states. Here, transition may entail positive economic effects on peoples» welfare but also increased uncertainty, the hollowing out of the state, and concerns about loss of political control and even cultural identity (Kahle & Lake 2003; Gilman 2014). In this sense, Egypt and Ukraine are societies existing within this broader transition in global history and their domestic transitions may be accelerated, impeded or blocked by wider transformative processes in the international system.

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<sup>3</sup> The term «societies in transition» also has no precise definition, but usually refers to societies undergoing major structural and institutional reform (see O'Donnell et al. 1986). Their thinking in subsequent texts would consider Ukraine an «unconsolidated», «illiberal» or «low quality» democracy ó but not quite simply «in transition» (O'Donnell 1996, 1998; O'Donnell et al. 2004; Whitehead 2002). The so-called transition paradigm was also heavily critiqued by numerous scholars, not least Thomas Carothers (Carothers 2002; Cavarozzi 1992; Croissant 2004; Kuzio 2001).

The openness of ‘societies in transition’ allows for reflection about transition from what to what, and who decides that. In the literature that cultural relations organisations produce about themselves (which we refer to in much more detail in our extended literature review – see footnote on p.12), the desired development and democracy goals would appear to be progress towards (more or less explicitly and favourably defined) neo-liberal models of democracy. And yet the Goethe-Institut and British Council have explored negative aspects of consumer culture, for instance. Indeed, this critical perspective is also how some independent artists and cultural activists that we worked with during this research understand the role of cultural relations organisations in ‘societies in transition’. Clearly, they tied together discussion about the openness of what ‘societies in transition’ means to the absence of a clear or agreed definition of what cultural relations is, is not, should be or could be.

Such reflections lead us to the core problem of defining cultural relations. The definition offered to us by the British Council and Goethe-Institut for this project (quoted above) is based on an understanding that cultural and educational cooperation in international relations are more important than ever. Through cultural relations, it is believed and hoped that increased trust and mutual understanding can be built which will contribute to resolving conflict and making the world a safer and more prosperous place. Strengthening civil society will help the transition towards deepening democracy and the principles on which it is based. For the Goethe-Institut, harmonious relations are the fruits of ‘good cultural relations’ and obviously bring mutual benefits both to participants and to Germany. For the British Council, operating closer to debates in London about ‘soft power’, mutually-beneficial relations are also discussed but in the context of improving trade, inward investment, and levels of tourism and international students. For both, the concept of mutual benefit is built into the very rationale of cultural relation and of this project and its attempt to gauge whether and to what extent this might be possible.

The following section offers a summary of the literature review conducted for the Cultural Value Project, published separately as a report by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut (Gillespie et al. 2018).<sup>4</sup>

## 2.1 Defining cultural relations?

There is no general agreement on what cultural relations are. Different national cultural relations organisations understand cultural relations through different lenses. The British Council, for example, has an expansive definition of cultural relations that encompasses soft power, and senior staff working in policy see this project as consistent with their goal to become thought leaders in the field of soft power (reflecting debates in London and to some extent Washington and Beijing). In contrast, the Goethe-Institut eschews notions of soft power and instead focuses on managing good cultural relations in line with the traditionally more multilateralist German foreign policy. Each may view cultural relations, and therefore culture, as an end in itself, but also as a means to specific further ends – of most importance for the purposes of this project being promoting civil society and improving stability in ‘societies in transition’.

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<sup>4</sup> The complete paper can be found here: <https://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/policy-insight-research/value-cult-relations>.

There are no universal definitions of culture or cultural relations or its sibling concepts, and the attempt to find any are doomed. Cultural relations is a concept embedded in practices. Policymakers and scholars offer definitions and guidelines, while cultural relations organisationsø staff, funders, audiences and others make cultural relations happen in particular contexts, often aware of those definitions but seeking to solve the problems in front of them.

Cultural relations are part of a semantic field that includes cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and soft power, particularly in the Anglosphere context. Cultural relations are not a distinctive phenomenon, but a set of activities that take place within those broader fields. In Germany, for example, the translation of cultural relations, *Kulturbeziehungen* or *kulturelle Beziehungen*, is barely used at all, as policymakers and practitioners work under the umbrella term –foreign cultural and education policyø (*Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik*, AKBP).

All these terms can refer to the same set of cultural activities within a broader foreign policy framework within a global cultural arena. All are associated with managing relations or communication across cultures, achieving long-term goals, accentuating people-to-people relations, cultivating feelings of mutuality, and facilitating the participation of state and non-state actors. But distinctions and tensions remain too. These concern the actual and desirable role of the state, the degree to which engagement is seen as an instrument while neglecting the intrinsic value of international exchange, and the difficulty of juggling the pursuit of the national interest with win-win, positive-sum relations.

Cultural relations practitioners have often taken the lead defining the field. From all parts of the –chain of influenceø passing from government to funders to institutions to practitioners to publics (Brown 2014), cultural relations will mean different things to different actors and will be practised differently, as we will see in the examples of the case studies. Uniform definitions of culture and cultural relations and its related concepts are ultimately neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it is best to work with the creative tensions between these concepts which can only be managed, never finally resolved, as we have done for the purpose of this research. Uniform definitions are also impossible because cultural relations policymakers and practitioners arrive at their own conceptions as they *do* cultural relations.

Indeed, the conceptual confusion can enable useful flexibility. From a user and beneficiary perspective, however, the confusion surrounding terms can mean that cultural relations organisations are not as well understood as they might be, as we have often found in our research. They may be perceived simply as –foreign fundersø and users may not have a clear understanding of their ultimate goals, or may not share them. Cultural relations organisations need to communicate openly and clearly both their instrumental as well as their intrinsic goals in promoting cultural activities if mutuality ø a key aspiration according to the British Council /Goethe-Institut definition ø is to be achieved. But they also need to acknowledge that the usersø and beneficiariesø goals and conceptions of mutuality might be entirely different to theirs.

For the British Council mutuality is indeed a core principle and –provides a way of eschewing one-way traffic in cultural relations, of giving equal value to differing cultures, and of ensuring that benefit accrues to all parties in the building up of long-term, sustainable relationships built on trust. We believe that in applying this principle, the sum of human

relationships will be strengthened and the international standing of the United Kingdom improved (Rose & Wadham-Smith 2004). For local artists and cultural actors mutuality might mean that Ukrainian or Egyptian culture finds visibility or exposure in Europe.

This may not chime with how the strategy teams see it as one of the crucial challenges, from their perspective, the purpose is to empower agents of social change in the region. Similarly, the ‘Transformation Partnership’ framework that regulates the activity of the Goethe-Institut prioritises civil society empowerment in the local context. Certainly, strategy teams pointed to exchange programmes that bring Ukrainian and Egyptian artists to the UK. Commenting on the Luhansk ART & FACTS project that brought some Ukrainians to be trained in Berlin, one Goethe-Institut strategy team member told us when those Ukrainians come to Berlin people in Germany get to hear how it really is in Ukraine, including the conflict, and therefore make a realistic appraisal<sup>5</sup>. Another said this was part of a new social contract: everyone questions how it is in *their* country by considering how it is in others; Germans realise how uncomfortable it is for Russian groups in Ukraine but that Germany has its own challenges [about identity and integration]<sup>6</sup>. Yet the strategy teams do not expect cultural relations to provide equal exposure of Egyptian or Ukrainian culture and language in Germany or Britain as German or British culture is represented in Egypt or Ukraine. As we shall see, many Egyptian local staff had greater expectations about travelling to Britain, for instance, than were met.

Across the literature, evidence suggests that cultural relations can have a strategic impact on the evolution of societies in transition such as post-revolutionary Egypt. The 2011 Egyptian uprisings galvanised a new range of civil society-led initiatives, while raising awareness about youth unemployment and social inequalities. However, political instability in the aftermath of the revolution affected foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and opportunities for trade liberalisation. Recent studies demonstrate that improving English skills and access to quality education amongst young people significantly helps stimulating FDI and employment (Ramaswami et al. 2012). Speaking English is perceived by a majority of Egyptians as an important asset for individuals’ personal development – a fact that, as we will see, is a crucial point coming out of one of our case studies in Egypt, the British Council supported Al-Azhar English Training Centre. This is evident both through aspirations to seek employment in the UK, US and Canada and to access opportunities through social media, particularly where it is possible to exchange across gender boundaries (to circumvent gender segregation operating in some parts of public life in Egypt (Wheeler 2006).

A review of the literature of cultural relations in Egypt also suggests avenues to contribute to security, stability and prosperity, which our research will put to the test. First, using cultural activities might mitigate existing socio-economic and urban/rural divides. Second, providing strategic direction to education reform and offering language services in the country, as the British Council is already doing, might help empower future leaders. Consumer spending on education outstrips government spending, and current education minister Dr Shawki’s reforms may involve privatisation, opening up provision possibilities (Powell-Davies 2016). Third, cultural relations organisations can play an important role in stimulating civil society

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<sup>5</sup> Unnamed Strategy Team Member 1, German, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017, Goethe-Institut

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

initiatives like sustainable social enterprises: «locally-grown businesses pursuing social purposes or citizen sector organisation that achieve their aims through revenue-generating activities» (British Council Baseline Research on Social Enterprise forthcoming, 4-5).<sup>7</sup>

The language of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy has come to the forefront in Ukraine in reaction to the 2014 crisis, a crisis that includes domestic political turmoil, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and armed conflict in eastern regions. Amid the urgency of war and perceived aggression of Russia's informational and hybrid warfare tactics, the British Council, Institut Français and Polish Institute are taken as examples to emulate in a struggle as much cultural as kinetic. The pressure of Russia in the 'marketplace for loyalties' is felt severely. Since the colour revolutions of the early 2000s, Russia has also mimicked Western cultural relations institutes. These are used both to influence opinion about Russia in the West and to provide language, cultural and informational resources to «compatriots» in the post-Soviet region (van Herpen 2016). While the Roszarubezhcentre (Russian Foreign Centre) was set up in 1925 and has operated in a way akin to German cultural institutes in the nineteenth century who sought to sustain the German-ness of their diaspora, its role can now be framed as leveraging open societal divisions between Russian speakers and non-Russian speakers in countries including Ukraine. However, despite this urgent condition of danger and division, this century-old cultural relations organisation points to continuities in cultural affinities in the region. Recent survey research shows many Ukrainians seek to be both Ukrainian and sustain links to Russia, due to family, religious or cultural ties (Szostek forthcoming). While the influence or importance of the Russian foreign centres is not particularly supported by our data, the latter point about Russian and Ukrainian identity was at the centre of one of our research case studies that looked at a Goethe-Institut project on cultural memory of the region of Luhansk, in the Occupied Territories in eastern Ukraine. There are signs of increasing Russian cultural relations activity, though. The Russkiy Mir Foundation, founded in 2007 by presidential decree, has since opened at its peak 11 cultural centres in Ukraine promoting Russian language and culture (Anheier 2017, 8).<sup>8</sup>

Urgent efforts to emulate European cultural institutes do not amount to learning or studying well-honed practices up close or recognising how these cultural institutions sit within broader public and private networks. First, Ukrainian public discourse is marked by a tendency to invoke «European standards» or «European values» without discussion of what they are (Orlova 2017). It may be that Ukraine needs to forge a sense of its own cultural uniqueness that avoids a binary choice between European or Russian affinities; this would reflect a sense of Ukraine's role in the world as a strategic partner both to the EU and Russia and to anyone else (Walker 2015). Second, this will be difficult to achieve unless cultural relations in Ukraine sits within a more supportive environment. Goethe-Institut research indicates that culture is not protected by law, nurtured in current education practice, or financed by diverse sources, while cultural relations organisations themselves work on creaking infrastructure

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<sup>7</sup> The objective is to help local entrepreneurs launch small businesses thanks to community investment schemes or crowdfunding. Research recently commissioned by the British Council demonstrated that the 2011 revolution played an important role in inspiring this kind of small-scale social enterprises (British Council forthcoming, 11). For this reason, one can safely assume that societies in transition like post-revolutionary Egypt may be well-placed to experiment with more sustainable forms of markets.

<sup>8</sup> Although this figure has declined most recently.

often without basic external communications officers (Ostrovska-Liuta et al. 2015, 11-12). This panorama will be put to the test through the CRD organisational survey.

These are the contexts in which the British Council and Goethe-Institut, as well as other cultural relations institutes, have to operate. Differences in their approaches and conceptions of cultural relations can be explained by tracing the national histories that have caused the creation of different diplomatic orientations and infrastructures. In the case of Germany and the UK, this is due to fundamental differences in understandings of nation formation, the significance of language, and definitions of culture, that have emerged historically in different countries. A country's cultural relations practices are often shaped by the priorities set by the ministry of foreign affairs at the time <sup>9</sup> and these depend on how the country understands its national interests and what it is trying to achieve, be it extricating itself from its imperial past, waging a Cold War, or trying to boost trade through diaspora links (Brown 2014).

Historical diplomatic relations also frame how cultural relations organisations are perceived among users in the present. Historical legacies are central to understanding the structural limitations for contemporary cultural relations. Past practices create hierarchies and inequalities and tend to be reproduced overtime. Just like legacies of communist, colonial and authoritarian rule impact the local environment within which cultural relations operate, historical relationships between British or German actors and Ukrainian or Egyptian actors shape the practice of cultural relations today.

The British Council has been working in Egypt for over 80 years, through the colonial and post-colonial periods and older generations still see it as a colonial organisation. Our research shows that the British Council is better known in Egypt for its language teaching and exchange programmes than for its cultural activities. Some participants in CVM workshops suggested showcasing British art and culture in a more accessible manner (corner libraries, film screenings and so on) to enable the British Council to have more visibility than as a language teaching institution and therefore engaging publics in a two-way intercultural dialogue. German-Egyptian relations do not suffer from the same postcolonial relationship that characterises British-Egyptian relations. But German cultural relations organisations are perceived by some participants as aloof. This may be due to some aspects of its communication strategy, to the relocation of its services from Downtown Cairo to Doqqi or to the conceptual architecture of its new facilities. Ultimately, the image of the institution might hinder potential partnerships and limit the reach and impact of their activities.<sup>9</sup>

In Ukraine British Council was one of the first foreign organisations active on the ground in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union and is seen as a partner in democratisation and a liberalising European force in Ukraine. Germany has a shorter history of cultural relations in Ukraine, which works to the advantage of the Goethe-Institut.

As we will show below, our research supports the fact noted in current literature that the position of cultural relations institutions within the diplomatic infrastructure matters. Goethe-Institut's remit is to focus exclusively on cultural projects because of its position within

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<sup>9</sup> Rich picture depicting the Goethe-Institut as a *stiff but friendly* giant. Film Week workshop 1. See case study report for Film Week.

Germany's diplomatic infrastructure. Other German agencies deal with overseas development (GIZ) and education (DAAD). British Council has a broader and more fluid remit and spans diplomatic and development projects in culture, education and society. This shapes activities. Goethe-Institut projects investigated in this research tended to be smaller in scale, local grassroots initiatives, animated through partnerships with (often charismatic) local cultural brokers. British Council projects were more large-scale and aimed at systemic reform. Whether this represents a wider pattern or difference in approach to cultural relations remains to be seen. Both have their value but there are also difficult trade-offs in each approach.

Despite the historical, conceptual and institutional differences between the German and British approaches to cultural relations, the way the two countries deploy them may in fact be motivated by very similar goals: for the purpose of this research, these are to support security, stability and prosperity as well as future leaders and civil society. How they do it is where we find the main differences. Goethe-Institut works closely with small groups of local actors to design and implement cutting-edge arts and cultural projects to which cultural relations professionals bring high levels of cultural and intellectual capital. Goethe-Institut's localised and personalised approach is much appreciated by local beneficiaries, but the downside is their limited reach as noted by several cultural insiders interviewed.<sup>10</sup> By promoting a bottom-up approach to civil society empowerment, the Goethe-Institut has raised the expectations of beneficiaries that are harder to reach, because they tend to be disconnected from the public sector and from the well-established institutional structures. Alternatively, the British Council succeeded in demonstrating high reach by relying on partnerships with very large institutions. However, it might be that the approach of the Goethe-Institut is comparatively more challenging because it is more ambitious when it comes to targeting a marginalised audience.

British Council programmes have good reach and are sustained over long periods enabling high educational or civil society impact and sustainable performance but over time they may lose sight of core aims and objectives and partners may feel undervalued. This being said, cultural insiders with a keen interest in British Council activities also commented on the fact that it was easy to fall out of the loop<sup>11</sup> whilst others stressed that maintaining lines of communication open whilst pursuing new audiences is something that both institutions could improve upon.<sup>11</sup>

The complex and nuanced nature of cultural relations suggests that attempts to evaluate them will themselves have to be sophisticated, nuanced, and sensitive to the different contexts in which they are taking place and different actors involved. One of the most important findings coming out of our review of existing literature and our research is that cultural relations organisations need to understand the local context in which they are operating in order to engage in a dialogue based on mutuality. The Cultural Value Project aims to build and use just such a method of evaluation, researching the contexts and practices of cultural relations in Egypt and Ukraine. It also seeks to create mutual awareness of convergences between

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<sup>10</sup> Unnamed Cultural Diplomacy Insider 1, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 1, Kenan Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 6, Mystetskyi Arsenal, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Curator and Artist, works closely with various German and British cultural institutions, Interview Kyiv, January 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Unnamed Cultural Manager 1; Unnamed Curator and Artist; Unnamed Cultural Manager 9

German and British cultural relations as a foundation for closer dialogue, pragmatism and cooperation in the future. Instead of spending further time on the ultimately irresolvable matter of what cultural relations *are*, let us therefore explore what cultural relations can *do*.

## 2.2 Summary

- The term «cultural relations» refers to interventions in foreign cultural arenas with the aim of enhancing intercultural dialogue and bringing about mutual benefits connected to security, stability and prosperity. There is no universally agreed definition of cultural relations. The conceptual confusion can lead to differences in practice, though it can also enable flexibility.
- Just as there is no common definition of cultural relations, there is no one correct approach to good cultural relations, or simple method of evaluating cultural relations. Practitioners face very different cultural and geopolitical contexts. Effective cultural relations necessarily involve flexibly adapting programmes in ways that resonate with these contexts.
- «Cultural relations» is primarily a practitioners' term and often regarded as synonymous with «cultural diplomacy», «public diplomacy» and - for some - as contributing to their country's «soft power». These terms belong within the same broad semantic field and share many common features, but it is important to distinguish them. Cultural relations practitioners aspire to genuine reciprocity and mutual understanding, while cultural and public diplomacy, and soft power, sometimes bear connotations of instrumentalism and self-interest.
- The emphasis on the intrinsic versus instrumental value of culture varies between different institutions and countries. Some tend to eschew overt instrumentalist ambitions and instead stress intrinsic value, while others are more comfortable with a balancing act between intrinsic and instrumental goals. The intrinsic value of cultural projects should remain paramount. But instrumental goals, when defined in ways that express mutual benefit, can and should be included for pragmatic purposes, and in response to changing funding regimes and requirements.
- Assessing the value of cultural relations in different countries and for different actors requires a range of methodologies that take diverse perspectives into account. It is important to situate the strategies and practices of cultural relations organisations like the Goethe-Institut and British Council within the wider histories of their countries to understand their distinctive approaches. German cultural relations are founded on a «strong» conception of culture (where culture is closely tied to national history, language and identity). In contrast, British cultural relations are based on a «weak» conception of culture, emerging from a tradition of liberal individualism and British empiricism. Germany and the UK have very similar goals in deploying culture relations to assist societies in transition. But they have different modi operandi.

- The complex and nuanced nature of cultural relations suggests that attempts to evaluate them will themselves have to be sophisticated, nuanced, and sensitive to the different contexts in which they are taking place and different actors involved.

### 3 Methodology

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#### 3.1 Researching international cultural relations: collaborative synergies

The Cultural Value Project brings two distinctive approaches into one shared analytical and methodological framework to research international cultural relations in Egypt and Ukraine. This combined approach enables hitherto unavailable insights to emerge and a richer understanding of the conditions and contexts where cultural relations can provide most value and impact.

The two distinctive approaches bring into dialogue:

- i. The Cultural Relations Diamond (CRD) offers a bird's eye view of the whole of the cultural relations ecology, including data on cultural relations actors, their work and the contexts in which they operate. The CRD works from the general to the particular.
- ii. The Cultural Value Model (CVM) presents a snail's eye, ethnographically informed, on-the-grounded analysis of the value of specific cultural relations programmes, projects and events set in their local and national contexts. The CVM moves the analytical framework from the particular to the general. The two approaches meet in the middle and enable new knowledge to emerge.

#### 3.2 The Cultural Relations Diamond approach

The Hertie School's Cultural Relations Diamond (CRD) approach provides a bird's-eye view of cultural relations on the national level. Its methodology is designed to allow for cross-national comparisons of cultural relations between Egypt and Ukraine. It aggregates information on a large number<sup>12</sup> of cultural actors and cultural relations activities (i.e. programmes/ projects/ events) within the countries under study, resulting in an overview of the landscape of cultural relations, in which cultural relations institutes like the Goethe-Institut and the British Council operate. In addition, it gives a measure of the external environment that can enable or hinder cultural relations at the national level. It is macro in scope, covering many actors and activities, thus providing a broad context and a sketch of cultural relations in Egypt and Ukraine, but does not examine the activities themselves or the processes of cultural engagement in detail.

The CRD approach involves several stages and methods of data collection and aggregation resulting in three graphic representations for each country:<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Though the CRD attempts to cover a broad spectrum and large number of actors and activities, the results cannot be said to be statistically representative. To claim representativeness, we would have required a full inventory of cultural actors and cultural relations activities in each country: such inventories do not exist, and resources did not permit creating them.

<sup>13</sup> More detail on the method for each element is provided in the CRD methodology paper, available from the Hertie School by contacting Regina List, [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org).

## Cultural Relations (CR) Map

The main purpose of the cultural relations maps is to give an overview of the topography of cultural relations organisations and cultural relations activities in both countries. To that end, it identifies commonalities and differences among cultural relations activities within each country. In addition, the mapping allows for the identification of cultural relations activities suitable for the case study work of Open University's Cultural Value Model (CVM), discussed below.

As a first step in creating the cultural relations maps, a local consultant in each country selected 40 to 50 cultural relations activities that took place or were ongoing in the period 2015–17. In the absence of a complete database of all such activities, which likely numbered in the hundreds, the local consultants scanned the internet, consulted with experts and colleagues in the field, and relied on their own broad experience to choose those that seemed most representative of the main types and variety of programmes, projects and events during that period. Based on extensive desk research, the consultants categorised each activity along four dimensions (area/target; field; budget/reach; foreign/domestic partners).<sup>14</sup> The Hertie School team then analysed these activities using hierarchical clustering methods and aggregated them into types of cultural relations programs sharing similar properties, represented on the map by bubbles, the size of which is determined by the number of activities of that particular type. Types that share similar properties and only diverge in some of their properties are then arranged together in clusters.

## Cultural Actors (CA) Map

The main purpose of the Cultural Actors Maps is to provide an impression of the cultural scene on the country level. It identifies key institutions and individuals from a variety of backgrounds which will be included in the organisational survey (see Cultural Relations Diamond below), offers an overview of the influential institutions in the cultural sector, and allows for the identification of sectors/types of actors that have close relationships with the Goethe-Institut / British Council and those that do not, finding blind spots in the engagement of the cultural relations actors. For the purpose of the mapping, ‘cultural actors’ are defined broadly to cover the different areas of work that cultural relations organisations engage in so that the resulting actors represent the different facets of cultural relations activities as discussed in the cultural relations map. It should be noted that this definition is driven primarily by the types of actors British Council and Goethe-Institut cooperate with. The selection of cultural actors includes societal entities whose principal purpose is the production or reproduction, promotion, and/or distribution of goods, services and activities of a creative, artistic or heritage-related nature, as well as organisations that engage in what we call ‘broader value generation’, that is, activities that are not specifically artistic in nature, but that aim at education, building social capital and strengthening communities.

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<sup>14</sup> What to map and which scope to use had been debated through a series of methodological papers between the Open University and the Hertie School, before the actual mapping workshops commenced. Input into the mapping process was given by the Open University external experts, who held initial meetings with Hertie School experts prior to the mapping and gave feedback on the completed CA and cultural relations maps to fill in gaps. More detail on the Cultural Relations Mapping methodology and the four dimensions can be found in the CRD methodology paper, available from the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; [list@hertieschool.org](mailto:list@hertieschool.org)).

The Cultural Actors Maps presented in this report are the result of a process that combines the knowledge of local British Council and Goethe-Institut staff and a local consultant. To obtain the first two perspectives, Hertie School researchers conducted workshops with each institute's local staff separately in each country in late March and early April 2017. Once maps based on these workshops were developed, a local consultant created a synthesis of the two Cultural Actors Maps and his/her own findings, resulting in one final map unifying the different perspectives. These synthesis maps were then vetted at expert workshops in each country (11 May 2017 in Cairo and 6 July 2017 in Kyiv) and adjusted accordingly when there was consensus regarding the need for change.

Within the maps, bubbles represent actors or groups of actors, with the bubble size reflecting mainly the actor's influence but also, when it is a group, the number of actors included. The dotted circles indicate the fields of work in which the actors are considered to be primarily active. The bubbles and circles are arranged keeping in mind similarity in the actors' work and organisational set-up, as well as presumed affinity or relationship. More information about the mapping process can be found in the CRD methodology paper, as well as in the reports prepared by the local consultants, available upon request to the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org)).

## Cultural Relations Diamond (CRD)

The CRD<sup>15</sup> is a visualisation of the main aspects of cultural relations that CVP is trying to measure. It can be used by various types of stakeholders to examine the state of cultural relations in a single country and comparatively between countries.

To create the CRD for each country, researchers assembled data from a novel survey of cultural actors/ organisations, other third-party surveys, and other reliable data sources to create indicators and thus scores for the five main dimensions and numerous subdimensions listed in Table 1. The points of the diamond reflect the scores for four of the dimensions on a standardised scale (0–100, where 0 is the minimum and 100 the maximum). The enabling environment, the fifth dimension, is represented as a circle and implies the same idea as the other four dimensions – the bigger the size, the better the environment for international cultural relations.<sup>16</sup>

Briefly, the dimensions and subdimensions consider the following:

**Vibrancy:** The assumption behind this dimension is that cultural relations will be more successful in general when cultural relations activities themselves address a wider public across diverse fields and where the country's population has access to and engages in culture and the arts.

- *Inclusiveness*, based on answers to questions from the CRD organisational survey, measures whether cultural relations activities involve a diversity of target groups,

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<sup>15</sup> The CRD draws inspiration from the Civil Society Diamond, developed by Helmut Anheier and implemented in 70+ countries by Civicus and its partners in two separate phases between 2003 and 2011. <http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/reports-publications/csi-reports>

<sup>16</sup> The enabling environment only hints at the state of social and political arena in a country, thus the relation between external environment and the diamond should not be over-interpreted.

including those that are especially vulnerable (with the definition of vulnerable groups determined at the country level).

- *Variety / diversity*, also based on organisational survey responses, examines whether cultural relations activities operate through various cultural mediums, in different cultural fields, and at different geographical levels. This measure assumes that greater diversity is better, but can also be adjusted in the event targeting is considered more important.
- *Cultural participation*, based on third-party population surveys, captures how actively populations participate in cultural events in general and whether they face barriers in participation. The assumption is that foreign cultural relations organisations work with an already existing cultural scene. The more active it is, the higher the leverage for cultural relations to generate value.

**Level of organisation:** This dimension captures the perceived effect of cultural relations or international cultural organisations on the capacity of cultural actors to sustain their operations, pursue their goals, and develop their potential. It assumes that for cultural relations activities to be fruitful, the local organisations need external and internal sustainability, good communications within the sector, and collaboration with other economic and governmental actors. All measurements are based on responses to the CRD organisational survey.

- *Internal sustainability* relates to the financial capacity and skills within cultural actors that allow them to operate successfully.
- *External sustainability* relates to cultural actors' visibility and outreach that could generate new audiences and participants that might sustain the actors' activity into the future.
- *Intersectoral communication* reflects opportunities to network and work with like-minded actors within the country and outside it.
- *Contact with other sectors* focuses on cultural actors' actual and potential ability to network or collaborate with other actors in the business and government sectors.

**Values:** This dimension explores what kind of values are pursued by and actually practiced by cultural relations actors and in their cultural relations activities. The strategic selection of which values to include here was based on the results of the first round of CVM workshops, feedback from the Hertie School's first round of expert workshops, and/or prior research.

- *Practice*, based on responses to the CRD organisational survey, takes into account what is important to cultural actors, e.g. stimulating creativity, learning more about other cultures, and so on. When the importance of these values is more highly shared across respondents, the score on this subdimension is higher.
- *Transfer*, also based on the CRD organisational survey, examines whether cultural relations activities contribute to the international transfer of values and whether they contribute to the development of civil society and future leaders.

- *Generation*, based on responses to the CRD organisational survey responses and an EU Neighbourhood Barometer, measures whether cultural relations activities contribute to cultural innovation and create international relationships, as well as the value a country's population places on its cultural heritage.

**Perceived impact:** In the absence of a formal evaluation of cultural relations activities, the level of impact that cultural relations actors and activities have is examined from the perspective of perceived impact, as recounted by observers within the cultural sector. All measures are based on responses to the CRD organisational survey.

- *Output* examines perceptions of selected outputs of cultural relations activities, including language programmes, opportunities for exposure of the country's culture abroad, and funding for organisations that do not receive support domestically.
- *Outcome* examines more general results in terms of whether expectations were met, the difference cultural relations activities made on different levels, and the broader social, economic and cultural impact such activities had.

**Environment:** Cultural relations do not take place in a vacuum. They and their potential to create value are affected by economic, social and political factors in both host and originating countries. The focus here is on circumstances in the host country where cultural relations activities take place. All measures are based on reliable third-party sources cited as appropriate throughout this report.

- *Economic* takes into account the population's attitudes in relation to culture and the economy and how they affect each other, combined with measures of the population's sense of economic well-being under the assumption that economic stress could constrain cultural relations activities.
- *Social* combines the population's interest in cultural activities and perceptions regarding culture's effects on social well-being and its ability to foster tolerance and understanding as approximations of the potential for cultural relations activities to have uptake and impact. This also includes perceptions of the contribution of social actors such as NGOs and religious organisations to cultural development.
- *Political* includes the extent of certain key freedoms (expression, cultural and academic), the legal environment for cultural activities more generally, the extent of civil society freedom, and the extent to which the government censors traditional media and online activities. These are combined with answers to questions relating to whether culture and education are an important part of international interactions.

Organisational survey statistics are provided in Appendix 1, the survey questionnaire in English is found in Appendix 2, and information on coding for the CRD dimensions is offered in Appendix 4. More details can be found in the CRD methodology paper, available upon request from the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org)).

<i>Vibrancy</i>	<i>Level of Organisation</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Perceived Impact</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusiveness</li> <li>• Variety</li> <li>• Cultural participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• External sustainability</li> <li>• Internal sustainability</li> <li>• Intersectoral communication</li> <li>• Contact with other sectors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Practice</li> <li>• Transfer</li> <li>• Generation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output</li> <li>• Outcome</li> </ul>

*Environment:*

Economic / Social / Political

*Table 1: CRD Dimensions and Subdimensions*

### 3.3 The Cultural Value Model

The Open University's Cultural Value Model (CVM) is designed to research cultural relations *practices and processes*: how cultural relations programmes and projects generate value for stakeholders involved in them. The CVM uses a case study approach - starting from a particular example of cultural relations, it moves its analytical framework from the particularities of the case outwards to more general processes. It does so by comparing and contrasting current and previous cases, conducting documentary analysis and interviews to assess precursors, patterns and principles. Its initial scope is highly focussed but rich in detail, taking into consideration the perspectives of multiple stakeholders, what matters to each of them, what their expectations are and what they imagine success to look like. It complements the CRD approach which moves from the general to the particular, its broad brushstrokes capturing the breadth of cultural relations actors and activities in Egypt and Ukraine. This allows us to situate the particular cases in this wider context.

The CVM operates via a set of participatory workshops that invite all stakeholders involved in a particular programme to articulate and record their expectations at the very outset (or failing that to discuss them retrospectively). The aim is to set clear assessment targets, and agree how success or failure to meet objectives will be measured. This process takes into account the British Council's and Goethe-Institut's own stated aims and objective. The CVM is unusual in inviting a participatory assessment process from diverse perspectives; and it offers a way of visualising impact at a particular moment.

The workshops involve guided group discussions. We also use visual methods. Participants are invited to visually present their ideas in mind maps and rich pictures. These offer insightful depictions of how the group perceived hierarchies and relations of power and

imagines the layout of the field of cultural relations in Ukraine and Egypt (see Appendix 7 and full CVM case study reports).

The workshops were complemented by a series of in-depth, follow-up (individual and small group) expert interviews with ‘insiders’ – key interlocutors who are closely involved in the local or national cultural relations scene (10 in Egypt and 25 in Ukraine; see Appendix 5 for full anonymized interviewee list and questionnaires). This allows us to test and calibrate our findings relating to specific examples in the context of broader perceptions. CVM survey questionnaires further provide opportunities to test and assess our findings beyond the specifics of the case study in hand (see Appendix 6 for CVM surveys, components, questions and scores). Indeed some of our CVM surveys involved over 135 respondents allowing us to combine qualitative and quantitative insights.

## Components of Value

The CVM combines generic components of value drawn from our prior and current research with international cultural relations organisations and international broadcasters (see bibliography for details) but it is adapted for each particular case study. This flexible adaptation has several advantages. It allows for comparisons across cases, places and time but also enables an in-depth analysis of processes involved in particular projects and contexts.

The components of value are grouped into three core *segments* or perspectives: strategic staff, production or delivery teams and users/beneficiaries of programmes. Sometimes the latter two segments may overlap. The CVM assesses how the value of a cultural relations intervention is defined from each of these perspectives. There are of course convergences as well as divergences in what each segment values so we take this into account.

**Strategic:** This segment assesses the value of cultural relations programme or project from the perspective of funders, donors and sponsors. These might be state and/or non-state, commercial actors. This includes British Council or Goethe-Institut management and UK or German government departments.

**Delivery:** This segment deals with aspects of value related to specific organisational and operational factors from the policy and strategy level to the day-to-day implementation of programmes and projects. It takes into account the needs of managers, delivery teams and partners. This includes, for example, teachers/trainers, event organisers and local teams responsible for delivery of projects.

**Users:** This segment deals with the audiences, beneficiaries, citizens and publics that have been targeted in a civil society context or customers and clients in more commercial contexts, as well as cross-overs between these where relevant.

Although the three segments offer distinct perspectives on cultural value, there may be occasions when people involved on the production side of an activity are also its users.

Each segment has core components of value that were identified through the workshop process as being shared by the British Council and Goethe-Institut programmes. The generic components for each segment are described below. Based on preliminary discussions with key members of staff, and an analysis of programme documentation, we summarised the different aspects of value of each cultural relations intervention in a set of preliminary

components. During a first workshop with stakeholders involved in each cultural relations intervention, participants were able to select and redefine these components according to their experiences of and expectations for each programme.<sup>17</sup> The description sets out the benefits that the cultural relations intervention should deliver if it performs to expectations.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Strategic*

<b>Partnerships</b>	The cultural relations activities are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between British Council /Goethe-Institut and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships.
<b>Dialogue</b>	The activities lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding.
<b>Participation</b>	The cultural relations activities target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised amongst the target groups.

#### *Delivery*

<b>Professionalism</b>	Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the cultural relations intervention. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the cultural relations intervention contributes to career development.
<b>Quality</b>	Staff consider content/activities of the cultural relations activities to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget.
<b>Collaboration</b>	There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of cultural relations activities. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally.

#### *Users*

<b>Appreciation</b>	Users praise the quality of outputs=they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The cultural relations activities meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others.
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<sup>17</sup>Workshops enable participants in BC or GI projects to talk about their expectations and experiences, and thus to give us insights into the values that people in different CVM segments attached to those projects. We use what people said in these workshops to check that the draft CVM components incorporate the issues that are most important to each group, and to examine ways in which the generic CVM components can be extended with elements specific to individual projects.

<sup>18</sup>Through a thematic analysis, we grouped feedback into 9 generic components of value. Each of these 9 components has a main definition that is broad enough to fit all case studies and is followed by a specific extension that explains how it fits the particularities of each of the case studies. For the specific definition of each component for each of the different cultural relations activities, see Appendix 6.

<b>Utility</b>	Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the cultural relations activities has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life.
<b>Opportunity</b>	The activities/outputs of the cultural relations activities do not stand in isolation but provide opportunities for development and/or progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment.

## Scoring and Constellations

Scoring each component is an essential part of the CVM process. For each component of value a score is calculated to indicate the extent to which a programme has met, exceeded or failed to meet the expectations and aspirations set out in the component definitions.


The score is expressed as a number ranging from 1 (performance well below expectations) to 7 (performance well above expectations). The range 365 indicates good and sustainable level of performance and is referred to as the ‘Band of Equilibrium’; it sets expectations at a realistic level that takes into account the resources available. It is important to note however that sometimes a score of 7 which exceeds expectations on some components of value is desirable and praise-worthy. Similarly, if a score of 2 is given because resources promised were not forthcoming, then that is understandable and must be discussed by the team. This underscores how the CVM and constellation should not be seen as a definitive evaluation but rather as a device to elicit fruitful discussion and engage stakeholders in a participatory process of assessment at different points in the project journey.

In order to arrive at a score, we turn the definitions into a set of questions against which a score is agreed by stakeholders based on evidence presented. The questions rephrased the generic definitions as well as the specific extensions, so that CVM surveys varied across case studies, while the main components remain the same. The overall score for the component is then calculated by averaging the scores for the separate questions.

Local British Council and Goethe-Institut staff helped distribute the CVM survey and a snow-balling technique was set in place to be able to expand the reach. Participants score each question on a scale from 1 to 7: to reiterate, a score of 4 represents a balanced assessment of sustainably good performance; higher scores indicate areas for which performance was seen as being excellent but perhaps at a level that would not be sustainable in the long term; scores below 3 or 4 indicate that performance was disappointing while 1 or 2 point to a failure of some kind. This may not always be a bad thing, as it may reveal a failure in resources to achieve that goal, or a prioritising of other goals.

The overall scores for components are displayed together in a diagram referred to as a ‘constellation’. This offers a visual depiction of the value of cultural relations programmes and projects based on evidence gathered.

Figure 1 shows a blank constellation.



*Figure 1: CVM Constellation, blank*


The ‘Band of Equilibrium’ is shown as a light blue circle inside the constellations, representing the 3-5 score range. The dark blue inner circle suggests an optimum level of sustainability in most but not necessarily all cases. It is particularly useful when presenting component scores which are an average of more than one value, since there is a tendency for these averages to be closer to the middle.

The Cultural Value Constellation visualises all the scores given by participants in the workshops in a snapshot. There are two sets of scores presented in the diagrams used for each case study:

- scores based on responses to questions asked in CVM **surveys** of managers and stakeholders, project delivery teams and users/participants—in each survey respondents were asked a number of questions related to each component and the scores shown are averages of the question scores (see Appendix 6)=
- scores given by **groups** of people participating in the second wave of workshops—the groups arrived at a single score for each component by consensus.

The first workshop identifies value components. During a second workshop, following a period of data collection, scored constellations are presented to the participants to reflect upon. Some of the participants had already attended the first workshop, while some were new. They were then able to comment on the scores and give feedback. We used these new scores and feedback to triangulate the findings from workshop 1 and the CVM survey. We also created another constellation with the average score that came out of group discussion during workshop 2 that we can read alongside the survey one. The workshop process is as

important as the scored constellations as it is during, the often intense, discussions that expectations, successes and failures are most clearly articulated. This incidental data gives very pertinent insights into cultural relations in action. Figure 2 shows an example of a constellation with the scored components.



*Figure 2: Example of a scored constellation (Active Citizens)*

The blue line shows the average scores from the CVM surveys, the orange line shows the average scores from the second workshops and the orange shading indicates the range (minimum to maximum) of the scores given by the workshop groups ó thus giving an idea of where the main divergences and convergence of valuation occur (see case study section). In figure 2 above, we see an example of a constellation that shows the average scores for each component of value from the survey (in blue) and the average scores from workshop 2 (in orange). The shaded area represents the variations in scores from workshop 2.<sup>19</sup> This is important because it shows a higher divergence and lack of agreement on that score than on others. During the Active Citizens second workshop, for example, there was considerable variation in scores between the groups for most components. For example, the score for Opportunity ranged from 2.5 to 7, as is reflected in the wide shaded area in constellation. By contrast, the score for Dialogue was much the same across all the groups, and therefore has hardly any shaded area, reflecting the fact that all groups gave it a score between 5 and 5.5.

<sup>19</sup> There is no shaded area to represent variations in scores from CVM survey, because it is mostly the case that respondents used the whole 1-7 range of scores, and therefore shaded area would not provide any meaningful explanation. In the case of the group scores, it represents discussions occurring during workshop 2 around more contested values, which are later qualified with the participants comments.

The shaded areas are therefore useful to study if one is interested in areas where agreement was difficult to achieve.

### 3.4 Collaborative synergies

While these distinctive approaches have been both tried and tested in different contexts, combining both has involved an iterative process of co-creation and adaptation of both models tailored specifically to the needs of the project. This kind of flexible adaptation has enabled an agile response to the societies researched, and to the local contexts in which the research takes place. Throughout the research process, the CVM and the CRD methodologies have forged collaborative synergies along the way to ensure that our approaches dovetailed (such as the mapping exercise, selection of case studies and the sharing of qualitative and quantitative data as already explained).

The two approaches complement one another, bringing distinct perspectives to bear on the same research questions. In this way we can build on the advantage of bringing micro and macro cultural relations processes into one framework yielding broader conclusions that are firmly rooted in practices. This fills a yawning gap in the field of cultural relations research that usually adopts either a top down, overly theoretical, empirically-void approach from the perspective of policymakers, or a bottom-up, practitioner perspective that fails to connect with wider structural and political, strategic and policy as well as organisational dynamics. By combining our analysis of quantitative, qualitative and ethnographic data, our two approaches are more than the sum of their parts.

The ethnographic qualitative work done by the Open University helped inform the design of the macro-level data gathering instruments used by the Hertie School of Governance. The qualitative data from CVM workshops fed into the CRD organisational survey at a fairly early stage and helped test concepts and emergent hypotheses. Qualitative and quantitative can act in harmony and mutually inform each other. This was done through an iterative process of reviews and feedback in which academics from both institutions participated.<sup>20</sup>

Using the metaphor of the cultural relations landscape, the CRD seeks to describe the landscape *as a whole* in general terms, examining its *general* distinguishing features and major properties, whereas the CVM seeks to analyse particular elements of the landscape painting in order to understand their intrinsic as well as their instrumental cultural value and how they relate back to the bigger picture. As such our joint approach to the study of cultural relations comes from two different directions: a) the CVM works from inside-out (inside the organisations and the activities), drawing conclusions about the value and impact of cultural relations more generally by starting with several specific cultural relations activities in the

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<sup>20</sup> Throughout the process, the researchers at the Open University and the Hertie School have continually liaised with each other and shared access to their working documents. Also during the data gathering, Open University and the Hertie School shared the qualitative/quantitative data gathered by both institutions. In order to reconcile the findings of the two approaches (CVM and CRD) relating to cultural relations, the researchers of the Open University and the Hertie School have met face-to-face on several occasions. This has allowed us to give each other feedback and plan next steps accordingly to ensure maximum synergy. These intense working meetings were held on December 5<sup>th</sup> 2016, September 11<sup>th</sup> 2017 and 27<sup>th</sup> March 2018.

landscape which represent distinct *types* of cultural relations activities; b) the CRD works from the outside-in (from outside specific organisations and at a societal level), deriving knowledge about the value of cultural relations from more macro-scale surveys, focus groups and secondary data.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The Cultural Value Project is a theoretically informed, methodologically rigorous but pragmatically actionable approach. It goes beyond market research evaluations to engage with the complexities of evaluating culture and eschewing simplistic or reductive assessments of the impact of cultural relations (see literature review). The CVP aims to provide a rich, contextually-grounded analysis of the value of cultural relations activities in Ukraine and Egypt, and a solid first step from which to draw more general conclusions about cultural relations in the international sphere, particularly in relation to ensuring security, stability and prosperity as well as empowering future leaders.

The joint methodology of the CVP provide **scope** and **perspective**. CRD provides a wider context and CVM an in-depth analysis. CVP also offers multiple views by including and considering the opinions of audiences and funders and of cultural relations actors and experts, for example, or by distinguishing between the work of management and practitioners. A plurality perspective is to be taken into account so that expectations and criteria of success are clear and can be evidenced, calibrated and assessed for sustainability.

We also evaluate the relational aspects of the organisations' work and offer a tool of **self-assessment** to look at impact over time. We partly build on British Council's and Goethe-Institut's existing data to ask a different set of questions; to make a broader case quantitatively speaking and a more focused, ethnographically-informed one about the impact of cultural relations on funders, cultural actors, participants and society as a whole.

With its innovative mixed-methods approach, the CVP provides **quantitative** data (larger samples for surveys, secondary data) and **qualitative** data and more detailed **ethnographic** research into reception and impact (not just perceptions of participants and experts, but wider publics and other stakeholders). We offer a 'thick description' of what is already happening (expected and unexpected, explicitly articulated and not) as a consequence of the work of cultural relations. An important goal of the CVP is to understand the **reception** of cultural relations activities among beneficiaries of the programmes, not just to evaluate organisations' objectives understood as outcomes.

It would however be a mistake to assume that the CRD is largely quantitative and therefore more representative, while the CVM is largely qualitative and therefore more insightful. In practice both approaches mix data sets. The CRD maps for example were produced via qualitative insights produced by small groups of local insiders. The CVM workshops were accompanied by CVM surveys involving strategic samples of actors involved in the cultural relations scene.

The CVP is a synergy of the CRD and CVM. It increases our research scope and perspectives and enables us to work on the theory and practice of cultural relations, honing in from the general cultural landscape of each country and its cultural relations context into specific case

studies in order to build up again to test out the methodological framework. The CVP as Methods in Motion should make a significant contribution to current policy and academic debates about the value of international cultural relations in a complex geopolitical and media ecology.

As with all research, we faced a series of methodological and practical challenges. Some of these challenges arose because the CVP is a complex project involving four organisations, and four countries and four languages. CVP was in itself an enactment of cultural relations. Here we identify just three key challenges

- (i) Communicating was complex, multilingual and involved many different actors and dimensions - between the academic researchers, between academics and the cultural relations organisations, and between CVP project members and local staff in Egypt and Ukraine. Further layers of communication requiring translators and interpreters with local users and beneficiaries of projects, strategic staff and diplomatic actors in Egypt and Ukraine.
- (ii) Understanding how different members of the CVP and local staff perceived the project, its purpose and its priorities proved difficult at first and required a good deal of trust-building.
- (iii) Harmonising theoretical and methodological approaches proved difficult at times, as did bringing into dialogue the strengths of quantitative and qualitative data analyses and bringing together a set of robust, reliable joint findings.

## 4 Findings Ukraine

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### 4.1 Context

#### **Transition towards what? Culture, civil society and cultural relations in Ukraine**

Since declaring its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine remains in ‐transition‐ with the question ‐towards what?‐ Over the last two decades, Ukraine has experienced not one, but two ‐revolutions‐ which have attempted to provide an answer to this question. The 2004 Orange Revolution was a wave of mass protests against electoral fraud and manipulations during the presidential elections (Onuch 2014). Although the protests successfully overturned the election result and the pro-Europe candidate won the day, some political and social instability continued. In November 2013, mass protests and civil unrest, referred to as EuroMaidan, were sparked by then-President Yanukovych’s and Prime Minister Azarov’s decision to suspend the signing of the EU Association Agreements (a 2010 campaign promise) and instead seek closer ties with Russia. After three months of protests across the country that were violently repressed by the government’s special operations militia, the Ukrainian president fled the country to Russia and was replaced with a pro-European government in early 2014. What started as an internal political crisis escalated into an international one, as Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and supported (physically and financially) separatists in two oblasts in eastern Ukraine provoking the outbreak of an ongoing conflict in which tens of thousands of people have since been killed<sup>21</sup> and which has resulted in the displacement of some 1.6 million people.<sup>22</sup> The events of 2014 caught Ukrainian and Western policy makers by surprise. The international diplomatic community has struggled to formulate a coherent response. Sanctions have been implemented against Russia, and Cold War-like rhetoric continues, but no solution has been found to the conflict.

But pro-West versus pro-Russia is one of the many issues facing Ukrainians. Modernising forces struggle against more conservative ones. Many institutions and structures, including those related to culture and cultural activities, still bear the imprint of Soviet times and the legacy of state control. Democratic institutions and practices exist and are inscribed in the country’s constitution, but oligarchs are still seen to have more influence and control than they should and corruption remains an issue. While armed conflict still rages in the eastern part of Ukraine, the country grapples with internally displaced people, a not-yet-stable economy, and many other social and economic challenges. And yet, Ukrainians have demonstrated extreme resilience, and expectations of further escalation of war, the rise of nationalism, state failure or economic collapse have not come to pass (Tucker 2018). Furthermore, they have supported moderate policy proposals such as decentralisation, shunned right-wing politicians and parties, and participated in peaceful elections (Hale et al.

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<sup>21</sup> The CIA’s World Factbook (2018) estimates the number at 34,000, but other estimates are lower.

<sup>22</sup> Approximately 800,000 IDPs reside permanently in government-controlled areas, while the rest travel back and forth across the contact line (UNIAN 2017).

2015). Some report indications that civic identity is gaining ground at the expense of ethno-nationalist identity (Onuch et al. 2016; Onuch & Sasse 2016).

On the cultural front, during EuroMaidan, artist groups used live performance and installations to convey their opposition to the regime; musicians led open air concerts across the country; independent online media grew to prominence; top universities like the Kyiv Mohyla Academy hosted an open access public university; protest sites hosted poet hours; and a group of the country's top PR executives started what is Ukraine's first public diplomacy institution, the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre. In the months and years that followed 2014, many top managers, executives, professors and civil society leaders left their private sector jobs to run ministries (Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education), state institutions (Mystetskyi Arsenal, Dovzhenko Centre, Institute of National Memory), and policy think tanks and NGOs (RPR ó Reanimation Packet of Reforms). Thanks to both state and non-state actor investment, the cultural scene and creative industries have flourished since 2014, and in 2017, the Ukrainian government set up its first official cultural diplomacy institution, the Ukrainian Institute.

To better understand the context in which cultural relations takes place and creates value in Ukraine, we first take a closer look at a snapshot of cultural actors (all of them stakeholders), their influence in the cultural scene, their relationships, and their activities. Next, we examine more specifically recent cultural relations programmes, projects, and other activities to identify their key characteristics and linkages. A further step then draws on responses to a CRD survey of Ukrainian cultural actors and on other reliable data sources, as well as the case studies examined using the CVM, to highlight the values held and generated by various stakeholders, outline the way cultural relations works, and explore the potential and actual power of cultural relations to reduce conflict and foster leaders and civil society in Ukraine.

## The cultural scene in Ukraine

Our snapshot of cultural actors in Ukraine in 2017, shown in Figure 3, depicts a diversity of actors sharing space in most of the fields of activity. Moreover, individuals feature prominently within almost all of the functional fields.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, at their respective mapping workshops in late March and early April 2017, experts from the British Council and Goethe-Institut agreed that networks of influential people from different activity fields are the most powerful forces shaping the cultural landscape in Ukraine and that these individuals' reputations are often disconnected from the organisations they work in. Furthermore, the

<sup>23</sup> In fact, in the British Council's cultural actors map for Ukraine, individuals were placed at the centre of the map, with all other actors circling them. Of note, the Ukrainian consultant's own list and map of cultural actors included far fewer individuals and far more organisations. Whose view of the relative strength and influence of individuals vs. organisations in Ukraine is correct? People interviewed as part of the CVM research also provided a mixed picture, but nonetheless all Ukrainian interviewees agreed that in the last 5-10 years institutions have developed significantly and their capacity goes beyond that of individual cultural managers. This seemed to be disconnected from the British Council's and Goethe-Institut's teams' perspective that individuals are paramount in the cultural space in Ukraine and that institutions are near not existent (Unnamed Active Citizens Program Director, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Strategy Team Member 1, German, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Strategy Team Member 2, Ukrainian, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Cultural Diplomacy Insider 1, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 1, Kenan Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018).

networks within Ukraine's cultural scene are considered to be mainly interpersonal, rather than inter-organisational, and institutions are considered by many to be relatively weak. In cultural relations practice, at least in the case of British Council and Goethe-Institut, key individuals are often targeted to initiate collaboration in the expectation that effecting change there will lead to a cascade effect of changes in the institutions with which these people are affiliated.

Ukrainian civil society actors occupy the most space across the map. They are particularly prominent in the bridge builders cluster that includes, among others, youth and cultural centres, cultural foundations, human rights organisations, and other CSOs addressing the needs of the disabled and ethnic minorities. Yet they are also influential and active in the cultural vibrancy, knowledge hub, and cultural policy-making clusters.

State actors co-exist with civil society and other actors in several clusters. Cultural policy-making, for example, is influenced not only by state actors such as the Ministries of Culture and Education, but also nonprofit think tanks, associations, individuals, and civil society bodies pushing for or monitoring reform efforts. The Ministry of Culture is perceived by many as an active contributor to change, but there remains a lack of trust among stakeholders, particularly towards government initiatives (Kern 2017).

Furthermore, the Ukrainian art scene represented by the cultural vibrancy cluster is not starkly divided on the map into separate state and independent groups (see below on the situation in Egypt). State galleries, theatres, and filmmakers work alongside nonprofit or civil society ones, as well as alongside selected commercial actors. Typically, however, state-run actors are criticised for hierarchy, lack of transparency, and orthodoxy -- likely remnants of Soviet times -- while municipal and independent actors have brought in new dynamism, especially in the theatre field (Helly 2014, 6; workshop participants). With the central government's ambition to decentralise many aspects of public administration and service provision, local governments should be providing and financing basic cultural services, including libraries, clubs, museums and theatres (Kern 2017).




Figure 3. Cultural Actors in Ukraine

Foreign actors are also plentiful, certainly some with more influence than others. In addition to the Western European and US embassies, aid agencies and cultural institutes, there is an influential (or numerous) group of actors representing Ukraine's Eastern European neighbours. In particular, close and dense cultural relations with Poland are evident in numerous joint Polish-Ukrainian exhibitions and programmes (Helly 2014, 11).<sup>24</sup> Among the prominent foreign actors involved in Ukraine's cultural scene we also find individuals and the Ukrainian diaspora abroad, which number in the millions and are supported by worldwide organisations such as the Ukrainian World Congress (Helly 2014, 7).<sup>25</sup>

Barely mentioned and not appearing on the cultural actors map are Russian foreign actors. Since the EuroMaidan and the Russian annexation of Crimea and inception of conflict in parts of the Donbas<sup>26</sup> region, the clout of Russia, Russian culture and Russian language has decreased, but it is still worth mentioning. Ethnic Russians are the largest minority in the country,<sup>27</sup> and Russian is the most widely spoken language after Ukrainian; in fact a plurality of Ukrainians are fully bilingual (Kulyk 2011; Onuch et al. 2018). Quiet as they might seem, according to Anheier (2017, 8), between 2010 and 2015 the number of Russkiy Mir Foundation institutes in Ukraine increased from six to eleven before declining again by 2018.

Ukrainian media actors are found in two separate clusters, with prime media within the creative economy cluster and cultural and art-related media within the freedom of expression cluster alongside activists and human rights organisations (Dyczok & Gaman-Golutvina 2009).

Alongside prime media, we find in the creative economy cluster mainly for-profit cultural entities such as publishing houses and crowdfunding platforms, as well as impact hubs and start-ups. Interesting here are the numerous actors in the hospitality and culinary industry, such as especially themed restaurants and pubs in Lviv. Social enterprises that straddle the boundary between the for-profit and civil society sectors are also active in this cluster.

Unique to the Ukrainian cultural actors map is an others cluster which contains actors that do not seem to fit in the other clusters. Some, such as radical political parties and paramilitary groups, can be perceived as nuisances in the cultural field. Also included are individuals, mainly religious leaders, whose influence could not be determined as positive or negative.

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<sup>24</sup> Ties with Poland also have historic roots as western Ukraine was part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, Polish kingdom and the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, so Poles and Ukrainians both lived in what is today western Ukraine (and eastern Poland), competing for influence. This fact of life in Halychyna or Galicia only ended after the forced relocation of Poles from western Ukraine to Poland and Ukrainians from Poland to western Ukraine orchestrated by Stalin after WWII. Following WWII western Ukrainians were also forcibly displaced from the Polish borderlands to northern Poland as part of the Akcja Wisła policy. Currently, Ukrainian residents who can demonstrate polish ethnic ties are able to apply for Karta Polaka which facilitates residence and employment in Poland.

<sup>25</sup> Diaspora were mentioned by Goethe-Institut staff, but not by British Council staff.

<sup>26</sup> The Donbas includes Luhansk and Donetsk oblasti in Ukraine.

<sup>27</sup> According to last available National Census of 2001 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001) ethnic Russians represent 17.3% of the general population.

Among the notable differences between the maps created by the two cultural institutes, British Council and Goethe-Institut, and that created by the project's local consultant (Yaroslav Minkin) we can mention the absence of ethnic minority groups and their associations on the British Council and Goethe-Institut maps. Furthermore, while individuals were also included in the local consultant's map, organisations were the main focus. This difference (as was suggested by numerous insiders interviewed in Kyiv) could indicate a slight underestimation of the organisational strength and capacity of Ukrainian actors on the part of the cultural institutes.<sup>28</sup> Whether or not this is the case, it is noteworthy and something to watch out for in the future. On the other hand, some at the expert workshops mentioned that individual leaders were generally more trusted than organisations.

Nevertheless, the final snapshot synthesising the lists and maps of the three independent creator teams reveals a diverse cultural actors scene in Ukraine and therefore a broad spectrum of stakeholders with sometimes varying priorities and perceptions of value. Civil society actors occupy the most space in this snapshot, in many clusters sharing room and roles with state actors. Foreign actors also have a prominent position. Notably, well-connected individuals are seen as influential throughout the cultural scene, in a sense tying it together and presenting clear targets for the foreign cultural actors in their programming. In light of the differences among the map creators, however, the focus on individuals might come at the expense of overlooking organisational actors.

## The cultural relations scene

To examine cultural relations more closely, we examined with the help of a local consultant a broad range of cultural relations activities that took place or were ongoing during the period 2015 to 2017. In the absence of a complete database of all such activities, we selected 46 that seemed most representative of the main types and variety of programmes, projects and events in Ukraine during that period. In a next step, we grouped them into types and clusters according to similarities to try to detect patterns. The visualisation of the result of this process can be found in Appendix 2.

The distinguishing features of the five main clusters include:

- **Programmes mainly directed towards the general public.** Five of the 10 events in this cluster, including major festivals (e.g., Zaxidfest and Republic), are classified as 'prime events' because they both seek a large audience and entail high costs. Most of the

<sup>28</sup> This was referenced in numerous interviews: Unnamed Cultural Diplomacy Insider 1, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 1, Kenan Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 2, Foreign Cultural Institute, and EUNIC Member, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 3, Involved in Literature, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 7, Mystetskyi Arsenal, Informal Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Cultural Manager 9, Renaissance Foundation, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Cultural Manager 11, Ukrainian Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Curator and Artist, works closely with various German and British cultural institutions, Interview Kyiv, January 2018; Unnamed Journalist, Hromadske TV, Interview Kyiv, January 2018

programmes in this cluster involve performance and celebration, while several have no foreign partner (e.g., International Art Festival Carpathian Space) or no local partner (e.g., Le Printemps Français 2016), the rest involve cooperation between local and foreign organisations.

- **Programmes which have one or more foreign partners and seek to generate broader value beyond arts and culture.** While five of the programmes target professionals with some kind of education component (e.g., 3x3 and Eastern Partnership Culture and Creativity), typically without a local partner, seven are aimed at the general public, such as ‘Good bye Lenin?’<sup>29</sup> and the Smart Living Challenge.
- **Niche programmes**, such as Luhansk’s ART & FACTs, which seek narrower, professional target audiences with more moderate budgets, focus mainly on the arts and cultural activities, and often involve more than one foreign partner.
- A smaller cluster of **cultural programmes aimed at the general public which bring together either more than one local partner or more than one foreign partner**. They can be conceptualised as medium-sized projects which serve to reach a moderately sized audience.
- **Projects aimed at broader value creation, mostly involving education/training or community and civil society development.** Most involve foreign partners.

A majority of these cultural relations activities revolve around broader value generation in general, and education in particular. This fact could be evidence that cultural relations actors in Ukraine, such as the British Council and Goethe-Institut, have significant latitude in setting up value-centric programmes, as opposed to merely supporting performances. This could enable them to have a larger leverage to have a positive impact on the societal and political transformations that are underway in Ukraine at the moment.

Moreover, a large share of these cultural relations activities target professionals and not only the general public. Possibly, this is a reflection of the Ukrainian cultural scene in Ukraine, which is perceived to be influenced at least as much by individuals as institutions. This ties in with the general strategy of the British Council: by targeting key individuals and using them as multipliers, cultural relations institutes can effect change throughout large networks of cultural actors and civil society organisations.


## The state of cultural relations: capacity, environment, implementation

Having provided an overview of cultural actors and the cultural relations scene, we now take a closer look at how cultural relations take place in Ukraine by way of a snapshot capturing five dimensions, each discussed in turn below. This snapshot, visualised in the Cultural Relations Diamond in Figure 4, reflects subjective responses to the Hertie School’s online organisational survey administered to Ukrainian cultural actors from February to May 2018,<sup>29</sup> as well as data from other reliable sources, including, among others, Freedom House and V-Dem, and expert opinions offered at two workshops held in Kyiv (see Appendix 1 for workshop statistics; more

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<sup>29</sup> See Appendix 1 for survey statistics and Appendix 3 for the survey questionnaire.

information on workshop proceedings can be made available by the Hertie School team; contact Regina List: [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org)).




*Figure 4: Cultural Relations Diamond: Ukraine*

The overall results, depicted in the cultural relations diamond (see Figure 4), show moderate results for the dimensions *level of organisation*, *vibrancy of cultural relations*, and *external environment*, a slightly higher result for the dimension *perceived impact*, and high results for the dimension *values*.

#### *Level of organisation*

When looking at the perceived effect of cultural relations or international cultural organisations on the capacity of cultural actors to sustain their operations, pursue their goals, and develop their potential, the Ukrainian cultural scene shows a moderate level of organisation overall, as reflected in Figure 4. The score combines indicators of internal and external sustainability, inter-sectoral communication, and contact or collaboration with other societal sectors (all derived from the Hertie School organisational survey) to approximate how cultural relations affects selected organisational capacities.



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 5: Benefits of cooperating with international cultural organisations, Ukraine (% of organisations answering 'to a moderate extent' and 'to a great extent' to each question; multiple answers possible)*

Ukrainian organisations involved in cultural relations that responded to the Hertie School survey see such activities as fostering both their internal and external sustainability. As shown in Figure 5, financial support in particular is considered by nearly 80% of cultural relations-active respondents as a key benefit of cooperation with cultural relations institutes, as is learning new professional skills (68%). More generally among all survey respondents, the great majority saw the presence of cultural relations organisations as having a positive effect on their ability to work, with 55% indicating that cultural relations organisations open up new opportunities for their organisations and 29% seeing cultural relations organisations as supporting their organisations in meeting their goals. In terms of external sustainability, 78% of cultural relations-active respondents perceived that cooperation with cultural relations organisations brought more interest from the general public, and 69% reported better outreach. Indeed, cultural relations activities seem to enhance both the capacity of Ukrainian organisations to conduct their programmes in the present and their potential for the future.


Somewhat less so, but still important are the opportunities for networking with similar organisations within and outside of Ukraine. Some 64% of cultural relations-active respondents saw enhanced networking within the country as a benefit, and 55% reported opportunities for networking with like-minded organisations in other countries in a similar light. In a country where networks already play such an important role, as noted above, these findings indicate room for potential improvement in already strong sectoral communication.

Building collaboration with other sectors is seen as less of a clear benefit or, perhaps, priority. Opportunities to work with the for-profit sector were marked by only 22% of respondents as a benefit of working with cultural relations organisations. By contrast, however, some 40% saw opportunities to work with state agencies as a bonus, reflecting at least openness to collaborate. Though the survey results do not tell us the reason behind these perceptions, we can speculate that, if stakeholders are open to improving cooperation, there is potential here to engage businesses and state actors more fully in the work of Ukrainian cultural relations organisations.

In sum, the organisational capacities of Ukraine's cultural actors can be considered moderate with some room for improvement. Among the four subdimensions for level of organisation, external sustainability, in the sense of building audiences and laying the groundwork for the future by generating interest and improving outreach, is the strongest. The weakest subdimension is contact with other sectors, which, if desired, shows plenty of potential for engaging business and state actors. In between these are internal sustainability, relating to financial and skill capacities, and intra-sectoral communication. Scores for both subdimensions fall near 60, indicating that cultural relations actors in the Ukraine are doing relatively well, but, as indicated by experts participating in workshops, can strengthen several aspects.

### *Vibrancy*

The assumption behind this dimension of the CRD is that cultural relations will be more successful in general when cultural relations activities themselves address a wider public across diverse fields and where people have access to and engage in culture and the arts. As reflected in Ukraine's Cultural Relations Diamond (see Figure 4), there is some room for improvement on this dimension, which combines responses to the Hertie School organisational survey related to inclusiveness and variety of cultural relations activities with responses to several questions relating to cultural participation and access from two waves of the 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer (European Commission 2016a; 2016b).



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 6. International cultural organisations... (Ukraine)*

In terms of the inclusivity of cultural relations activities in Ukraine, the impression is quite mixed. As shown in Figure 6, while nearly half (47%) of all Ukrainian cultural actors responding to the Hertie School survey reported that cultural relations organisations tend to cooperate on projects benefiting a variety of vulnerable groups, a slightly larger share (49%) believed that this cooperation took place mostly with high-profile organisations and focused mainly in the capital or big cities.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, some 43% indicated that cultural relations organisations support activities that are mostly aimed at the most educated and/ or wealthiest audiences.<sup>31</sup> These findings reflect impressions from expert workshops in which participants suggested that a considerable number of Ukrainians might not have the human capital, geographic access (especially rural vs. urban), or awareness to engage with cultural relations organisations and related activities. Furthermore, the desire to reach a large audience and get as much ‘bang for the

<sup>30</sup> That the activity focuses on cities might be explained in part by the impression that Ukrainian cultural innovation and connections with the outside world are taking place in cities rather than at the national level (Helly 2014, 6). For example, there exists an active Ukrainian network of cities involved in the Intercultural Cities programme.

<sup>31</sup> Note that for calculating the aggregate score for the inclusiveness subdimension, the coding of responses to questions that indicated exclusivity was reversed, essentially measuring the share of respondents that disagreed with the negative statements.

buckøas possible was mentioned as a reason that some cultural relations organisations focus their activities mostly on the big cities, where their projects can generate visibility.

When asked about which particular population groups were targeted by cultural relations activities, 80% of cultural relations-active survey respondents pointed to young people, and about 60% to students. Further down the list of target groups were migrants, refugees and internally displaced people (38%), women (35%), senior citizens (35%) and ethnic minorities (25%). People with little income, little education or no job were the target audience for less than 15% of cultural relations projects. The primary focus on young people and students may well be a reflection of the general goals of many international cultural relations organisations as they seek to educate and build future leaders or even specific annual objectives, since we only asked respondents about programmes carried out jointly in 2017. Yet, local experts cautioned that this focus might mean that cultural relations underexploits the potential of middle-aged Ukrainians to contribute to cultural exchange, which is especially important since the generation that grew up in Soviet Ukraine brings more social and economic capital as well as their own unique perspectives that should be represented in cultural relations.

The very strong focus on young people and students as the target audience (at least in 2017) is consistent with the type of projects in which responding organisations cooperated with international cultural relations organisations: More than half (52%) reported working on education, training and research programmes. The 50% that reported programmes related to performance and celebration may also have had youth as the primary, but certainly not only target. Interestingly, some 37% mentioned community service, civil society development, and protection of vulnerable groups as among the cultural relations activities in which they engaged. This is rather remarkable since these would not typically be the primary goals of cultural relations, but rather fostering cultural exchange and awareness of foreign cultures. In general, the fields of activity are relatively diverse and balanced.

The impression held by some survey respondents and local experts that cultural relations activities are geared toward a narrower range of audiences contrasts with a more generally accessible cultural scene in Ukraine. In a 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer (European Commission 2016b), a general population survey, well over half of Ukrainian respondents reported that access to cultural activities such as visiting historical monuments or museums or attending a play or concert was fairly or very easy. Access to public libraries was particularly easy, according to 89% of respondents. Only attending a ballet or opera was considered more difficult. Despite the perception of easy access, actual participation in such activities was less widespread in 2014. Though about two-thirds of respondents reported reading a book or watching cultural programmes on TV, only one-third visited a monument, attended a concert or watched a film in a cinema at least once during the year in question. These relatively lower levels of cultural participation might mean a relatively narrow band of possible participants for the activities organised in cooperation with or by cultural relations organisations.

Thus, along the vibrancy dimension of the CRD, Ukraineøs cultural relations scene lies just beyond the middle (on a scale of 0 to 100). The variety of cultural relations activities being undertaken by survey respondents is the strong point here. While the population enjoys relatively

good access to cultural sites and events, rates of actual engagement with culture are somewhat lower. The relative weak point, though still near the middle ground, relates to the inclusiveness of cultural relations activities and the perception of some that they are not reaching the broadest audiences possible.

### *Values*

As shown in the CRD (see Figure 3), the Ukrainian cultural relations scene is perceived to uphold, transfer and generate a high level of values. This image is drawn mainly on the basis of responses to questions in the Hertie School organisational survey relating to what is important to cultural actors (practice), how values are shared (transfer), and what their work contributes (generate).

When asked what is important to their respective organisations, the full set of survey respondents reported practicing a diverse range of values. Most important to Ukrainian organisations were providing an outlet for creativity, bringing different people together, fostering education, and sharing ideas, each marked by more than 30% of all survey respondents. Least important was encouraging people to imagine the world differently.<sup>32</sup>

Ideally, cultural relations activities foster mutual understanding and the sharing of values rather than their unilateral transmission from one culture to another. The vast majority of Ukrainian CRD survey respondents (88%) agreed that the presence of international cultural relations organisations in Ukraine indeed served to build bridges between Ukraine and other countries (see Figure 6). Moreover, 75% agreed that such organisations contribute to the development of civil society and support future leaders, a finding that coincides with the modus operandi of many cultural relations institutes, especially the British Council, to engage future leaders and young professionals in networks, empowering them and equipping them with skills so that they might instil change within their own organisations.

A large majority of respondents also consider themselves as contributors to and thus generators of value. Perhaps not surprisingly, 86% of all Hertie School survey respondents agreed that the cultural activities offered by their organisations contributed to cultural innovation and development. Interestingly, even though only 56% of respondents reported being involved in cultural relations, over two-thirds of all Ukrainian survey respondents saw their cultural work as leading to more and deeper international relationships. It is likely that Ukrainian cultural organisations already engage in some form of exchange of ideas and culture without the involvement of cultural relations organisations or that they perceive their activities as involving foreign values and artists, which makes them contribute to international understanding in some form.

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<sup>32</sup> While the overall levels for each of the ‘important’ values are lower for Ukraine than for Egypt (see the findings on Egypt below), this does not mean that Ukrainian organisations are less value oriented. It means rather that the organisations were more selective in what is important to them. Because the distribution of values is more uniform on aggregate for Ukraine, the score for this question is higher.

It would be a surprise if cultural actors in Ukraine did not perceive themselves as practicing, transferring or generating value. Yet, those that responded to the Hertie School survey were still somewhat modest. They see themselves more clearly practicing values (the strongest score) than generating values (lowest subdimension score, though still near 80), especially in terms of leading to better international relations. As noted above, however, barely half of the cultural actors that responded to the survey are engaged in cultural relations, and thus this ‘weakness’ tells a more positive story of a cultural scene in Ukraine that is aware of such broader values and goals.

### *Perceived Impact*

To have some – however imperfect – measure of the impact of cultural actors and cultural relations activities, the Hertie School survey asked organisations involved in the cultural scene to share their subjective perceptions of the impact of the cultural relations activities they were involved in and of international cultural organisations more generally. As shown above in Figure 3, the Cultural Relations Diamond, Ukrainians perceived a moderate level of impact overall in terms of output and outcome.

In terms of output, among all Ukrainian CRD survey respondents, nearly 80% agreed that cultural relations organisations provide high quality language and educational programmes (see Figure 6). Only 58% thought that international cultural relations organisations supported programmes that were unlikely to be supported by domestic institutions. Though survey responses do not elaborate on an explanation, this could be a reflection of a more favourable environment for cultural relations in Ukraine that requires fewer alternative supporters; or it could be a sign that cultural relations organisations tend to support organisations that already receive attention domestically.


The perception of reciprocal impact is not very strong: only 37% of all CRD survey respondents believed that international cultural relations organisations provide opportunities for the exposure of Ukrainian culture abroad. This finding might be a matter of priorities and expectations on the part of different stakeholders. While the primary aim of international cultural organisations is generally to promote awareness of their own country’s culture, some such as the British Council and the Goethe-Institut also seek to enable mutual exchange and learning between the UK/Germany and their host countries. Sometimes, however, as will be mentioned in later case studies, organisations and individuals in the host country expect cultural relations activities to offer more opportunities to expose their cultures elsewhere.

Among those organisations responding to the Hertie School survey who are active in cultural relations programmes, more than three-quarters were either somewhat or very satisfied with the social and cultural impact of those programmes. Given that survey responses are anonymised, this is a relatively humble assessment, but shows that cultural relations actors themselves see room for having even greater impact.

When looking then at the outcome of cultural relations activities and how they made a difference, 85% of Ukrainian survey respondents active in cultural relations reported that the activities they had conducted in 2017 together with international cultural organisations had met

their expectations, whatever those were (see Figure 7). Assessments of the difference those programmes had made were more modest. Though two-thirds (66%) of organisations thought the projects had an impact on other similar organisations, fewer perceived impact on the general public (59%) or in the arts community (47%). Reflecting the perception of the broader set of respondents, a mere 32% thought that the cultural relations programmes in which they were involved in Ukraine made any difference at the international level. To put this latter finding in perspective, however, only 31% of all organisations that were surveyed stated that their work is international in scope, narrowing down the number of organisations whose work could realistically have an international impact.

Thus, among organisations involved in cultural relations and other organisations responding to the Hertie School survey in Ukraine, the perception of the impact of their work and of international cultural organisations is somewhat reserved. Outcomes, i.e. whether the activities made a difference, were more favourably considered than outputs, including providing alternative support and exposure of Ukrainian culture abroad, with a bright spot being the quality of language and educational programmes. All this means that there is considerable potential for enhancing the impact of cultural relations in Ukraine.



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 7. Joint project outcomes, Ukraine*

## *Environment*

As shown by the circle surrounding the centre of the CRD (see Figure 3), the overall environment for the cultural scene and, in particular, cultural relations activities in Ukraine is somewhat favourable (more so than in Egypt, as will be seen below), but still has some room for improvement. This dimension takes into account the economic, social and political context, drawing on desk research and data from population surveys (e.g. Neighbourhood Barometer, Gallup World Poll) and other well-known indicator data sets from the US Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and Freedom House among others as described below.

In some senses, the economic environment in Ukraine is not entirely favourable for culture and cultural relations. Ukrainians responding to a 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer poll (European Commission 2016b) were not convinced that private banks and for-profit companies contributed to the country's cultural development. Only domestic banks were seen by more than half of respondents as important contributors. But that 2014 poll took place before a wave of bank bankruptcies wiped out the accounts of many civil society organisations (USAID 2017, 244) and likely of many individuals and corporations. Despite the government's stated intent to encourage corporate sponsorship of the arts and culture, corporate support for civil society organisations more generally was seen to have declined due to economic crisis (USAID 2017, 245).

While economic actors are not seen to contribute much to cultural development, cultural activities were indeed considered by 78% of Ukrainians in 2014 to contribute to the country's economic development. These attitudes exist(ed) in a somewhat difficult economic context, with 44% of Ukrainians saying they find it difficult or very difficult to get by on current income, whereas 40% reported they "get by" and only 13% said they lived comfortably with their income (Gallup Inc. 2018). Looking at the perception of Ukrainians where they stand now and, in the future, the picture is a bit worse still. In 2017, 34% of Ukrainians said they were "suffering," 52% said they were "struggling" and only 13% said they were "thriving." While these numbers had improved slightly from the 2016 iteration of the Gallup poll, the self-perceived economic situation of Ukrainians now is much worse than it was 10 years ago. Things seem to be looking up for the Ukrainian economy in general, with signs of recovery and projected strengthening growth in the future. In 2016, Ukrainian GDP grew by a modest 2.3% after suffering a large contraction of 16% total in the two years prior (World Bank 2018a). Considering the not-so-favourable economic conditions, the perceived positive economic impact of cultural relations could open another angle for gathering attention and funding.

Despite the challenging economic environment, the social basis and environment is relatively more favourable. Despite somewhat lower cultural participation rates mentioned earlier as a sign of vibrancy, Ukrainians in 2014 were fairly or very interested in a wide range of cultural activities, especially watching or listening to cultural programmes on TV or radio and reading books (European Commission 2016b). Attending concerts and visiting a historical monument were also of interest to more than 50% of Ukrainians. Cultural relations organisations could exploit the discrepancy between cultural participation rates and interest by making concerted efforts to activate Ukrainians through their programmes and thereby tap into new audiences.

A very positive sign of the potential for culture and cultural relations is that the great majority (83%) of Ukrainians (at least in 2014) believed that cultural activities contributed to the social well-being of the country (even higher than the percentage of those who thought they contributed to economic development). An even larger share (90%) thought that culture and cultural exchanges could play a role in developing greater understanding and tolerance (European Commission 2016b). On the other hand, NGOs and religious organisations are seen by less than 40% of Ukrainians as contributing to cultural development. This rather underwhelming view of NGOs and religious organisations might be the result of the relatively lower visibility of NGOs active in the cultural field. Furthermore, Ukrainians might not perceive what NGOs and CSOs actually do: for example, they might not consider art collectives and festival organisers as NGOs.

The political environment in Ukraine is rather favourable to cultural relations (significantly more so than in Egypt, as we will show below), but still not optimal. In the first place, we assume that the environment for cultural relations is shaped by attitudes that consider culture and education to be an important part of international interactions. As an example, while Ukrainians believed in 2014 that the EU should play a greater role in culture (54% of them) and, in particular, education (66%), only 20% thought culture and education was the most important area of cooperation and a mere 7% thought more aid should be devoted to it (European Commission 2016b). Apparently, it would be nice, but does not top the list of priorities, which is understandable given greater economic and other needs. These numbers should not give cause for too much worry, though, as they ask specifically about cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union, but not directly about individual countries that might be cultural relations partners.

More important in many senses is the country's governance and its support for (or restrictions on) how people and organisations engage in and with culture and, in particular, cultural relations. For example, Ukrainian laws and practices related to freedom of expression, including cultural expression, are assessed as somewhat favourable, but still lacking in comparison with other countries studied within V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2017). The working environment for civil society organisations engaged in culture and other fields is freer than, for example, in Egypt (see below), but not entirely free from state control. The environment saw some improvements for civil society action, at least in 2016, including reduction of the cost of and barriers to registration and elimination of the need to request permission for peaceful assembly (USAID 2017). Looking at the V-Dem scores for freedom of cultural expression and government control of CSO entry and exit, Ukraine falls in the 40<sup>th</sup> percentile of all countries covered by V-Dem. Similar scores are given to government censorship of the media. In contrast, the government exercises relatively little control over the internet. Similarly, Ukraine's repression of civil society groups is below the average of all countries in the V-Dem data set.

All in all, the environment in which cultural relations takes place in Ukraine is somewhat positive, especially in terms of attitudes toward the contributions cultural activities can make to society and interest in culture. Economic difficulties weigh on the population and the cultural scene and on civil society actors more generally. The political context, though favourable in some senses and improving in others, is not as open and free of constraints as might be desired.

## 4.2 Case Studies

### Case study selection

The selection of case studies for Ukraine is informed by our key research questions and several sources and criteria: the cultural relations map; the literature review; guidance of regional experts; and advice from the British Council and Goethe-Institut local staff in Kyiv. We sought to identify case studies that might illustrate and exemplify different types of cultural relations and different ways of working developed by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut in Ukraine. We also had to select case studies that were viable in terms of the nature, scope and scale within the resources granted for the project and the CVM process. Criteria for the selection included highlighting the differences in the working of the British Council and the Goethe-Institut in Ukraine; looking to complement other case studies, by representing different types of cultural relations activities in terms of audiences, reach, topic and the involvement of one or more local partners; and to satisfy the interests of local British Council and Goethe-Institut staff by selecting case studies which are of heightened interest to them.

Based on findings of the cultural relations mapping in combination with the regional strategy of the Goethe-Institut,<sup>33</sup> the focus of the Goethe-Institut in Kyiv seems to be in mediating in dialogues between German and Ukrainian artists, developing networks between foreign cultural institutions and local artists and supporting the exchange between Europe and Eastern European societies. After an iterative process that involved Goethe-Institut local staff, they suggested, Luhansk& ART & FACTs which is a programme within the cluster of visual arts/crafts/media, directed at the general public, prestige project with more than one foreign partner and one local partner (see cultural relations map above). Also based on findings of the cultural relations mapping in combination with the regional strategy of the British Council, the selection of Active Citizens (again, suggested by the local British Council staff in Ukraine) is based on the focus on strengthening civil society and empowering future leaders. It is a broader value programme, aimed at the general public and with foreign and more than one local partner (see cultural relations map above).

It must be noted that the programmes selected as case studies to address our research questions were not specifically designed to address those questions so may be successful at fulfilling alternative goals. Furthermore, not all stakeholders share the same objectives. The CVM offers all participants a chance to set their own objectives and expectations for the programme through a discussion on the meaning of the components of value. Many of the findings outlined in the following sections are not related specifically to our research questions, but are important to the stakeholders involved and therefore to the programme/project and our research. The section at the end of each case study summarises the implications of findings for our research questions.

For each of the following two case studies, we therefore explain their importance for understanding the overall research questions, we summarise the findings and recommendations

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<sup>33</sup> The priorities of the GI are taken from the GI Kyiv& website at <https://www.goethe.de/ins/ua/de/ueb/auf.html> (accessed May 2nd, 2017)

coming out of the analysis done through the CVM and we highlights the implications for understanding the value of cultural relations for different stakeholder, their relationship with promoting stability and prosperity and their role in empowering future leaders and civil society.

## Case Study 1: Active Citizens & British Council

British Council's Active Citizens is a social leadership programme that promotes intercultural dialogue and social responsibility as key leadership competencies in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Active Citizens Global Toolkit 2017). It has been operational since 2009, having trained over 240,000 people in 68 countries and worked with 971 partner organisations. Active Citizens have launched 9,305 social action projects around the world (see: <https://www.britishcouncil.org/active-citizens>).

The programme works with a global network of partner organisations who are responsible for delivering the programme locally. The aims of the project and its benefits are described by the British Council in the following way: partners recruit facilitators to attend Active Citizens training. Facilitators have experience in connecting and inspiring the community to learn, share and take action together. Facilitators then cascade the training within their communities.

Together, those that have received the training are known as Active Citizens. It is intended that these Active Citizens develop new skills, knowledge and motivation to work with their communities. The aims are to build trust and take meaningful social action. Active Citizens communities connect globally through workshops, study visits, partner networking, online resources and social media. They share experiences, build skills and generate ideas for social action. As an adaptive programme, Active Citizens can work at scale through a variety of funding models and as a key component of wider initiatives in different country contexts.

In Ukraine, according to the British Council, the project is focused on working with youth in developing behaviour and skills which promote intercultural dialogue and conflict resolution across the whole of Ukraine, and others affected specifically by the conflict in the East of Ukraine. Working in partnership with local organisations, British Council in Ukraine trains facilitators, who can then apply for seed funding for projects that they themselves initiate at the local level, across Ukraine. British Council is very clear that it is for individuals and groups to identify local problems to solve and that local communities should not only be beneficiaries but also be active citizens involved in this process. Through these projects, further social leadership skills and experience are cascaded across all regions in Ukraine with the aim of forging a national network of Active Citizens.

### *What is Active Citizens a case study of?*

First, Active Citizens works through an interesting hybrid cascade-network model of cultural relations. Participants can become facilitators themselves and therefore become brokers between British Council and local communities, communicating and enacting civil society values through local projects; skills are cascaded across projects and regions. At the same time, they seek to expand the network by training others and initiating new projects. It is an emergent, flexible

multiplying cultural relations model, but it depends on a degree of planning and oversight to ensure standards are met and a diversity of projects go ahead. Projects receive only short-term funding: individuals get 4.5 days training and partners get relatively low levels of funding, compelling Active Citizens to seek other donors and partners if they wish their projects to be sustainable, which is often difficult.<sup>34</sup>

Second, the Active Citizens programme in Ukraine seeks to empower young people by building trust and understanding in a context of conflict. It functions as a laboratory to illuminate the kinds of projects that young people feel are necessary to address issues that they care about. While some of these may be related to political conflict others seek to reduce social conflicts. Active Citizens allows participants to set the agenda for civil society. It is important to mention that the programme does not specifically focus on countering conflict, even though over the years it has been delivered with a wide range of audiences in diverse communities, including in fragile and conflict-affected settings. For example, Active Citizens are also finding solutions to support universities displaced by the conflict in the east of the country.

Globally, the programme follows a core methodology, which is used flexibly in different country contexts in response to needs and priorities. In Ukraine, the programme was not perceived by those interviewed as seeking to achieve pre-ordained, large-scale objectives. As one workshop participant noted, *‐what concerns higher visions—multiculturalism, inclusiveness, it is all wonderful, but this programme is not focused on such big-scaled topics‐* If Ukraine can be characterised as a *‐society in transition‐* Active Citizens does not seek to steer that transition in the direction of concrete geopolitical or diplomatic goals and so allows for genuine mutuality of interests to be identified. Active Citizens manage to negotiate idealism and pragmatism in local projects aimed at recycling rubbish or upcycling clothes, or setting up local social enterprises.<sup>35</sup>

CVM workshops were well attended by different groups of Active Citizens:

*Facilitators* have already been trained by the British Council and act as trainers and mediators between British Council and civil society groups. They can initiate and pursue their own projects.

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<sup>34</sup> According to the British Council, it is in response to Ukrainian local authorities placing a stronger focus on youth issues that the Active Citizens programme also seeks to equip young people with the skills to secure government funding for social action projects in their communities. Through a series of social action competitions, supported by the British Council and local authorities throughout Ukraine, some youth activists take up the opportunities to pitch their ideas for social action. It is intended that participants gain the necessary project design and pitching skills they need for success. So far, 16 events have led to more than 140 projects receiving government funding, supporting greater social cohesion and stability in communities (Active Citizens Annual Report 2016-2017). However, the participants in our workshops still noted the difficulties in accessing funding beyond the scope of the programme.

<sup>35</sup> For stories about the lasting impact from the global Active Citizens programme, including on how the programme works to support universities displaced by the conflict in the east of Ukraine, please refer to our Annual Report 2016-2017. <https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/annual-report-2016-17.pdf>

*Beneficiaries* come from different regions in Ukraine. They are involved in the ground work of setting up projects in their local communities and as they do so they receive training to become Active Citizens.


There is a blurred boundary between facilitators who deliver training on Active Citizens programmes and beneficiaries who are receiving training. For this reason in our summary of findings below we combine users and delivery teams. This is consistent both with the ethos of the programme and with the self-perception of users. In this sense Active Citizens is quite unique among our case studies where clearer boundaries prevail from the ICO delivering a programme and its local users.

*Activists* also attended the workshops. Most had not been able to secure British Council funding for various reasons – including a lack of training.

The workshop organisers separated these groups to work together on different tables to enable their distinctive perspectives to emerge. Several British Council staff working on Active Citizen were also present. The workshops offered Active Citizens the chance to express their views as well as hear from the British Council staff who manage the programme. Participants engaged with our questions and discussions were intense, providing good feedback about the Active Citizens programme. The different views of all stakeholders are represented in the summary of findings below.

#### *Constellation for Active Citizens*

As described in Section 5.3 above, we calculate a score for each Component of Value, using data from different stakeholder perspectives collected in workshops and CVM surveys. The constellation below summarises the scores given to each value component. In subsequent sections we interpret and analyse these findings.



*Figure 8. Constellation for Active Citizens. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.<sup>36</sup>*

<sup>36</sup> Survey scores come from CVM surveys carried out amongst managers and delivery teams/users. Because of the nature of the project it was not possible to make a clear distinction between delivery and users. Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and five questions per component. Response levels were relatively high: there were three Strategic responses and 132 Delivery/Users. The group scores come from six workshop groups. By contrast, the score for Dialogue was much the same across all the groups. It should be noted that the average scores from the surveys mask a wide range of individual responses which cannot easily be summarised in a chart. For the group scores, we have added a shaded area in each constellation that represents the range of scores given by groups, of which the constellation score is the average. There was considerable variation in scores between the groups for most components. For example, the score for Opportunity ranged from 2.5 to 7, as is reflected in the shaded area. By contrast, the score for Dialogue was much the same across all the groups, and therefore has hardly any shaded area. Overall there were clear similarities between the assessment of the AC programme in the first and second workshop (see methodology section above).

## *Summary of findings<sup>37</sup>*

- The evaluation of the programme as a whole was highly positive, with most participants overwhelmingly showing *appreciation* for the *opportunities* to develop skills and know-how.
- There is a broad *alignment of goals* between strategic and delivery teams, facilitators, trainers and users but this remains fragile.
- British Council strategic staff seek to enable Active Citizens groups to become self-sustaining and flourish with eventual autonomy but in practice this does not always work due to lack of resources in local context.<sup>38</sup>
- The critiques that arose were consistent: the need for further career and *professional* development, networking opportunities and better channels of information and communication during and after projects have ended.

## *Users and delivery*

- Users generally showed great appreciation for the many *opportunities* created for them and their local communities but urged for greater sustainability.
- Facilitators express the desire and need for more training, and for a second stage of *professionalisation* within the Active Citizens community.
- Participants' high expectations for further training or more *sustainable* funding suggest that the parameters of Active Citizens was not clear to them in terms of the limited start-up funding available.
- Different types of beneficiaries reported different levels of *appreciation* of Active Citizens:
- Active Citizens *facilitators and managers* ó mostly from central Ukraine ó have developed a close network and are personally attached to programme, which they see as very valuable to their career development. Their key interest is to increase networking opportunities and support the systems that enable their ongoing work.
- The *trained participants who won grants* for local initiatives explained that their work and involvement in the programme relies on their own motivation and capacity. They would like to receive more support from the British Council for further training and career development. They questioned whether the programme impacted on their status as active citizens

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<sup>37</sup> Findings presented in this research should be interpreted in the context of the Active Citizens programme delivery in Ukraine and not in other countries.

<sup>38</sup> According to the British Council, the need to provide more support for social action projects to become more sustainable has been recognised as one of the current priorities for the global programme and is being addressed in the revised Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, which was launched in April 2018 with the aim of enabling rigorous qualitative and quantitative monitoring and evaluation data over the programme lifetime to be captured. The new Theory of Change includes an Active Citizens sphere of influence and control incorporating Core Active Citizens and Tailored support, working with/across Active Citizens, Facilitators, Partners, Communities and State and Society. However, the limitations of staff time should be taken into consideration when discussing further support to projects.

suggesting that they were already active citizens and that the programme benefitted from them. While there is a general commitment among all Active Citizens beneficiaries to keep the programme going as a *sustainable* network, British Council needs to be wary of the risk of emotional burnout among individuals who invest a great deal but progressively feel underappreciated or unrewarded.

- The *trained participants whose grants were rejected* also reiterated the idea that they were already active citizens before doing the training. They expressed frustration at the lack of feedback on why their applications for funding failed. This in their view hinders their chances of improving and succeeding at attaining funding for their projects. The British Council staff replied that they simply did not have resources to offer individual feedback, and noted that success is not measured by attaining funding alone but by becoming Active Citizens<sup>39</sup>. Yet, it is clear that for participants, their *success* was indeed measured in terms of both a) attaining funding and b) being able to complete their project and thus, the lack of feedback on funding applications was clearly a sore point.
- Participants in CVM workshop reported that the *utility* of the Active Citizens projects is difficult to measure. Many stated that they found the programme useful at the personal/individual level at least initially but, they argued, they could not assess its effect on local communities or on Ukraine more widely.<sup>39</sup>
- Respondents valued *collaboration* with Active Citizens from across Ukraine and local communities. However, they complained that local politicians and business are difficult to collaborate with and this posed obstacles to their projects. Collaboration with the British Council was deemed as generally good, but they reported that better and more sustainable channels of communication are needed.

#### [Delivery/users](#)

- Participants argued that perhaps British Council should focus more on the *quality* (of participants, facilitators and projects) over the quantity (reaching large numbers). But others argued that it might advantage existing facilitators by not opening the programme to other participants.
- The debate around *professionalism* and professional development elicited some disagreement because some were concerned about a certain lack of professionalism as a programme while others focused on the professionalism generated and whether this met the very diverse needs, aims and concerns of Active Citizens participants.
- *Responsibility* is a related value often reported by stakeholders in CVM workshops in relation to their roles in the programme and to concerns about professionalism.
- Users feel an important risk to success is whether and when some Active Citizens facilitators become proprietorial, acting as not only enablers but as filters and gatekeepers for the

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<sup>39</sup> According to the British Council, capturing the programme's impact at the community level is now being addressed in the revised Theory of Change and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the global programme.

programme. This sense of some Active Citizens acquiring a certain power over others is not helped by the fact that facilitators who are involved in the selection of projects for funding also have their own projects that are active. This might suggest a conflict of interest. As such they are in direct competition with other potential beneficiaries of the programme. This highlights that cultural relations can produce conflicts of interest that need to be carefully managed. In contexts of scarce resources such tensions can be amplified and damage the possibilities of success.

### Strategic

- Active Citizens is hitting British Council targets for *inclusion* and *diversity*. The project's planned, sustainable expansion mechanisms (via cascading and networking models of cultural relations) mean it can constantly include new and diverse sets of local actors. The model is inclusive, diverse and aimed at equality. Its flexibility also means it can be rapidly responsive to changing local needs.
- A small minority (including those who had not succeeded in getting funding) challenged the relatively high scores for transparency and inclusiveness of the programme.
- Some users perceived the programme in Ukraine as focusing on reaching as many youth as possible, which they found undermined quality.
- Proper assessment of levels of *participation* and prospects for long-term *sustainability* requires further investigation. This is particularly relevant as participants in CVM workshops questioned whether current levels of participation were a marker of success for Active Citizens.
- Participants offered many examples of improved *dialogue* between groups within Ukraine generated by Active Citizens training or projects. Nevertheless, participants still felt that effective dialogue was sometimes not achieved in practice, for several reasons: (i) they found that dialogue sometimes provoked conflict or; (ii) there is a lack of commitment to communicating across differences in some sectors of Ukrainian youth; (iii) they believed that the dialogue instigated by Active Citizens is focussed in Ukraine and fails to engage Active Citizens with the wider British Council or British community.<sup>40</sup>
- Participants appreciated that Active Citizens enables multiple and fruitful *partnerships*, although at times some may not be that useful or easy to manage. Interestingly, participants in CVM workshops did not distinguish between partnerships (between institutions) and collaboration (between individuals). This is perhaps indicative of the over-reliance of cultural relations activities on trusted individuals and further underscores a wider underestimation of institutions, noted throughout our research.

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<sup>40</sup> According to a member of the Active Citizens team: The Active Citizens Global Toolkit contains guidance on methodology and techniques around conflict resolution and dialogue in conflict-affected communities. Training for working in conflict-affected settings is included in the facilitator's toolkit. The programme is currently looking at how to strengthen its global connections component (Active Citizens Annual Report 2016-2017)

## *Implications*

### What kinds of cultural relations work best?

- Active Citizens can bring change to **local** life. Participants in CVM workshops were keen to say that Active Citizens (and by implication the British Council) helped change some aspects of their locality. Examples given enabled a more detailed discussion of why some aspects of Active Citizens worked better than others and to differing extents in different localities. Projects used as examples of success seem to involve small local community initiatives and focused on youth outreach and education (e.g. film directing for youth). Those that were deemed most successful by facilitators also tended to receive further/continued support from British Council beyond Active Citizens (e.g. clothing exchange in Lutsk).
- The beneficiaries understand the ethos and strategy behind Active Citizens as a programme but become disconsolate when opportunities to sustain and develop their investment of time and hard work are remote. While they indicate that they will continue to work with Active Citizens, British Council should be aware of *competition*. Training run by rival cultural institutions (e.g. USAID, Goethe-Institut) is tempting and their previously-loyal facilitators may gravitate to new opportunities as they seek to enhance their skills and opportunities. Participants in workshops also noted that some of their partners saw Active Citizens (and by extension the British Council) as their competitors, hindering the working relationship. Competition is growing in this field. This can also make cultural relations organisations proprietorial towards ↗owning↗their beneficiaries.

### Conflict reduction/resolution; future leaders; civil society

- If ↗*Trust* is overcoming fear↗(Workshop 1 participant quote) then Active Citizens *could* have transformative effects in Ukraine, but there are mixed views on *how*. Promoting peace in Ukraine requires sustained dialogue and increased mutual understanding across regions and conflicted constituencies. Some Active Citizens participants testified to the Active Citizens programme helping to generate trust. Individuals from some regions fear others; cultural exchange can help mitigate such fears when they are inclusive. However, they also offered examples of dialogue failing, whether through a lack of interest from some young people in any form of civic engagement or a lack of professional communication by facilitators and/or British Council. The locally-oriented ↗let a thousand flowers blossom↗ approach of Active Citizens may need to innovate fast to foster more robust and sustainable *dialogue*.
- Active Citizens also relies on already *existing networks* of youth leaders, many of which are already active in their local universities and communities. Active Citizens can be seen a supportive of certain *local practices and values*. Does Active Citizens create and inspire new leaders or rather recruit already successful leaders in student and youth communities? Whilst, as pointed out by British Council staff, the content of the trainings (project development) is perhaps new to the participants, the recruitment process does not seem to be

inclusive, as it does not reach out to those youth who are out of particular youth leadership networks – like those found in universities, college clubs and student unions. Could British Council do *even* more to reach out to youth from different socio-demographic groups and with different educational backgrounds (specifically those without tertiary education)?<sup>41</sup>

- Active Citizens is well known in the cultural relations sector but it is one of the less known projects of the British Council in Ukraine. When interviewed about Active Citizens, sector leaders took pause to reflect that whilst supporting future leaders in their early 20s<sup>42</sup> is highly useful, so is supporting young leaders in the mid-30s and early 40s. This latter group, it was explained, were the central driving force behind both the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the EuroMaidan in 2013/14 (Onuch 2014), and are currently reshaping the political, economic, and cultural sectors of Ukraine – often leaving lucrative private sector careers to start up (or reinforce) NGOs, and re-invigorate failing state organisations. Certainly, Active Citizens has open registration and does not actively discourage older applicants, but it is notable that even this research project was given a research question to address the conditions for young leaders in social change – in line with models of international influence in UK foreign policy (House of Lords 2014). A **focus on young leaders** inevitably introduces a time lag into the cultivation of reciprocity: it may be a decade or more before they become cultural relations leaders who can steer Ukrainian culture towards the UK and generate a genuine two-way exchange. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the local, civic work these young individuals do through Active Citizens in the meantime is not extremely valuable.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Our findings relate to the Active Citizens programme specifically in Ukraine. It is important to note that the assessment of the global programme by British Council may differ. At a more global level we were informed their partners include –leaders working in, and with, –marginalised communities (Active Citizens Global Toolkit 2017).

<sup>42</sup> Based on the data made available to us as well as our interviews with BC staff, this age cohort represents the vast majority of ACs participants (group interviews with: Unnamed Active Citizens Program Director, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Active Citizens Program Manager, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Deputy Director, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017; Unnamed Director 1, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017). This being said, there are individual project managers that are –older than 30 and 40 and even 50– as per BC staff reflections. In our workshops, for which the BC was tasked with providing a representative group, only about 5% of participants were 35 and older (considered non-youth).

<sup>43</sup> According to a member of the British Council’s Active Citizens team: –it should be noted that Active Citizens delivery varies from country to country and choosing a target audience within a certain context is part of the flexibility of the programme.

## Case Study 2: Luhansk's ART & FACTs & Goethe-Institut

Luhansk's ART & FACTs (Preservation of Cultural Heritage of Donbas) (LAF) is a project funded by the Goethe-Institut in 2016. Its main creation is a website that serves as an online digital museum. The project collects and curates artefacts representing the cultural life and social activism that took place in Luhansk oblast (province) between 2004 and 2013. Luhansk is one of two oblasts (the other being Donetsk) that together make up the Donbas Basin region. Parts of Donbas are currently occupied by Ukrainian separatists and Russian-backed military forces (territory referred to by the Ukrainian government as Temporarily Occupied Territories).

Some, but not all, of Luhansk's ART & FACTs participants are Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from the Occupied Zone. Others migrated to the central and west Ukraine prior to the initiation of conflict. The project also involves American, German and Russian participants who joined the project independently. They are not members of partner organisations.

Luhansk's ART & FACTs is a collaboration between the Goethe-Institut and the Youth Organisation STAN with financial support of the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany under the Eastern Partnership initiative with consultation from the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Museum in Berlin (see: <http://www.artluhansk.com/en/about>). As stated on the Luhansk's ART & FACTs website, the project was launched in response to unsubstantiated claims that there is a lack of culture in eastern Ukraine and in particular in Luhansk. In CVM workshops, initiators of the project argued that one of the central aims of the project was to correct this misperception and to demonstrate that arts and culture in fact flourished in the period between the Orange Revolution in 2004 and EuroMaidan 2013-2014.

### *What is Luhansk's ART & FACTs a case study of?*

First, it represents an opportunity for cultural exchange within a country where relations between regions are believed to be in tension (the project website makes clear that those from outside Luhansk oblast believe it has a lack of culture). The project raises two questions. First, when culture and cultural artefacts become mobile and transplanted, because many people's culture has been internally displaced due to conflict and occupation, how do Ukrainians from other regions engage with cultural difference? Second, as a digital museum it should allow for analysis of online curation and engagement around cultural objects and for analysis of how such a digital project is designed and enacted in practice.

Luhansk's ART & FACTs reflects the Goethe-Institut's strategic objective (educational cooperation). In the context of the Eastern Partnership and after the EuroMaidan, Goethe-Institut intensified its capacity building programmes and collaboration with NGOs in Ukraine and neighbouring countries like Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. A Culture and Education Academy was set up in Ukraine and Goethe-Institut established Round Tables for cultural activists and stakeholders in different parts of the country. Enabling participants to map the cultural state of the art and to implement professional tools of cultural and educational work, Goethe-Institut particularly supports civil initiatives at the grass root level in order to promote decentralisation and citizen participation. Luhansk's ART & FACTs (2016) can be seen as a follow up project: some members of the NGO participated in 2014-2015 in workshops and Round Tables of the


-Culture and Education Academyø and asked for Goethe-Institutøs expertise and partnership to realise this project in 2016.

Besides aiming to support educational cooperation, Luhanskøs ART & FACTs also reflects Goethe-Institutøs strategic goal regarding -culture exchange and intercultural dialogueø. Within this objective the Goethe-Institut aims to 1) initiate creative processes for encounters and equal and fair dialogue 2) provide free spaces for experiments and cultural development and 3) use innovative formats which take place in the digital and physical space. The regional sub strategy for -Eastern Europe-Central Asiaø focusses also on the perception of history and culture of commemoration in order to strengthen pluralistic perspectives on the past and foster the process of identity building in the present. In this context, in 2012-2014 the Goethe-Institut Ukraine planned and implemented -Heldenø an example of a project which dealt deeply with identity and memory and was realised in cooperation with the National Museum of Art in Kyiv. Goethe-Institut also provided several phases of training on the development of museums as well as travel grants for experts and project grants for specific activities in museums in the following years. Luhanskøs ART & FACTs was the first digital archive project implemented by the Goethe-Institut Ukraine.

#### *Constellation for Luhansk's ART & FACTs*

As described in Section 5.3 above, we calculate a score for each Component of Value, using data from different stakeholder perspectives collected in workshops and CVM surveys.

The constellation below summarises the scores given to each value component. In subsequent sections we interpret and analyse these findings.



*Figure 9: Constellation for Luhansk's ART & FACTs. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.<sup>44</sup>*

The survey scores, depicted above, come from surveys carried out amongst delivery teams (12 participants) and users (7 participants). There was no survey of Goethe-Institut managers, as they declined to be part of the evaluation to, in their view, remain neutral. The Group scores come from three workshop groups with 5-6 participants each. There was a wide variation in the scores of the three groups (strategic, delivery and users) for most of the components (see Appendix 5 for more workshop data).

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<sup>44</sup>Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and four questions per component. Shaded section in constellation represents this range.

### *Summary of findings*

- Luhansk& ART & FACTs is an extremely well-conceived and co-designed project by experts, artists and local activists. CVM survey responses were especially positive, with scores at or above the CVM band of equilibrium on all but one component of value.
- Nevertheless, CVM survey responses and feedback during workshops reveal that stakeholders had markedly different sets of expectations and assessment of its value varied considerably by the end of the project.
- STAN received seed corn funding from Goethe-Institut but Luhansk& ART & FACTs had ended by the time of our study. Workshop participants expressed confusion about the principles underlying seed corn funding, as well as a great desire to make this a sustainable project (for instance to install a permanent collection on the digital museum as well as specialist exhibitions).
- In our analysis we systematically observed two disconnects or differences of perception. The most visible disconnect (one repeated in both workshops and mentioned in informal interviews) was between Luhansk& ART & FACTs project managers (including STAN) and the intended users of the website. The second was between the Goethe-Institut and Luhansk& ART & FACTs project managers ó specifically around misaligned expectations of the project aims, outcomes and capacity for sustainability.
- Luhansk& ART & FACTs failed to match the expectations of older local users who had very different experiences of to the younger members of Luhansk& ART & FACTs. A sharp generational divide emerged during the workshop.

In contrast, local delivery teams and Goethe-Institut staff were reasonably satisfied with the outcome

### *Users*

- Users very much liked the project concept. It was judged to be innovative and optimistic. The balance between subjective or objective perspectives on Luhansk culture was also deemed important. However, the choice of cultural artefacts was deemed to be too narrow and not sufficiently representative.
- Users argued with great passion that Luhansk& ART & FACTs could have been delivered in a more inclusive and participatory way that opened up opportunities to contribute to a wider cross-section of local people and cultural tastes. This is reflected in the lower scores given to *participation* and *opportunity*, both relating to the very limited reach, user engagement and inclusiveness of the website.
- Luhansk& ART & FACTs project managers (STAN) explained that it was never their intention to show the different facets of Luhansk& culture let alone a wider range of examples of Donbas&art and culture. They argued that the project was always going to be

limited in scope, funding and time. This is in contrast to their mission statement online, much of which is in the future tense (see link above).

- Users expected the process of creating the digital museum to be more participatory. Many had travelled quite a long distance to contribute to the first CVM workshop. They were disappointed that their input had not been taken into account. They attended the second workshop in the belief that the museum was still active and that content was being replenished. It came as a great surprise to users (and to us researchers) that the project had in fact already come to an end. Users expressed dismay when they learned that the organisers did not have the funding or necessary resources to invest in building and managing the museum.
- Goethe-Institut acknowledged the tensions in the project and in the room. They argued that their intention had been to provide seed corn funding and to provoke dialogue, not to fund a permanent and ongoing digital museum. The rich debate and discussion around the digital museum, they said, was an end in itself and an achievement. This statement was met with derision among some users. It became very clear that the expectations of the Goethe-Institut and the Luhansk& ART & FACTs organiser were also misaligned as he too wished the project to continue.

#### [Delivery](#)

- The STAN delivery team reported satisfaction with their work during the design and development of the project and website. They felt that the project had helped them in their *professional* development, and that there had been good levels of *collaboration* with other members of the team as well as the experts they met through the Goethe-Institut.
- There was a general agreement among the STAN delivery team that Luhansk& ART & FACTs had curated and preserved the culture of a region in a highly innovative way. Luhansk& ART & FACTs, they claimed, has the potential to become *a model of good practice* for similar projects in other regions.
- Luhansk& ART & FACTs, it was observed by users and the research team, relied on one key individual and his networks. Over-reliance on individuals can lead to mixed results in cultural relations. While funding and support benefits trusted cultural brokers, this might hinder and limit the cultural relations organisations' understanding of the broader cultural field.
- Serious reservations were expressed about the limited scope and reach of Luhansk& ART & FACTs that was put down to limited resources that diminished its overall *quality*.
- The frustration around not receiving follow-on funding made STAN members question whether their investment of time and work (much of it voluntary) had been worthwhile.

Goethe-Institut staff present at the workshop explained that they could not provide more than seed corn funding and said that the terms of engagement had been clearly laid out

- The STAN leader said that he had limited user *participation* on the digital museum website to prevent SPAM or strong or hateful political speech. Digital brings the possibilities for greater connectivity but in situations of conflict this must be curated carefully.

#### Strategic

- The Goethe-Institut saw the project as achieving its aim of -sparking a discussionø about cultural artefacts and cultural memory among small circle of cultural activists, academics and civil society groups in Kyiv and Lviv ó where the Luhanskøs ART & FACTs project managers are currently residing. This view was shared by other stakeholders at CVM workshops and by cultural sector leaders in interviews. STAN and the Luhanskøs ART & FACTs project are renowned for fostering, at times, controversial discussions (especially online on Facebook and VKontakte). The project was regarded as instrumental in shaping some of the sector-specific debate on -art from the regionsø
- Nonetheless, it was explained in the workshops by users that the project did not do enough to engage ordinary citizens in this *dialogue* ó be it in Luhansk or elsewhere in Ukraine. Users were strongly divided about whether the project was or was not offering -politically correctø or -liberalø portrayal of the cultural sphere in Luhansk. For instance, users at the workshops noted that some artists ó who some participants saw as important but who are now supporters of the separatists ó were *not included* in the project for political reasons, while CVM survey respondents criticised Luhanskøs ART & FACTs for *including* those same artists, who represent a -terrorist groupø. This perhaps demonstrates that more dialogue across the political spectrums urgently needed if projects like Luhanskøs ART & FACTs are to achieve greater dialogue and deeper relationships that can lay the ground for avoiding, mitigating or contributing to resolving conflict.
- It was suggested by more than one strategic group at the workshops that *participation*, *collaboration* and *partnerships* (which they saw as very similar) were not fully achieved due to a lack of integration of the Luhansk artist community in local cultural communities and civil society in *other* parts of Ukraine.
- With regards to *participation*, reaching a broader audience was a difficult challenge for this project. This was acknowledged by all stakeholders involved. Who is the target audience beyond Luhansk and how best to reach them were key questions. It was argued that even if the digital museum and website had fresh news and a new set of bloggers and extended the range of people nominating and selecting objects, how could the project reach those target audiences? How could they get them involved actively by submitting artefacts to the digital museum?

- The stated aims of the project on the website and user expectations are well beyond the Goethe-Institut's remit and the constraints of seed corn funding. However, the very fact that these problems were articulated led to a very fertile and passionate discussion about what *could* be possible, should more funding become available.
- Imagining possibilities can be a very productive outcome for Goethe-Institut and for users and delivery teams.

### *Implications for our research questions*

#### *What kinds of cultural relations work best?*

- Cultural relations that are highly sensitive to context and inclusive work best. Producers/deliverers expressed a strong sense of social responsibility and the great need for sensitivity to trauma, the difficulties of expressing this to an audience online, and the need to moderate or eliminate antagonistic user comments in online spaces. But at the same time their lack of involvement with the users during the project underscored the users' sense of being overlooked and triggered recent traumatic memories of their displacement. This is similar to the Active Citizens case study whereby participants who were from the south and east of the country also saw themselves as overlooked. In societies in transition, cultural relations must be as transparent as possible about who is included and why so that sensitivities are not unnecessarily triggered.
- Good cultural relations can make a vital contribution to societies in transition in which regional or ethnic identities are contested and fragile. What *is* or *are* Luhansk culture/s and identity/ies? Are they singular or more likely plural? Is a project like this simply a good way to flush out different aspects of regional cultures? Our workshops uncovered underlying tensions between conceptions of culture: culture as humanism and activism or culture as politics; official versus unofficial culture.

The Luhansk ART & FACTs project represents an opportunity to examine the mechanisms and experiences that lead to good cultural relations and exchange within a country where some believe that political, economic and social relations between macro regions<sup>45</sup> are deeply divided. Furthermore, like in the case of the North West in the UK, Catalonia in Spain, or Bavaria in Germany, are also some distinct micro regions like the Donbas<sup>46</sup> or Halychyna,<sup>47</sup> which are believed to have distinct cultural and historical legacies as well as

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<sup>45</sup> It is believed that there are four main macro regions in Ukraine: centre, west, east and south. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has group Ukraine's macro regions as: West (Chernivets'ka, Ivano-Frankivs'ka, Kmelnyts'ka, Lvivs'ka, Rivens'ka, Ternopils'ka, Volyns'ka and Zakarpats'ka); Center (Cherkas'ka, Chernihivs'ka, Kirovohrads'ka, Kyivs'ka, Poltavs'ka, Sums'ka, Vynnyts'ka and Zhytomyrs'ka); East (Dontes'ka, Kharkivs'ka and Luhans'ka); and South (Dnipropetrovs'ka, Khersons'ka, Kryms'ka, Mykolaivs'ka, Odes'ka and Zaporizhs'ka).

<sup>46</sup> The Donbas includes Luhansk and Donetsk *oblasti* in Ukraine.

<sup>47</sup> Halychyna or Galicia includes Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk.

salient regional identities (that may or may not overlap with ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic practice). Such regional identities may be entrenched in a sense of pride, but also, as Giuliano (2018) found, a sense of not being understood or of being left behind by the central Government. The Luhansk& ART & FACTs project website specifically explains (although without providing references/examples) that Ukrainians residing outside of Luhansk oblast believe it lacks culture. Whilst it is not clear based on what information/experience the organisers of Luhansk& ART & FACTs believe this to be the case, the fact that they believe that Ukrainians generally hold negative stereotypes of their oblast and its culture is significant. It is even more significant if this became the *raison d'être* behind the project. This leaves open a fascinating research question: How do cultural entrepreneurs seek to mobilise and diffuse cultural artefacts across communities? How do they decide what should travel and become accessible? How do they decide who their audiences should be, and do they engage with their audience? And finally, when cultural artefacts become mobile and accessible to a wider audience, how do residents from other regions engage with cultural difference?

#### Conflict reduction/resolution; future leaders; civil society

- In a society in conflict like Ukraine, is it a sufficient public good for a cultural relations project like Luhansk& ART & FACTs to fund a particular group experiencing traumatic events and invite them to work-through the situation from their own cultural standpoint and history even if this excludes significant others? Intensely local teams must indeed be granted autonomy to build their own project and process their experience of conflict but they may require further support to ensure their projects are inclusive. There are difficult trade-offs between autonomy and mutuality. If Luhansk& ART & FACTs had managed to achieve autonomy as a self-sustaining virtual museum about Donbas culture, how then could mutual exchange be fostered? Even if mutuality was evident in the trip to Germany by the lead cultural broker to set up the website, after that it seems mutuality was hard to achieve – and, one must ask, mutual exchange between which groups? There was little evidence the project had engaged any audiences outside the Donbas, despite being of high quality.
- In a situation of conflict, what counts as courage in the practice of cultural relations? This was a question posed in Workshop 1 where the delivery team argued that the very act of creating a digital museum was a courageous act in itself. But the users claimed that it would be more courageous to produce a more inclusive museum that recognised the wider history and complexity of the region. How then to represent silenced cultures without silencing the culture of the older generation was a further key question posed.
- If the Goethe-Institut wished to *produce* a dialogue about cultural memory, as their strategic team indicated as a mean of conflict reduction, then Luhansk& ART & FACTs had to take responsibility to *curate and manage* that dialogue, as well as its consequences. This involves difficult trade-offs between autonomy and inclusivity. This again has wider applicability as cultural memories are integral to the very identities that are central to violent conflict.

### 4.3 Summary of Findings and Implications: Ukraine

The context for cultural relations in Ukraine is quite promising in many ways.

- As the Cultural Relations Diamond for Ukraine (Figure 4) shows, the level of organisation of cultural relations actors, the vibrancy of cultural relations, and the economic, social and political environment in which it takes place are all assessed as moderate, i.e. above the mid-range. Cultural actors perceive their cultural relations work as having significant impact, and they practice, transfer and generate value at a high level.

If benefits are equated with value, then cultural relations are indeed creating value in Ukraine. In particular,

- Those actors cooperating with international organisations in cultural relations perceive benefits primarily in receiving needed financial support, but also in generating interest for their work from the general public, achieving better outreach, and networking with organisations like theirs within Ukraine. This was mirrored by CVM respondents who could identify many benefits to participating in cultural relations activities, such as receiving funding, acquiring new skills and expanding their networks. In this sense, working with foreign partners on cultural relations activities not only provides local cultural actors needed resources for current activities, but may also help build the foundations for their future work.
- However, CVM participants also reported some dissatisfaction with the lack of support once the programmes finish, bringing the sustainability of impact into question. Cultural relations organisations must consider trade-offs between the quality and quantity of the support they offer as well as manage expectations of all stakeholders involved.
- While building bridges with other cultures is considered an important value, the CRD survey highlighted that Ukrainian cultural actors are not wholly convinced that cultural relations contributes to exposure of their country's culture abroad.
- Dialogue between regions within Ukraine was also seen as an important objective by both international cultural relations organisations and users. However, while CVM respondents appreciated cultural relations organisations initiating this dialogue, they also reported scope for improvement, highlighting instances where communication was hampered, either between different regions in Ukraine, between different types of users or between users and the cultural relations organisations.
- CVM participants referred to ‘good’ cultural relations as conceived of in relation to ‘bad’ cultural relations, including unidirectional cultural imposition or the expectation of some ‘payback’ or return (Russian ‘Russkiy Mir’ was often cited in this regards). Admittedly, such mutuality and reciprocity are not within the mandate of most foreign actors working in Ukraine. Those foreign actors actively seeking this kind of mutual exchange need to be aware that it might not yet be achieved or apparent in the case of Ukraine.

The CVP can shed some light on how cultural relations can prevent or ameliorate conflict and its effects in Ukraine, but more longitudinal research is needed.

- There are signs of positive potential: A vast majority of the population believes that culture and cultural activities contribute to social well-being more generally and to developing greater understanding and tolerance even where there is tension. CVM respondents reported that Active Citizens (and by implication the British Council) had a positive local impact; and through Luhansk& ART & FACTs we found that internally-displaced people can assist cross-regional communication and can act as cultural brokers mediating between diverse sectors of Ukrainian society, and between cultural relations organisations and beneficiaries. But this work is also difficult and politically highly sensitive.
- Because identities in Ukraine tend to be complex, culture is often seen as having the potential to act as social ‘glue’. Again, we noted a perception among the experts we consulted and CVM workshop participants that good cultural relations can possibly aid in conflict resolution, but bad cultural relations or poorly executed projects can exacerbate a conflict.
- The Ukrainian population claims great interest in culture and seems to have relatively easy access to cultural goods. Furthermore, civil society and state actors work in many of the same fields of activity, apparently without the antagonism seen in other environments (e.g. Egypt), and might be encouraged to collaborate. Thus, there seems to be fertile soil for culture and cultural relations to be the starting point for engaging a variety of cultural actors in dealing with societal tensions and conflict.

Yet, potential barriers also seem to exist.

- The perception among a sizeable minority of CRD survey respondents was that foreign actors tend to cooperate with already well-established individuals, networks and organisations, which might indicate signs of tension within the cultural relations scene that could eventually hinder efforts to prevent or reduce broader societal conflicts. This includes tendencies of cultural relations organisations to work with individuals, instead of institutions, and with younger generations of Ukrainians rather than the more established post-Soviet generation. While these patterns may not reflect all cultural relations activities, they nonetheless signal to cultural relations organisations a need to carefully assess their partnership and collaboration strategies as well as the audiences they seek to reach in order to present themselves as open and inclusive spaces that can support security, stability and prosperity.
- Nevertheless, if the strategy of cultural relations institutes is to work with such individuals and organisations in order to be able to reach and strengthen other future leaders and civil society more broadly, then this perception might change over time.

A strong majority of the cultural actors surveyed in Ukraine already believe that the work of cultural relations organisations contributes to the development of civil society and future leaders.

This is mirrored by the fact that the majority of cultural relations activities identified for closer examination revolve around education and training of professionals, in particular.

However, among the general population, the role of civil society in cultural development does not seem to be recognised or understood in Ukraine. Perhaps as cultural relations programmes and projects continue their work, especially in supporting professional skills, not only will civil society be strengthened, but the image of the organisations and individuals included in it will be enhanced.

## 5 Findings Egypt

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### 5.1 Context

#### **The Arab Spring and beyond: culture, civil society and cultural relations in post-revolutionary Egypt**

As in other countries in the region, the so-called Arab Spring took hold in Egypt in 2011. Mass protests, with their focal point at Cairo’s Tahrir Square, quickly led to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak after some 30 years of rule. The 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections saw the Muslim Brotherhood –Freedom and Justice– party emerge as the strongest force in parliament and Mohammed Morsi as the president. After a brief year in power marked by a constitutional referendum and public protest, Morsi lost power, and a new presidential election brought former army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to office in 2014. Since then, his administration has been on a course to enact IMF-backed macroeconomic reforms and combat sluggish growth, while also extending government restrictions on political civil liberties. In March 2018, President el-Sisi won a second term.

The political instability in the wake of the Arab Spring and subsequent developments have undoubtedly had an impact on Egyptian culture and civil society, as well as on cultural relations. Over a brief period of time, the 2011 Egyptian uprisings allowed more space for political forms of artistic expressions. Visual artists, like the famous painter Mohamed Abla, would set up workshops and other cultural initiatives, engaging with the youth in iconic revolutionary places, such as Tahrir Square. Despite the lack of economic prospects, curators and artists invested in what they thought was about to become a vibrant independent art scene and a few art galleries opened in Cairo. Street art and graffiti temporarily invaded the urban space reaching out to different social classes, which helped the Egyptian society experiment with creative approaches to citizenship (Abaza 2012). In this context, the Goethe-Institut launched its Tahrir Lounge non-profit project in April 2011, dedicated to community capacity building and designed to stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation. This was only one of many initiatives introduced by different foreign cultural offices willing to help create opportunities for social change in the transitional period.

The enthusiasm however progressively faded, not only as a result of the increasingly polarised environment in which the 2012 constitutional referendum took place, but also because of the instability in the aftermath of the 2013 military intervention. Since then, human rights advocates, independent artists and journalists claim to have seen their freedom of expression increasingly challenged.<sup>48</sup> Some of the most proactive nongovernmental organisations relocated their

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<sup>48</sup> Staff members of the independent digital news site Mada Masr, which was created on 30 June 2013, have been arrested on the grounds of supporting terrorism and extremism.

headquarters to Lebanon and Jordan.<sup>49</sup> In March 2016, Said Boumedouha, Deputy Director of Amnesty International, stated that ‘Egypt’s civil society [was] being treated like an enemy of the state, rather than a partner for reform and progress’ (Amnesty International 2016). These recent developments have progressively frustrated hopes for pluralism and democratisation.

The el-Sisi government’s discourse on national security and the argument of political stability have presumably played an important role in justifying the line it has taken against the civil opposition. In this context, one could easily argue that foreign agencies willing to implement cultural relations initiatives as a way to prevent or counter radicalisation and instability may not be particularly well placed to promote civil society empowerment.

To explore this argument and examine how cultural relations can add value in the Egyptian context, we begin with an overview of the cultural scene in Egypt around 2017–18, identifying key actors, their activities, and their relations. A closer look at a selected set of cultural relations initiatives highlights patterns in the types of programmes and projects undertaken and who is involved in them and enables the selection of case studies. Finally, through the analysis of CRD survey results and findings from case studies, a comprehensive look at the values held and generated by various stakeholders, at cultural actors’ capacities and impact, and at the environment in which they work allows for exploration of the potential and actual power of cultural relations to reduce conflict and foster leaders and civil society.

## **The cultural scene in Egypt as of 2017/18**

Egypt’s cultural scene looks back on a long history that is too extensive to summarise here, but has been recorded elsewhere.<sup>50</sup> Although the state maintained a rather firm hand in controlling cultural and artistic activity in the period following independence from Britain, an independent art scene started emerging in the 1980s and 1990s as a space for exploration and expression beyond the confines of state-managed culture. As noted previously, the 2011 revolution inspired new activity, but the instability and uncertainty in its aftermath has taken a toll.

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<sup>49</sup> The Mawred al Thaqafy Foundation, which supports independent arts, announced in August 2015 that it was about to suspend its activity in Egypt due to a new legislation allowing security agencies to disrupt non-state organisations by refusing to license them or issuing fines and prison sentences.

<sup>50</sup> See, for example, El Batraoui and Khafagui (2010), which is now somewhat outdated but provides information on pre-Arab Spring cultural policy in Egypt.




Figure 10. Cultural Actors in Egypt

In the snapshot of actors involved in the broader Egyptian cultural scene in 2017 (see Figure 10),<sup>51</sup> the largest space is occupied by state actors as cultural policy-makers, art promoters and providers, and knowledge hubs. Among state actors, those most directly linked to cultural policy-making are the Supreme Council of Culture, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Antiquities, and Parliament. Other state actors seen to be involved more indirectly in shaping and implementing cultural policy include, among others, the Military, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Sports and Youth, Al-Azhar, Social Fund for Development, National Council for Women, National Council for Motherhood and Childhood, and National Council for Disability Affairs. As might be surmised by the large number of actors in this cluster, cultural policy-making is complex and bureaucratic. Notably, in its Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030 (2016, 227), the Egyptian government recognises this and proposes a programme to improve governance in the cultural system, focusing in particular on enhancing coordination, integration, and accountability.

State actors also dominate the knowledge hub cluster, situated near cultural policy-makers cluster to indicate close relationships. The Egyptian government manages the vast majority of schools and universities, including the highly recognised Cairo University and Helwan. Private schools and universities also exist, including the American University in Cairo, the German University in Cairo, the British University in Egypt, numerous pre- and after-schools, and language education providers. The Bibliotheca Alexandrina, founded in 2002, is a modern centre of learning and study that was built in cooperation between UNESCO and the Egyptian government. It serves as a high-visibility flagship in public education.

Particularly notable is the clear distinction in Egypt between the state and independent art scenes, located in different corners of Figure 10. In the state cluster we find the renowned Cairo Opera House, world famous and lesser known museums and heritage sites, and major festivals such as the Cairo International Film Festival.

Far removed from the state art scene and cultural policy-makers in Figure 10 is the independent art scene, clustering a diverse set of non-governmental actors engaged in visual and performing arts and in heritage management, among other cultural activities. The independent *movement*, as Metwaly (n.d.) calls it, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to seek options and spaces that were free from government constraints, and the scene *began to breathe* in the 2000s. The events of 2011 and subsequent years presented the independent art scene both new opportunities – one outcome of which was a veritable boom of festivals for children, photography, digital arts, etc. – as well as additional challenges. Yet not all of these independent actors have the same level of influence. Though theatre and dance groups were at the forefront of the movement at its beginning, they seem to have lost influence as interest has waned and changed. Furthermore,

<sup>51</sup> This *map* is the product of a subjective mapping process that took place in the first half of 2017 involving staff members of the British Council and the Goethe-Institut and Bahia Shehab, contracted by the Goethe-Institut to conduct the mapping with the Hertie School. More details on the mapping exercise can be found in the CRD methodology paper, available upon request from the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org)).

though the festival scene has seen a boom, their actual impact is considered to be quite narrow, in comparison with that of other mainstream or state-funded and advertised events, regardless of quality.<sup>52</sup> By contrast, heritage managers and music producers seem to be more influential. The independent art scene is the segment that staff at the British Council and Goethe-Institut who contributed to creating the cultural actors map seems to be most familiar with.

Near the centre, situated between state cultural policy-makers, the state art scene, and the independent art scene are foreign actors, including foreign institutions, foreign cultural centres, foreign foundations, embassies, and UNESCO, each playing different roles and having different levels of influence on and within the cultural scene. Indeed, the landscape in which foreign actors work has been shifting, especially since the events of 2011, due to constant changes in ministers in the different ministries, policy changes, and lack of structure, making action by foreign actors more challenging. For some actors, especially those affected by restrictions on foreign funding (see below under environment), their ability to have influence is now more limited. Among embassies, the most active and therefore influential have been the American, French, and German, with the Dutch, Swedish, and Italian embassies increasing their activities in recent years.

Also near the centre of the map, notably between the cultural policy-makers and state art scene, are the mass media. Television<sup>53</sup> is clearly the dominant force with 99% of households in Egypt owning a TV set.<sup>54</sup> State TV channels that air for free have a 90% viewership. In a country where more than a quarter of the population was below poverty line in 2015,<sup>55</sup> state-owned channels represent the main source for information and entertainment. Private channels offer better content in terms of production quality and programmes but have a lower mass following in comparison to state-owned media due to the paid nature of the service. Social media as a platform is included with the other mass media actors, due to its large importance in Egypt. Though there have been restrictions placed on social media by the government in recent years, it remains a place where many ideas are communicated. Facebook, in particular, is a key platform, with 35 million Egyptians having accounts and averaging 5 visits per day.

For-profit cultural actors are mainly found in the creative economy cluster, though, as noted above, they are also present as educational organisations in the knowledge hubs cluster. Creative economy actors include the music industry, crowdsourced funding, production companies, cinemas, bookstores and publishers, and private art galleries. Most influential among these seem to be the music industry and production companies. Each of these groups of actors has the potential of offering cultural vibrancy a different and new support system.

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<sup>52</sup> See Bahia Shebab's cultural actors mapping report for Egypt, available upon request from the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; list@hertie-school.org).

<sup>53</sup> The Goethe-Institut staff gave less prominence to mass media TV and radio stations in their map because the stations' programming was less interesting and not of high quality and thus were not considered suitable partners.

<sup>54</sup> The statistics in this section were sourced from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in Egypt January report of 2015.

<sup>55</sup> According to the Egyptian statistical agency CAPMAS, about 27.8 % of Egyptians lived below the poverty line of LE 482 monthly income (roughly 20 Euros) (see: Masriya 2016).

Civil society actors, especially organisations, but also some individuals, are most apparent in the bridge builders and freedom of expression clusters. Among the bridge builders, nestled between the state and independent art scenes, as well as foreign actors, NGOs, art networks, cultural operators, cultural centres, think tanks, and incubators are important and influential. Others such as women's rights groups and the gender and sexual equality advocates are good potential bridge builders in the future but cannot play a stronger role currently because of the religious discourse that is overpowering in society. Religious institutions are included as potential bridge builders because they have a strong physical infrastructure, like access to prayer sites like mosques and churches and religious schools, and the human resources to support their work. Though they might not be willing to support all ideas, their resources might offer support in the future.

Not surprisingly, civil society actors are the only type found in the freedom of expression cluster. These are by and large individuals, including bloggers, citizen reporters, and cultural activists, many with a large following and mainly using digital media as the preferred platform.

In addition to providing a broad overview of the cultural actors in Egypt, their influence and their relations, the triangular mapping process involving two foreign cultural institutes, namely, the British Council and the Goethe-Institut, and an independent consultant (Bahia Shehab) revealed several potential blind spots that might also be relevant for other foreign actors.<sup>56</sup> For example, the creative economy cluster as described by British Council and Goethe-Institut seemed to be underdeveloped: the actors listed by British Council and Goethe-Institut were relatively new for the most part, thus both overlooking the dynamics at play between these newer actors and more established ones and failing to recognise the great potential this cluster holds. With regard to the bridge builders cluster, actors were included, particularly on the Goethe-Institut list, that may have been of interest but may not have great or broader influence; many of them address primarily a social segment that has access to the internet and even English language skills, thus reducing their potential reach. It is likely that the foreign cultural institutes are aware of many of these overlooked actors, but did not include them on their maps because they were not considered of particular interest for their organisation.

Furthermore, it is notable that unions appear on none of the cultural actors maps for Egypt. According to Hariri and Kassis (2016, 18), cultural professions in Egypt are mainly regulated by unions, which require payment of annual dues and registration fees. Furthermore, it is generally the case that declared artists, that is, members of these unions can use public cultural spaces for free, unlike those who are not members. It would seem then that unions in many senses control which cultural professionals can operate formally and which are relegated to the informal economy.

Regardless of these possible omissions, the final snapshot synthesising the lists and maps of three separate creator teams reveals a cultural scene in Egypt marked by a clear separation of actors in distinct functional fields. The art scene, in particular, is divided into separate state and independent, civil society groupings. In general, one can assume that the priorities and values of

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<sup>56</sup> For more information, see Bahia Shehab's cultural actors mapping report, available upon request from the Hertie School of Governance (Regina List; [list@hertie-school.org](mailto:list@hertie-school.org)).

the various stakeholders differ significantly. The position of foreign actors, including foreign cultural centres, in between independent and state actors indicates both possible opportunities for building bridges between them and challenges in balancing expectations and sensitivities.

## The cultural relations scene

Narrowing the view, we now take a look at cultural relations within the Egyptian cultural scene. To be able to do so and with the help of a local consultant, we researched a wide range of events or programmes that took place or were ongoing during the period 2015–17. Because a comprehensive database from which to draw a representative sample did not exist, we selected forty-one of these events based on their visibility and influence. What they all had in common was the involvement of cultural actors of many sorts from different countries. We arranged these into clusters based on common sets of characteristics using hierarchical clustering methods (a visualisation of the result of this process can be found in Appendix 2).

Of the forty-one programmes and events, only eight focus on broader cultural values, education and/or heritage (e.g., the Nile Gathering, KulturAkademie, and Al Azhar English Training Center). The great majority of cultural relations activities identified involve performance, visual arts, and other arts and cultural programmes and target the general public. The types of cultural activity observed on the ground are likely shaped by the current political environment. When the political situation is tense, as is the case in Egypt at the time, then it is understandable that such activities tend away from broader value programmes, which revolve around values, in favour of more arts-related programmes, which can be presented as being apolitical. Indeed, programmes related to performances, especially music festivals, are likely to raise fewer eyebrows with the authorities.

The scope of the programmes or events also varies. In Egypt the majority of cultural relations activities can be classified as mass events, which involve relatively small amounts of funding and reach a large audience. The next largest group of cultural relations activities are niche programmes such as Cairocomix and Spend the Day at Al-Khalifa, which require low budgets but also target and reach relatively small audiences. High-budget programmes and events, whether they reach large audiences (prime events such as Cairo Opera House’s Arab Music Festival) or narrow ones (prestige projects such as Cairo’s Fashion Festival), are few. The preponderance of low-budget cultural relations activities could well reflect the modest financial resources available for (or invested in) cultural relations. It could also be due to efforts to try to get the most bang for the buck out of existing resources.

Interestingly, more than half of the cultural relations activities identified here involve no foreign partner. Instead, they are most often implemented by or in association with the Ministry of Culture or one of the actors in the state cultural scene such as the Cairo Opera House. Others without foreign partners tend to be niche programmes, with the exception of Darb 1718’s Mawaleel Festival. The prominence of cultural relations activities without foreign partners gives an indication of the apparent dominance of the state and state arts scene, as well as to Egypt’s wish to continue to be a cultural leader in the Arab/MENA region. However, it also shows to what extent independent cultural actors are marginalised from the mainstream cultural

sphere. It also points to the difficulty foreign organisations might have in acting in Egypt without being on good terms with the state, as the state has such a strong presence in the cultural scene. For their part, foreign partners are most strongly represented among the forty-one activities we identified that were related to performance and celebration directed towards the general public (as opposed to programmes creating broader value and directed at professionals). Most of the programmes organised by or in cooperation with foreign actors are mass events, which is sensible given that in order for cultural relations to reach its goals of mutual understanding, it is useful to reach a large audience.

### **The state of cultural relations today: capacity, environment, implementation**

Against this backdrop, we now take a closer look at how cultural relations take place by way of a snapshot capturing five dimensions, each discussed in turn below. This snapshot, visualised in the Cultural Relations Diamond in Figure 11, reflects subjective responses to the Hertie School's online organisational survey of Egyptian cultural actors administered from February to May 2018, as well as data drawn from other reliable sources, such as the Neighbourhood Survey and others mentioned below, and expert input derived from discussions at workshops held in Cairo (see Appendix 1 for more information about workshop participants; contact the Hertie School of Governance for more information about workshop proceedings).

The overall results, depicted in the cultural relations diamond (see Figure 11), show moderate results for the dimensions *level of organisation* and *vibrancy of cultural relations*, below moderate results for the dimensions *external environment* and high results for the dimension *perceived impact and values*.





Figure 11: Cultural Relations Diamond: Egypt

#### *Level of organisation*

This dimension assesses the perceived effect of cultural relations or international cultural organisations on the capacity of Egyptian cultural actors to sustain their operations, pursue their goals, and develop their potential. It assumes that for cultural relations activities to be fruitful, the local organisations need external and internal sustainability, good communications within the sector, and collaboration with other economic and governmental actors. We measure these on the basis of Egyptian responses to the Hertie School organisational survey. As shown in Figure 11, the Cultural Relations Diamond for Egypt, the overall score for level of organisation, which combines these four subdimensions, is moderate.



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 12: Benefits of cooperating with international cultural organisations (% of organisations answering ‘to a moderate extent’ and ‘to a great extent’; multiple answers possible)*

According to the majority of Egyptian respondents to the Hertie School survey (82%), cooperation with international cultural organisations has helped them generate more interest from the general public and, to a lesser extent (but still 75%), achieve better outreach, thereby enhancing their ~~external sustainability~~ the strongest subdimension score among the four making up this CRD dimension (see Figure 12). Increased interest and outreach lay a potentially fruitful foundation for their activities and impact into the future.

Looking at ~~internal~~ organisational sustainability, some 60% of respondents reported having benefited in terms of financial support<sup>57</sup> or professional skills from involvement in cultural relations activities. The benefit of professional skills seems of particular value since, according

<sup>57</sup> Of the organisations that responded to the organisational survey, 31% stated that it was difficult to obtain funding from foreign cultural institutes, whereas 19% said it was easy (leaving 50% who said it was neither easy nor difficult).

to participants in a May 2017 workshop, a more general problem seems to be an undersupply of training programmes and recognised university degrees for cultural managers, which means that most cultural managers in Egypt are self-taught. Some foreign cultural relations institutes have sought to fill this gap: in Egypt 12.5% of organisations surveyed that had cooperated with a foreign cultural institute stated that the cooperation primarily revolved around skills development. More generally, those surveyed overwhelmingly believed that the presence of cultural relations organisations contributes to their organisation: some 45% found that the presence of cultural relations organisations supports organisations in meeting their goals, and 41% that it opens up new opportunities.<sup>58</sup>

Networking with other arts, cultural and educational organisations seems to be one of the key benefits for Egyptian cultural actors of being involved in cultural relations activities: 65% of respondents reported opportunities to network with organisations in other countries as a benefit, while 59% cited opportunities within Egypt (see Figure 12). It is in promoting opportunities to work with for-profit and state agencies where engagement in cultural relations activities seems to falter, if that is a goal at all: only 24% and 25%, respectively, of respondents reported this as a benefit of engaging in cultural relations activities.

In general, obtaining funding or sponsorships from private enterprises, even big multinationals, seems to be very difficult for cultural organisations in Egypt, according to cultural managers present at the Hertie School's Cairo workshop in May 2017. Managers at major corporations appear to be unaware of the immediate value of culture, since it does not directly show up in their balance sheets. Moreover, organisations, which are typically understaffed, lack dedicated fundraisers who are able to sell cultural engagement to corporations and attract their interest. Additionally, the people that have the business mindset and with networks linked to larger corporations, that is, those who could make good fundraisers, are often not interested in foregoing lucrative corporate jobs in favour of poorly paid and insecure employment in cultural organisations.

In terms of cooperating with the state, cultural managers that participated in CVP-related workshops voiced their frustration in trying to collaborate with state-run venues for hosting cultural events, citing problems with their bureaucracy and the fact that infrastructure is often poorly managed and maintained. It is questionable whether involvement in cultural relations activities can resolve this challenge.

Reflecting some of these challenges, the overall level of organisation in the cultural relations scene in Egypt is considered moderate. As noted above, the strongest subdimension is external sustainability, with improved outreach and higher interest boding well for future activities. Intrasectoral communication is also somewhat strong, with cultural relations encouraging networking within the Egyptian cultural sector and with similar foreign organisations. Gaps in skills and funding make for moderate internal sustainability. Clearly the weakest link here is

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
<sup>58</sup> 7% responded that the presence of cultural relations organisations made no difference for organisations like theirs, and another 7% thought that ICO presence brings too much outside influence into organisations like theirs.

contact with business and state actors in cultural relations, which on one hand reflects the difficulty of current relationships and on the other hand signals potential for improvement.

### *Vibrancy*

This dimension assesses how vibrant the cultural relations scene is by examining the inclusiveness of cultural relations activities in terms of target audiences and location, the diversity of fields of cultural relations activity, and people's access to and involvement in culture and the arts more broadly. The first two are assessed based on responses to the Hertie School organisational survey, while the third draws on data from a 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer.

The assumption is that cultural relations is more successful in general when cultural relations activities themselves address a wider public across diverse fields and where people have access to and engage in culture and the arts. Despite this ideal, the reality is often that the goals of cultural relations organisations and other foreign actors might be much narrower, that is, reaching specific target groups or focusing on specific topics or fields of competence.



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 13. International cultural organisations... (Egypt)*

In terms of inclusivity of cultural relations activities in Egypt, 75% of all Hertie School survey respondents reported that cultural relations organisations tend to cooperate on projects benefiting a variety of vulnerable groups (see Figure 13). Indeed, according to organisational survey data, although the largest percentage of organisations reported focusing cultural relations activities on young people and students, some 58% focus on women and around a third focused on either disabled, migrants or low-income people.

That being said, more than half of all Egyptian survey respondents believed that cultural relations organisations support projects mainly in the capital or big cities, 45% that they tend to cooperate mostly with already high-profile actors, and 41% that such projects are mainly aimed at the most educated or wealthy. Particularly in terms of location, the respondents' perception reflects the reality of constraints faced by cultural relations organisations beyond their immediate control. For example, some cultural actors have reported that their organisations do not host activities outside of major cities because they cannot guarantee the safety of participants. Others, particularly smaller organisations, often opt to hold their events in large cities in order to gain as much exposure as possible for the money they invest. Furthermore, a lack of appropriate infrastructure or venues outside major population areas can preclude broad geographical dispersion. Some cultural relations organisations work to overcome these restrictions. For example, the Goethe-Institut is represented in rural areas through the Robert-Bosch cultural managers who bring movies to the provinces with Film Week (see case study below). As for working with high-profile actors, some studies have observed the emergence of a kind of clientelism in which donors tend to allocate their funds to the same cultural operators (Shams n.d., 19) and local actors fail to seek alternate sources of funding; but this is certainly not the case for all foreign cultural organisations.

In Egypt, the variety of projects and programmes on which respondents have cooperated with international cultural organisations is relatively wide. Within the mix, 58% engaged in performance and celebration, 37% in education / training / research, and 26% each in community service / civil society and visual arts and crafts. As noted previously, the preponderance of cultural relations activities involving performance and celebration could be explained at least in part by the likelihood that such activities run a smaller risk of arousing the attention of government authorities as compared to projects revolving around non-language education and civil society engagement. Furthermore, such activities can help reach broader audiences since no particular level of education or literacy is required to enjoy them.

The vibrancy of cultural relations is also a reflection of the population's access to and participation in cultural goods and culture more generally. In 2014, the year corresponding to the latest available data (European Commission 2016b), access to cultural events and activities, namely, attending a ballet, opera performance, concert, or theatre play and even visiting historical monuments, museums, or art galleries, was considered 'easy' or 'very easy' by some 20% of Egyptians. Only watching or listening to cultural programmes on TV or radio was considered easy by more than 50%.

Given the relatively poor accessibility of such cultural goods (and certainly other circumstances not related to access), it is no surprise that cultural participation in Egypt was also low in 2014.

Less than 30% of Egyptians took part in the cultural activities listed above, other than watching television. High culture events, such as ballet and opera performances, were attended by only 11%. Admittedly, the Neighbourhood Barometer (European Commission 2016b) did not capture all forms of cultural activity in which Egyptians might engage or even all those in which Egyptian cultural actors are involved, but even these numbers provide a general picture.

Of note, Egypt Vision 2030, the government's Sustainable Development Strategy, recognises the disparity in the availability of cultural services and sets a goal of reducing the geographical gap in providing such services.

Overall, the Egyptian cultural relations scene is somewhat but not highly vibrant, at least as measured by the three subdimensions. The variety of cultural relations interventions is the strong point here, offering a balanced diversity of activities and programmes. Inclusiveness is not so strong, mainly due to the perception that most activities take place in large urban centres. Still, the weakest subdimension is cultural participation, reflecting suboptimal accessibility and lower rates of engagement with a range of activities and sites.

### *Values*

The Egyptian cultural relations scene holds, transfers and generates values at a high level, at least according to the respondents to the organisational survey (see Figure 11). This impression is based mainly on responses to questions in the Hertie School organisational survey relating to what is important to cultural actors (practice), how values are shared (transfer), and what their work contributes (generate).

When asked what is important to their respective organisations, Hertie School survey respondents indicated that they practiced a diverse range of values. Most important to Egyptian organisations was the aim of sharing ideas, marked by some 46% of respondents, followed closely by providing an outlet for creativity, fostering freedom of expression, and bringing different people together. Helping people in need was the least frequently mentioned aim (20% of respondents), but given that the Hertie School survey was addressed to and answered by organisations engaged mainly in cultural and educational activities, that should not be too surprising.<sup>59</sup>

In cultural relations, transferring values should ideally be a two-way rather than unilateral process, ultimately fostering mutual understanding. Of all the CRD survey respondents in Egypt, 83% agreed that international cultural organisations build bridges between Egypt and other countries (see Figure 13). Moreover, 84% of respondents thought that such organisations contribute to the development of civil society and support future leaders.

The vast majority of respondents to the Hertie School survey also consider themselves as contributors to and thus generators of value. As might be expected, 88% of respondents agreed that their organisation contributed to cultural innovation and development. Furthermore, nearly

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<sup>59</sup> Only 13% of respondents identified themselves as social development organisations and 4% each as social services and health organisations.

three-quarters of these saw their work as leading to more and deeper international relationships (roughly equivalent to the share of respondents that had cooperated on a project or programme with an ICO).

Thus, all three subdimensions along the value dimension were considered by organisations responding to the CRD survey to be very strong. The transfer of values score, reflecting the belief that the presence of international cultural relations organisations helps build bridges across cultures and contributes to the development of civil society and future leaders, was particularly strong.

### *Perception of impact*

Measuring the actual impact of cultural actors and cultural relations activities on a broad level is tricky. Instead, through the CRD organisational survey, we asked organisations involved in the cultural scene to share their subjective perceptions of the impact of the cultural relations activities they were involved in and of international cultural organisations more generally. As the CRD shows (see Figure 11), Egyptian CRD survey respondents perceived a quite strong level of impact overall in terms of output and outcome.


When looking at what cultural relations organisations bring to cultural relations, 92% of all CRD survey respondents recognised the high quality of the educational and language programmes provided by international cultural relations organisations (see Figure 12). What is perhaps more compelling is that roughly 80% of respondents believed that foreign cultural relations organisations support activities that are unlikely to be supported by domestic institutions. Furthermore, about half of the entire set of respondents, including those who had not been involved in such a project, considered that international cultural relations organisations offered many opportunities for the exposure of Egyptian culture abroad, also a sign of impact.

Focusing then only on the Egyptian survey respondents who had engaged in a project or programme with cultural relations organisations, all were either somewhat or very satisfied with their cultural impact. The social impact of cultural relations projects and programmes was also highly rated: 88% of those who had engaged in such activities were somewhat or very satisfied with their social impact.

If outcome can be measured roughly as whether a programme or activity made a difference, the result is also perceived as highly positive among Egyptian organisations that had been involved in cultural relations directly (see Figure 14). While nearly three-quarters of Hertie School survey respondents perceived their cultural relations activity to have made a difference to the general public, and somewhat more believed it to have affected the arts community, 81% saw an impact on other organisations – like ours! Where such activities seem to have made less of a difference was at the international level: 56% of those who had cooperated with an ICO considered this to be an outcome.

All in all, Egyptian cultural actors responding to the CRD survey were quite happy with the impact of their own cultural relations activities and of international cultural relations organisations more generally. The output score in particular was boosted not only by praise for

the high quality of foreign organisations' language and training programmes, but also by appreciation for the support received that might not come from domestic sources. Though such self-assessments without objective measures need to be considered carefully, the positive attitude itself could be a sign of impact.



*Source: Hertie School survey 2018*

*Figure 14. Joint project outcomes, Egypt*

#### *Environment: political, economic and social*

As shown by the circle surrounding the centre of the CRD (see Figure 11),<sup>60</sup> the overall environment for the cultural scene and, in particular, cultural relations activities in Egypt is less than positive. Environment, as understood here, encompasses contextual factors as well as attitudes that encourage or constrain cultural relations. The score combines data on economic, social and political factors drawn mainly from population surveys (e.g. Neighbourhood

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<sup>60</sup> The initial scores were vetted at workshops held in March 2018 in Cairo with cultural relations and other cultural experts and revised to incorporate additional data.

Barometers, Gallup World Poll) and well-respected indicator data sets (e.g. V-Dem, Freedom House, USAID).

In some senses, the economic environment seems to be somewhat favourable for culture. For example, more than half of Egyptians responding to a 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer poll (European Commission 2016b) believed that private banks and for-profit companies – both national and international – contributed to the country’s cultural development a lot or to some extent. This finding, however, must be considered alongside feedback from cultural managers, who – as noted above – have perceived very little interest on the part of private companies in investing in culture. Furthermore two-thirds of Egyptians participating in the Neighbourhood Barometer saw that cultural activities contributed to the country’s economic development, a perception perhaps related to tourism and cultural heritage sites.

While cultural activities might contribute to the country’s economy, Egypt’s recent and current economic situation is not necessarily contributing to the health of the cultural scene or cultural relations. After GDP growth plummeted in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and continued to fall before the 2011 revolution, it has not yet returned to pre-crash levels. Slow growth has been accompanied by high inflation, although it returned to less extreme values in early 2018 (World Bank 2018b). Inflation has greatly increased the cost of imported consumer goods, which hit Egyptians of all social strata. Indeed, the share of Egyptians who evaluated their perceptions of where they stand now and, in the future, as ‘suffering’ (as opposed to ‘struggling’ or ‘thriving’) increased from 17% in 2016 to 37% in 2017. At the same time, the share of respondents who said they were ‘thriving’ declined from 11% to 8% (Gallup Inc. 2018).<sup>61</sup> In short, Egyptians are finding it difficult to make ends meet, and that together with such mundane obstacles as traffic congestion and long working hours, among other factors, likely affects their capacity and willingness to engage in and support cultural activities.

Egyptians’ attitudes towards culture and cultural activities form at least part of the basis for the social context in which cultural relations works. In 2014, Egyptians expressed only moderate interest in cultural activities, much in line with their perceptions regarding cultural access and participation cited earlier: while some 44% reported interest in watching or listening to cultural programmes on TV or radio, less than 10% were interested in attending a concert, ballet performance or theatre play (European Commission 2016b). It is likely that difficulties in accessing culture dampen the population’s interest, particularly in costly ‘high culture’ activities. But still, according to the results of the Neighbourhood Barometer, Egyptians understand culture as a force for good. Cultural activities were seen by some 61% of those polled as contributing to the social well-being of the country.<sup>62</sup> A slightly larger share thought that culture and cultural exchanges could play a role in developing greater understanding and tolerance.

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<sup>61</sup> For comparison, the share of Egyptians who said they were suffering in 2007, i.e. before the global crisis, was only 13%, while the share who said they were thriving stood at 25%.

<sup>62</sup> This was lower than the percentage of the Egyptian population who thought culture contributed to economic development, a reflection of the priority given by society now to economic matters as a result of frustration relating to the polarisation of post-2011 political debate.

The political environment subdimension score, Egypt’s lowest, takes into account at least two aspects. On one hand, attitudes toward cultural relations, in particular with regard to the EU, and its role in the country shape the political environment. While more than 40% of Egyptians polled for the 2014 Neighbourhood Barometer thought that the EU should play a greater role in culture and education, only 10% thought it was the most important area of cooperation and only 6% thought more aid should be devoted to it (European Commission 2018b). In other words, it would be nice, but it is clearly not the highest priority.

More important, we would argue, is the governance context, which in the case of Egypt is not favourable at the moment for the cultural scene in general and cultural relations involving civil society organisations and foreign cultural relations organisations in particular. For example, although Egypt’s new constitution, ratified by referendum in 2014, establishes guarantees for rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression, the laws and regulations remaining from pre-2011 governments have not been adjusted accordingly and, when they have been adjusted, it has mainly been further away from the constitutional rights. This mismatch is clearly reflected in low scores on governance indicators such as V-Dem’s –freedom of academic and cultural expression (Coppedge et al. 2017)<sup>63</sup> and on Freedom House’s –associational and organisational rights (Freedom House 2018).<sup>64</sup>

Already in September 2013, just months after the new constitution had been drafted (but before it was ratified), Article 78 of the penal code was amended by presidential decree to increase sanctions against those organisations that receive financial aid from foreign organisations or states and that the government deems harmful to national security. As USAID (2016, 4) reported, –the vague language of Article 78 has had a chilling effect on CSOs’ activitiesí ; many CSOs supported by foreign donors fear that the law will be used against them for carrying out legitimate, peaceful activities that are not favourable with the government

And then in May 2017, President Sisi approved Law 70 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work, which contains many provisions relevant to cultural relations actors. For example, the law provides for limits on the activities CSOs may engage in: associations and foreign NGOs are restricted to activities in the fields of development and social welfare, and those activities must align with the state’s development plan and priorities. Furthermore, certain activities, such as conducting field research and opinion polls or concluding an agreement with a foreign entity, require prior government permission. The new law also affects domestic fundraising: associations must obtain prior consent from the Ministry of Social Solidarity before they may fundraise or receive any donations. Though the detailed regulations and procedures were still under development at the time of writing, most observers consider the new CSO law to be more restrictive than the previous one, resulting in even less room for

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<sup>63</sup> The average inter-coder score for Egypt in 2017 of 1 out of 4 (0 being worst and 4 being best) indicates that freedom of academic and cultural expression is practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of government is generally met with repression.

<sup>64</sup> A score of 2 out of 12, covering freedom of assembly, freedom for NGOs, and freedom for trade unions and professional associations.

manoeuvre for independent organisations and for foreign actors and likely leading to a dampening of cultural relations activities.

## 5.2 Case Studies

### Case study selection

The selection of case studies for Egypt is informed by our key research questions and several sources and criteria: the cultural relations map; the literature review; guidance of regional experts; and advice from the British Council and Goethe-Institut local staff in Cairo. We sought to identify case studies that might illustrate and exemplify different types of cultural relations and different ways of working developed by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut in Egypt. We also had to select case studies that were viable in terms of the nature, scope and scale within the resources granted for the project and the CVM process.

The cultural relations map (see Appendix 2), reveals that few cultural relations activities in Egypt address broad values, education and/or heritage for the period 2015-2017. Because of the nature of our research questions, two of our three case studies have fallen into the cluster, represented in the upper left corner of the map.

A preliminary analysis of the Goethe-Institut cultural relations activities in Egypt suggested that those under the German Foreign Ministry's umbrella programme of transformation partnerships and focusing on cultural management would help us answer our overarching research questions of how cultural relations can have a positive and lasting impact on civil society. The cultural relation activity's overarching goal should be towards fostering support for intra-society discussion, reflecting issues within societies and providing arenas for dialogue, all through the medium of art and culture; operate at the intersection of culture and civil society; bring together the local cultural scene with Goethe-Institut staff and/or foreign and German actors to foster a vibrant exchange of ideas and experiences; and allow local partners to engage with the Goethe-Institut on equal footing, allowing them to share in the conception and implementation of the project.

Based on these criteria, local Goethe-Institut staff suggested their cultural management programme, Kulturakademie, which is a combination of a regional-wide programme for independent sector (Kulturakademie MENA) and a national programme for state sector cultural workers (Kulturakademie Egypt).<sup>65</sup> In order to complement this cultural relations programme, we suggested selecting another activity that spoke to the Goethe-Institut's strengths in promoting the visual arts, and that was aimed at a broader audience. Again, local staff suggested Goethe Film Week, the annual film screening of German and Arab films.<sup>66</sup>

A preliminary analysis of British Council projects in Egypt suggest that while cultural and arts programmes feature strongly and productively in the mapping with Goethe-Institut and would

<sup>65</sup> Kulturakademie MENA (NANO in map) is coded in the map as →broader cultural value programs, Ø →target professionals, Ø →prestige programme, Ø with →more than 1 foreign and more than 1 local partner Ø (see map, p.). Kulturakademie Egypt (Ägypten in map) is coded as →education, Ø →broader cultural value programme, Ø →1 local partner Ø

<sup>66</sup> Film Week (Filmwoche in map) is coded as →visual arts, Ø arts/cultural programme, Ø →general public, Ø →mass event, Ø and with →more than 1 local partner Ø

form a good/strategic case study, education and training projects might also make for a good complementary case study for The British Council. The Al-Azhar English Training Centre was identified by local British Council staff as well as by our regional expert in being suited to address the broader value of cultural relations for promoting peace and security as well as civil society leadership.<sup>67</sup> It allows us to explore several dimensions of cultural relations activities as it is targeted to both professionals (teachers ó foreign and local ó as an important group of cultural relations brokers) and a particular cluster of young population (Al-Azhar students), very different to those targeted by the Goethe-Institut.

It must be noted that the programmes we selected as case studies to address our research questions weren't always specifically designed in themselves to address those questions, so may be successful at fulfilling their own alternative goals. Furthermore, not all stakeholders share the same objectives. The CVM offers all participants a chance to set their own objectives and expectations for the programme through a discussion on the meaning of the components of value. Many of the findings outlined in the following sections are not related specifically to our research questions, but are important to the stakeholders involved and therefore to the programme/project and our research. The implications section at the end of each case study summarises the implications of some of these findings for our research questions.

For each of the following two case studies, we therefore explain their importance for understanding the overall research questions, we summarise the findings and recommendations coming out of the analysis done through the CVM and we highlights the implications for understanding the value of cultural relations for different stakeholder, their relationship with promoting stability and prosperity and their role in empowering future leaders and civil society.

## **Case Study1: Al -Azhar English Training Centre & the British Council**

Al-Azhar is one of the oldest universities in the Middle East. Imams from all over the Muslim world flock to Al-Azhar in Cairo for access to Higher Education, for training in religious scholarship, as well as for English language learning. This case study examines the joint programme between Al-Azhar University, and the British Council, Egypt. Its main goal is to enhance the language capacities of students in Al-Azhar education system in order to allow them to engage in a dialogue about Islam with the English-speaking world. It also aims to train Egyptian teachers in pedagogical methodologies, mentoring and management. The ultimate aim is to articulate and promote óthe true meaning of Islam, and interfaith and intercultural dialogueø (see: <http://www.alazharetc.com/en/al-azhar-english-training-centre/>).

The programme began in 2007 with the creation of a small teaching centre within Al-Azhar University. The programme currently consists of two complementary strands: Al-Azhar English Teaching Centre (AAETC), which is the focus of our study; and the Al-Azhar Institutes - a

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<sup>67</sup> Coded in cultural relations map (see appendix 2) as óeducation,ø óbroader cultural value programme,ø ó1 local partnerø

network of some nine thousand Al-Azhar primary and secondary schools across Egypt, which are not covered by this study.<sup>68</sup> AAETC is a teaching centre providing English classes through the General English Programme and the English for Religious Purposes course (ERP), as well as soft skills to selected students from the Faculty of Islamic Studies. There are also associated projects such as Young Azhari Voices ó a debating project part of the British Council supported wider programme [Young Arab Voices](#).

British Council and Al-Azhar University seek to work via two sets of brokers: the teachers (between British Council and students) and the student Imams and theology scholars (between Al-Azhar and the Muslim diaspora and non-Muslim world). Both teachers and students play active roles in the process. Our case study demonstrates that they have multi-faceted agendas of their own, sometimes seeking and finding benefits that are not anticipated by British Council or Al-Azhar management.

#### *What is Al-Azhar English Training Centre a case study of?*

The case of the Al-Azhar English Training Centre is an opportunity to better understand the interplay between cultural relations and social change as well as the boundaries between cultural relations and what can be perceived as soft power in the Egyptian context. It also allows us to explore how cultural relations can benefit the reforms in the education sector in Egypt. The case study can offer insights into the extent to which the partnership is achieving its goals of training imams and theology students and skilling them up for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It allows for an assessment of the extent to which expectations and goals are aligned among stakeholders ó whether and to what extent, for example, the strategic aim of promoting moderate Islam through its English teaching is shared by students and teachers.

#### *Constellation for Al-Azhar English Training Centre*

As described in Section 5.3 above, we calculate a score for each Component of Value, using data from different stakeholder perspectives collected in CVM surveys and two workshops conducted in Cairo.

The two workshops were very well attended reaching up to 60 participants. There was a good response to CVM surveys too which allows for robust results in this case study.<sup>69</sup> Participants at workshops were eager to talk to us. During workshop 1 participants articulated what their expectations were and during workshop 2 they were able to assess the extent to which they were met. The conversations that took place at the workshops were very much valued and highlighted a gap in responding to their need for being listened to as valuable stakeholders. Participants at

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
<sup>68</sup> British Council and Al-Azhar are piloting a programme of Special Classes, in which selected students follow a communicative English language programme.

<sup>69</sup> Survey scores come from surveys carried out amongst strategic teams at British Council and Al-Azhar, delivery teams (teachers) and users (students and alumni). Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and five questions per component. Response levels were relatively high for Egypt: there were 6 Strategic responses, 20 Delivery and 50 Users. The group scores come from four workshop groups. The shaded area represent the range of scores from groups.

the second workshop reported that some action had already been taken as a result of the first CVM workshops and the feedback given by the participants in the first round. This is a very positive outcome for the Cultural Value Project.

For AAETC, the strategic segment includes members of the senior management team at British Council and Al-Azhar, as well as those that work directly at AAETC. The delivery segment consists of the Egyptian teachers of English working at AAETC. Users are mainly Egyptian Al-Azhar students and alumni. Some are postgraduate students while others now work at Al-Azhar or AAETC. One female alumna who attended had been awarded a PhD scholarship funded by the British Council -UK Embassy and Al-Azhar. She is now studying Comparative Theology in the UK with the hope of contributing to faith diplomacy.

The constellation below summarises the scores given to each value component. In subsequent sections we interpret and analyse these findings.



*Figure 15: Constellations for Al-Azhar. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.*

### *Summary of findings*

- The Cultural Value Constellation above shows scores based on data from both workshops and CVM survey. These indicate that the Al-Azhar English Centre is very much appreciated by students, teachers and Al-Azhar management. There are some very high scores particularly for appreciation. However, there are also some low scores below the designated level of sustainable performance (or the Band of Equilibrium). For example, collaboration, participation and opportunity are not scored highly and as we will explain below remain somewhat problematic.

### *Users*

- When considering the *opportunities* offered by Al-Azhar, students offered the lowest of scores. While most students in our workshops acknowledged that the AAETC provided new opportunities, these were not deemed to be enough. It became clear that the programme did not deliver according to their expectations. Students requested more opportunities to progress at a faster pace up the English Language Learning qualifications ladder. They also expressed a strong desire to interact more with Anglophone culture and society. Most importantly, in the Egyptian context of low and limited employment prospects, they had hoped that their newly acquired skills would open up new employment opportunities. For most this did not happen and this was a disappointment. Alumni, for example, criticised the lack of support and contact once the programme was over. They called for a more sustainable level of support and continuous training ( - teaching with no interruption). The creation and maintenance of an alumni network on social media would be a massive step forward in this direction.
- While a core strategic objective of the programme is to help promote the true meaning of Islam and interfaith and intercultural dialogue, this goal hardly featured in the discussion with students. Though they were aware of it, they were much more concerned about the *utility* of the programme for their future prospects, about opportunities for networking, making a living, with the employment and academic opportunities that AAETC could offer in Egypt and abroad.
- Students expressed a good deal of *appreciation* for their Egyptian teachers of English and felt a strong bond with them. They particularly appreciate The Soliya Connect Program as an example of the type of cross-cultural networking experience they expect from the AAETC.

### *Delivery*

- Teachers recognise their role as cultural mediators but also lament the limitations they experience in fulfilling this role to the professional level to which they aspire. They cite lack of resources, lack of equity in the pay and treatment of Al-Azhar teachers (as compared with

BCstaff) as contributing to feelings of not being recognised and rewarded as they should be.<sup>70</sup>

- The *quality* of the teaching, materials and range of methods used was valued positively by teachers and students. However, teachers are very concerned about the lack of progress and level of attainment among some students who only have to attend classes in order to pass. Some do not take their studies seriously and prevent others from progressing. Such students, it was argued, should not be allowed to pass simply for attending.
- Teachers requested more opportunities to immerse themselves in British culture.
- Teachers would welcome more *professional* support, development and assessment of their progress, as well as greater equal opportunities in promotions. Guidelines for promotion are not clear. Promotion opportunities, they argued should be well-advertised and offer greater transparency in how schemes are run.

#### Strategic

- *Participation* on the programme lacks of inclusiveness. Gender equality should be improved, according to teachers and students: from increasing the number of female undergraduate students and PhD scholarships to opening up the number of managerial positions offered to female members of staff. Participants also felt that much more could be done to promote the centre within Al-Azhar and beyond, across the Muslim diaspora.
- Even though dialogue was positively scored by the British Council and Al-Azhar management, there was little evidence either expressed by students or that could be discerned from workshops about the impact of *dialogue* generated by the partnership on attitudes or behaviour. Nonetheless, students expressed appreciation of the role of AAETC in promoting inter-faith dialogue and agreed that it could, in principle, help avoid and resolve conflicts and promote security and stability. But some pointed out that this is not the role of the centre. Others praised Young Al-Azhari Voices for achieving much better intercultural dialogue.
- The *partnership* between British Council and the Al-Azhar was regarded positively and all parties were happy for it to continue, but agreed that the relationship also needs to improve and evolve and to take their vision to new and exciting places.

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<sup>70</sup> One BC manager explained to us that the British Council employs one project manager (who is Egyptian) and one Senior Teacher Trainer (who is British) who work full time on the Al-Azhar project. The teachers on the project are all employed by Al-Azhar. Al Azhar doesn't employ UK staff at the English Training Centre. Al Azhar do not pay the British Council for the project ó it is grant funded. The British Council team based at the Al-Azhar English Training Centre do not do the same work as the Al-Azhar teachers or the academic management team.

### *Implications for research questions*

- Underpinning the AA-BC partnership is a practical -theory of changeø about how systemic reform of the higher education sector will help strengthen civil society and cultivate future leaders, as well as reduce conflict. It is a remarkable achievement that the British Council has managed to sustain an excellent and cordial set of relations with AA management for over a decade.
- The number of students who have benefitted is indeed impressive and there is clear appreciation for the staff and their teaching. The ways in which they were able to articulate their views in English at the workshops and the investment in their learning was deeply impressive and a reflection of the high quality teaching they received
- Moreover, the very fact that this partnership exists and functions as well as it does, despite some inevitable as well as avoidable problems, bears testimony to the hard work, political will and devotion of successive managers on both sides ó as well as teachers and students. This is the context in which all other implications below for our research questions must be interpreted.
- Strong partnerships are key to ensure that when problems arise there is a door open for dialogue and the workshops certainly provided such an opportunity that was warmly welcomed by all participants. Ensuring that there is a broad -culture of dialogueø within CR institutions is vital to their success as goals have to be communicated and aligned and this is difficult and time-consuming given many competing interests and limitations of resources.
- The warm satisfaction with the partnership expressed by both the British Council and Al-Azhar strategic and management teams seems to represent good CRs. Teachers and students did not always share such positive views, alerting us to a disjunction in judgement which we explain below and which have implications for the degree of success of long-term strategic goals.
- AA Egyptian teachers appreciated their jobs and training but did not always feel as if they were treated as equal and valued members of staff when compared with their British counterparts. They reported a sense of being treated as passive recipients of British culture, while having limited access to the UK ó either through opportunities to travel to the UK, communicate with British people, or consume cultural and artistic products.
- Mutuality, what it is and how it should be put into practice, is understood differently by different actors but the notion of mutual benefit nevertheless sets up expectations. Any perceived lack of a two-way, balanced, even-handed reciprocal cultural exchange can damage prospects of good cultural relations.
- While students were (albeit rather dimly) aware that intercultural dialogue and faith diplomacy are long term strategic objectives, their preoccupations centred much more on

more immediate and short-term personal objectives, like employability, opportunity and the utility of programme. This is a patterned response on *societies in transition* where prospects are so limited so users often harbour exceedingly high and unrealistic expectations which may be difficult for the CR organisation to expel.

- Good CRs need to balance corporate, societal and long-term impact goals with individuals' short-term objectives.
- While there is evidence of some inter-faith dialogue taking place between Al-Azhar students and English speakers it was felt to be very limited. Evidencing the impact of intercultural dialogue would require longer-term research among alumni.
- A good balance between the reach and the quality of programme leads to good CRs
- Stakeholders commonly agree that gender equality should be improved on different levels (e.g. the number of female students and of PhD scholarships offered to female graduates, and the number of managerial positions offered to female members of staff). Good CRs need to be inclusive and promote gender equality. This is especially important in *societies in transition*
- The benefits of acquiring new skills and opportunities for networking are essential to good CRs but in need of some improvement, especially regarding continuity and sustainability.
- The importance of local cultural brokers cannot be exaggerated. This includes those working for the British Council, the teachers and the students. Students are to become (it is hoped) leaders-in-the-making. They are encouraged to communicate their knowledge of *true Islam* to peers in the English-speaking world, but the opportunities to do so are limited.
- The partnership with AA, it is hoped, allows for the diffusion of values that Britain cherishes. This diffusion model can work well through this stable decade-long partnership. However, values are not always shared and, as explained above, a perception of instrumentalism and a one-way partnership poses a high risk for good cultural relations which work best when there is a high level of reciprocity and mutual benefit.
- Promoting stability and conflict reduction at a societal level requires interaction with those holding different and opposing views and an ability to negotiate differences and conflicts. It is unclear whether such skills in diplomatic resolution of conflicts is required or even the role of cultural relations actors.

## **Case Study 2: Kulturakademie MENA, Kulturakademie Egypt & Goethe-Institut**

### *Kulturakademie MENA*

Kulturakademie MENA is a regional programme funded within the framework of the German Foreign Office Transformation Partnership between Germany and the Arab World. The project offers training in cultural management for those working in or aspiring to work in cultural sector in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA).

The programme took place for the seventh time between 24 April and 2 June 2017. A 6-week training course was offered to 15 prospective cultural managers in Berlin. The aim is for these participants to pass on their newly acquired skills and knowledge as multipliers within their institutions ó operating, in effect, a cascade training model (similar to Active Citizens but on a much smaller scale).

The target group of beneficiaries include independent, non-state actors from different cultural disciplines from the entire MENA region. The number of applications has steadily increased since 2011 ó not surprising perhaps in a context of scarcity of such opportunities.

The cultural management training is conducted by both Arab and German trainers (in English). Participants are from Algeria, Egypt, GCC Countries, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Selection is made by the Goethe-Institut and an independent Arab cultural organisation Al Mawred Al Thaqafy or Culture Resource (2015-2016 edition). The programme in its present form has now finished due to budgetary constraints and the Goethe-Institut is working on reshaping its future with the help of former participants.<sup>71</sup>

### *Kulturakademie Egypt*

Kulturakademie Egypt is the local/national version of Kulturakademie MENA. It started in 2013 and aims to professionalise up to 20 staff from the Egyptian Ministry of Culture as well as other state-funded cultural institutions. In addition to participants from Cairo, people from Alexandria and other provinces also participate.

Two-day modules on various topics of cultural management are offered by trainers from Germany. In addition to basic knowledge in project management, change management and budget planning, the participants are trained in marketing for public institutions, communication and presentation techniques.

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<sup>71</sup> Stakeholders from the strategic team have anticipated restrictions of budget for the years following the September 2017 German elections. Participants and members of the alumni have been informed that the Kulturakademie MENA training would no longer exist in its current form. In the occasion of the 2017 CVM workshops, all stakeholders have been invited to think collaboratively about a less expensive version of the programme. 7 participants took part in a focus group: graduates from the Middle Eastern Kulturakademie Programme / curators and cultural managers working in partnership with different private institutions (civil society organisations, foreign offices, NGOs), plus ex of organisations: Mawred al Thaqafy, the Swiss Cultural office, Eman Zaky Alexandria project.

The Training-of-Trainers (ToT) module then links former participants in the Kulturakademie Egypt with the Egyptian alumni of Kulturakademie MENA and trains them as multipliers who then disseminate their skills knowledge within their institutions. Approximately 10-12 participants are taken through practical examples of how they themselves can prepare training and enable interactive, experiential learning.

#### *What is Kulturakademie a case study of?*

Kulturakademie operates a hybrid cascade and network model of cultural relations. It offers training and conducts research in cultural management, providing initial training for individuals who then go on to provide training for others. The Training of Trainers (ToT) programmes for cultural managers work across the non-state and state sector.

Kulturakademie MENA provides an exchange programme for cultural managers in the MENA region. It aims to develop skills and build the cultural infrastructure in civil society. It offers training to a limited community of beneficiaries, with the expectation that the knowledge is shared thought the participants' networks. It is a prestige programme that adopts an individualised approach within a network model of cultural relations.

Kulturakademie Egypt aims to develop skills and challenge hierarchical structures in the state sector. It is a prestige programme (subtle/implicit) and an individualised approach. It is low funding in comparison to Kulturakademie MENA and a programme with lower reach, although the participant level is set by the Ministry of Culture and not Goethe-Institut.

#### *Constellations for Kulturakademie MENA and Kulturakademie Egypt*

As described in Section 5.3 above, we calculate a score for each Component of Value, using data from different stakeholder perspectives collected in workshops and CVM surveys.

Workshops were well attended by beneficiaries of Kulturakademie Egypt and Kulturakademie MENA (around 18 Kulturakademie alumni, excluding Goethe-Institut staff and workshop trainers). The strategic segment consisted of members of Goethe-Institut staff involved in the management of the project. During workshop 1, they were joined by academics from the American University in Cairo with expertise and professional experience in the arts and culture industry. In-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with trainers (delivery), absent from workshops. Kulturakademie Egypt and Kulturakademie MENA users were divided into two groups during workshop 1 and in four mixed groups during workshop 2.

The constellations below summarise the scores given to each value component. Separate constellations are shown for Kulturakademie Egypt and Kulturakademie MENA. In subsequent sections we interpret and analyse these findings.




Figure 16: Constellation for Kulturakademie MENA. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Survey scores come from CVM surveys carried out amongst managers, delivery teams and users. Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and nine questions per component. The Group scores come from two workshop groups. Neither group gave a score for Participation. Of the three CVM segments, only two – Strategic and Users – were represented at workshops 1 and 2, but we were able to interview 2 trainers following the same structure. For the strategic team, the group consisted of members of GI staff involved in the management of the project along with academic from the American University in Cairo with expertise and professional experience in the arts and culture industry. The Users were in two separate groups, for State and Independent. During workshop 2, state and non-state cultural managers were mixed in groups. The tensions between these two groups are reflected in our findings. MENA participants during workshop 2 did not score participation. Shaded areas represent where range of scores were varied.




Figure 17: Constellation for Kulturakademie Egypt. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Survey scores come from CVM surveys carried out amongst managers, delivery teams and users. Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and nine questions per component. The Group scores come from two workshop groups. A number of the components were scored by only one of the workshop groups, hence the shaded area does not apply to all components.

## *Summary of findings (Kulturakademie MENA and Kulturakademie Egypt)*

### Users

- *Appreciation* for KA MENA and Egypt was generally very high. Although slightly higher scores were awarded to KA MENA, in both cases there was a wider variation in scores than for other components suggesting a divergence of opinion. Still it should be noted that all scores are above the -band of equilibrium<sup>74</sup> and so KA is considered to be performing well. It was clear that scores were shaped by one's positioning in the sector. Experiences of Kulturakademie Egypt (state sector) were unsurprisingly very different to Kulturakademie MENA (non-state) and the research team perceived deep divisions between the state and non-state cultural sector, which appeared to damage opportunities for synergy in the cultural sector as a whole. Cultural workers in the state sector were seen as a privileged, secure in their employment but supine with regard to state control. In contrast, cultural workers in the independent sector found it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to make a living or even to work part-time at their chosen cultural profession. The exigencies of earning a living took such a toll on their energies and this was compounded by fears of censorship and/or state violence was expressed vociferously in our CVM workshops.
- Participants at the workshops nevertheless expressed the urgent need to bridge the gap between the two sectors of the Egyptian cultural scene. The state sector expressed more willingness to find common ground with the non-state sector. The non-state sector do not trust those working in the state sector and even fear the consequences of being exposed to the authorities if their artworks are considered to be too subversive. Both overt and self-censorship operate to stifle the public cultural scene in Egypt. As a result, the cultural underground is much more vibrant, assertive and innovative and ready to challenge the status quo. The independent sector called for more support from the Goethe-Institut rather than trust the state-sector cultural workers.
- *Opportunity* scored unevenly across the board and programmes. While some users expressed satisfaction with the programme others criticised the follow-up which, it was argued, could have raised more specific questions and recommendations based on preliminary findings.
- *Utility* was also questioned. Participants in Kulturakademie Egypt reported difficulties in applying their new skills in their everyday professional life. Participants in Kulturakademie MENA suggested the training could have been more beneficial in the long run if participants were offered the chance to apply for a small grant and put their knowledge into practice.<sup>74</sup> They complained that the training was too theoretical and not relevant to the Egyptian cultural scene as base assumptions were taken from the German cultural scene.
- Users from the Kulturakademie MENA programme reported that the training was very beneficial in offering them the *opportunity* to network with their peers from across the

<sup>74</sup> It should be noted that this is something that the Goethe-Institut actually provides for their alumni. Participants can apply for the project development fund of up to 3000€ to implement the project ideas with which they had initially applied with to attend the program. At least five projects were funded every year.

MENA region. They also appreciated learning from the minority of Arab-speaking trainers with an experience of working in the region, introduced by the Goethe-Institut to balance the mainly German approach to cultural management.

- Kulturakademie Egypt agreed with Kulturakademie MENA participants saying that they appreciated having the opportunity to network and exchange ideas with their peers. They also emphasised the fact that the training did not always provide realistically applicable knowledge in the Egyptian context.

Users from the Kulturakademie MENA programme asserted that immersion in a German cultural environment was an important incentive and facilitated interaction between professionals from the region and the German cultural scene.

#### **Delivery**

- Delivery teams agreed with users that the *quality* of the training in Germany could be improved and should be less theoretical and provide a more relevant toolkit on different aspects of cultural management in situations of political conflict, for example, crisis management, public relations and fundraising from international organisations and foundations. This was the perception despite the Goethe-Institut's efforts to mitigate this by ensuring that all participants apply with a project idea that is presented to the trainers in advance with the request to include it into the training in order to ensure a practical approach. Trainers also suggested that a more pragmatic approach would help monitor participants' progress over time and enable greater sustainability of programmes.
- Quality scored lower in the workshop than in the survey because trainers were considered to have a relatively low understanding of the professional needs and challenges faced by participants of Kulturakademie MENA as well as Kulturakademie Egypt.

The delivery team stated that the environment of Kulturakademie Egypt training was not favourable for *collaborative learning*, which was partly due to hierarchical divisions within the Ministry of Culture.

#### **Strategic**

- *Participation* is seen as good. Kulturakademie MENA is oversubscribed. Participation in Kulturakademie Egypt is decided by the Egyptian state – so this has profound implications for selection. Whether the programme is inclusive and representative across the board of state-managed cultural organisations is impossible to say. But perhaps a certain exclusivity is the price to be paid for keeping the partnership going?
- Cultural managers working in state institutions resented perceptions of them as ‘puppets of the state’ by the independent cultural sector. They also resented not being offered opportunities to participate in Kulturakademie MENA. However, this is somehow justified

by the fact that the Goethe-Institut is keener to offer the same training to a broader range of applicants, thereby refusing to introduce a culture of clientelism.

- The strategic team see Kulturakademie MENA as an opportunity for professionals to network and exchange ideas with other actors working in the independent cultural sector who share the same challenges across the MENA region.

Strategic team and users reported satisfaction with the *partnerships* in the independent sector, but there is a recognized need to redefine the terms of the engagement due to limitations in the budgetary context.

#### *Implications for research questions*

- Understanding and responding to the political situation in Egypt where many independent artists and cultural workers state they are marginalised, oppressed and feel desperate is extremely difficult. Several workshop participants and cultural relations -insidersø (later interviewed) noted increased rates of depression among their peers and even a number of suicides among artists and intellectuals due to threat of or actual political violence. Censorship and surveillance of independent artists and cultural activists who challenge state authorities was, they reported, widespread. Add economic hardship to this mix (the inability of most independent cultural workers and activists to earn a living) and it is not hard to appreciate the hostile circumstances in which KA Egypt has to operate. Such a programme requires great sensitivity to context. Goethe-Institut does indeed demonstrate tact and sensitivity to these difficulties. Given this context its capacity to contribute to conflict reduction or resolution is necessarily limited, small-scale and depends on a long-term strategy.
- The challenges facing cultural workers and Kulturakademie programmes reflect wider problems for foreign cultural institutes in -societies in transitionø in mediating relationships between conflicted cultural actors and in playing a role as cultural brokers ø promoting intercultural dialogue and exchange. The -elephant in the roomø for many workshop participants was (they later stressed in interviews), the security situation. Both they and Goethe-Institut must walk a tight-rope to avoid confrontations with authorities so difficult trade-offs are inevitable.
- In providing a politically neutral cultural space and diplomatic immunity on site Goethe-Institut is, according to participants from the independent sector, very helpful and useful. An alternative cultural environment can be created that helps a small number of people. This creates a perception that Goethe- Institute works with a limited number of -regularsø or -usual suspectsø who benefit repeatedly. This kind of perception, no matter how unjustified, is damaging to good cultural relations.
- Greater synergies between different sectors of the independent cultural industry could be created in time and better use could be made of the premises themselves. This could help stimulate productivity and creativity in the local cultural scene, allowing new spaces for artistic forms of political expression to take shape.

- Managing the visibility and invisibility of artists and projects was stated as among the most important and crucial aspects of cultural relations in this context ó determining success or failure.
- Creating opportunities for Egyptian and MENA cultural professionals to network and share experiences internationally and regionally can help mitigate the frustration caused by the deepening economic and political instability across the region.
- Deploying cascade and network models of cultural relations effectively to multiply effects and widen participation could address some of the challenges. For example, providing online interactive training resources would enable cultural workers to train themselves and network international (and in so doing bypass state authorities) and could be fruitful in affording creative freedoms and helping promote cultural rights and perhaps foster the kind of independence and autonomy the Goethe-Institut seek to cultivate among the cultural workers/project that they help create. For example, the Arabic MOOC on cultural policy and cultural management which is supposed to be the next step following the Kulturakademie, which would help build capacities in the field of cultural management in the whole region.

### **Case Study 3: Film Week & Goethe-Institut**

Film Week (‐Film Week: A Matter of Perspective‐) is a Goethe-Institut film screening programme that has taken place annually since 2013, featuring new German and Arabic feature films and documentaries. The screenings in Cairo transferred from the popular downtown centre to the Goethe-Institut in Doqqi. Although an impressively designed new building, it may appear as more inaccessible because it is no longer located in the city centre. . Since 2015 a smaller selection of films has also been screened in Alexandria, Assiut, El Minia, Mansoura, Ismailia, Damanhour, Sohag, Luxor and Assuan.

Films are shown subtitled in English and/or Arabic and entry is free. On occasion, the director(s) of a film or one of the artists involved is present for discussion with the public. Topics of 2017 Film Week discussions included migration, the meaning of home, revolution, war, family and women's rights. These and other topics are discussed by and with film makers, experts and the audience during the week. During the 2017 festival (269 May) films screened included Anne Zohra Berrached's *24 Weeks*, the black comedy *Toni Erdmann*, Kurdish filmmaker Soleen Youssef *House without Roof*, and Iman Kamel's *Egyptian Jeanne d'Arc*. Film Week is time-tested format used more widely by the Goethe-Institut to promote culture exchange and intercultural dialogue and to bring perspectives from Germany to the cultural scene in Egypt.

#### *What is Film Week a case study of?*

Film Week trains and gives opportunities to people in the Egyptian films scene to meet and network with each other and with foreign film makers. It provides a ‐safe space‐for public debate about important and relevant social issues through the film screenings of German and Arab productions. It aims to build trust and mutual understanding. Its audience is relatively small and comprises a regular circle of film makers, screenwriters, distributors and others in the film

scene. It also aims to reach larger local populations in big cities and rural areas with more popular independent films. It is a low funding, low reach programme that is aimed at the general public through the screenings, but also works with small circles of dedicated individuals at local level (e.g. through workshops). This personalised and localised approach is much appreciated by those who benefit, but this also raises issues of inclusion and diversity and the inevitable trade-offs in value, as we shall see below.

Film Week is an important initiative because it forces us to reflect on how different audiences engage with and relate to cultural relations depending on their commitment to cultural activism and political engagement. Audiences' engagement with Film Week involves a willingness to debate taboo issues openly and publicly (albeit with diplomatic immunity) and in so doing take some risks. Film Week also requires us to think about how foreign cultural institutes respond to local cultural actors who are marginalised (due to limited cultural and economic capital) and as a result under-represented in the mainstream cultural sphere, as well as how they negotiate between the expectations of different audiences.

### *Constellation for Film Week*


The CVM workshops were attended by small numbers ó 18 people including Goethe-Institut staff. Members of the general public ó the key target for the screenings themselves ó were not represented in these workshops. The CVM surveys, likewise elicited relatively few respondents in a first round on-line, but users were then reached via another film screening, Montags in Missaha.<sup>75</sup> Montags in Missaha is another Goethe-Institut film screening programme that attracts a similar audience to Film Week. Since viewers of Film Week were difficult to reach on-line, CVM surveys were distributed among the audience of Montags in Missaha that had also attended Film Week. We then got a high response to the hard copy versions of survey from the audiences of Film Week also present at these screenings (149 respondents).<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Survey scores come from on-line surveys carried out amongst strategic team (Goethe-Institut Cairo staff) and delivery/users (people involved in the film sector or in Film Week). Since we could not reach a broader audience of Film Week, we triangulated the surveys scores with another survey answered by audience to another film festival, Montags in Missaha. Component scores are average of scores for a number of questions; there were between two and five questions per component. Response levels were low on-line and for strategic and delivery segments: the maximum number of respondents for any question was 10; all questions were answered by at least four people. Response levels were high for paper surveys aimed at Montags in Missaha users, with 149 respondents, but we did not include these in the constellation as it is not the programme discussed during workshops. The Group scores come from two workshop groups. Only one group gave scores in the Strategic component and neither group scored Partnerships, as they felt they did not know enough about them.

<sup>76</sup> Montags in Missaha is another Goethe-Institut film screening programme that attracts a similar audience to Filmwoche. Since viewers of Filmwoche were difficult to reach on-line, surveys of user segment were distributed among the audience of Montags in Missaha. The scores from this survey largely coincide with average scores given by users to Film Week (Appreciation scored 5.4 by FW and 5.5 by MiM; Utility scored 5.9 by FW and 5.4 by MiM and Opportunity scored 5.9 by FW and 6.1 by MiM). Montags in Missaha has been running since 2017. It is a successor project to Montags in Bustan, which was organised in 2016. It screens movies in Cairo. This programme was not part of CVM workshops, but surveys have been used to triangulate Film Week user scores.

The constellation below summarises the scores given to each value component. In subsequent sections we interpret and analyse these findings.



*Figure 18: Constellation for Film Week. It combines data from CVM surveys and workshop 2 (groups). Shaded area represents the higher and lower range of scores given by the different groups.*

Three main perspectives are represented in the constellation and investigated in the following presentation and analysis of findings: (i) the strategic segment at Goethe-Institut; the delivery segment consisting of film producers, screenwriters; film students (some of which were involved in Film Week as volunteers), film distributors and marketing company representatives; and the users/ audiences of the film programme. These include members of public, film students and fans and German language students.

Although Film Week targets a large audience, it offers a range of activities that are highly appealing to film-lovers with a highly educated taste in film. As a result, it has also consolidated a public made of young professionals or aspiring filmmakers or film students with well-defined artistic tastes and strong political awareness. This user group comes to Film Week with high expectations. They are very eager to gain experience of filmmaking and associated practices from workshops and debates with foreign filmmakers.

## *Summary of Findings*

### *Users*

- CVM workshops reported that Film Week is very much *appreciated* by users and highly positive feedback was recorded in the CVM survey. Local film industry professionals involved in the programme are also very enthusiastic about Film Week, although they were more prone to criticise of some aspects of it.
- Participants gave *opportunity* the highest score, followed by *utility* and *appreciation*.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless users in the workshops argued that the programme could offer even more opportunities for networking with relevant sectors of the independent film sector, and for their personal professional development.

### *Delivery*

- Delivery teams awarded *collaboration* the highest of all scores in the focus groups. They reflected on the ways in which the team worked very hard with various organisations outside Cairo to bring independent films to audiences who would otherwise not have access. The challenges of working in this local context should not be underestimates. Nevertheless, collaboration was scored much lower by survey respondents who would like to see closer co-operation with a wider group of organisations.
- Differences in opinion were also expressed when discussing the *quality* and *professionalism* of the programme. It was widely praised for tackling contentious socio-political and taboo issues relevant to the Egyptian context, but the lack of opportunities for networking and professional development was a repeated source of concern. However, this is partly due to the fact that the most dedicated members of the audience experience it from a professional perspective, hoping that the event could act as a platform for networking and professional development.

### *Strategic*

- Film Week achieves a good level of active participation and reaches an appropriate range of different groups ó younger audiences, rural populations, the general public, new audiences, film students, German students, according to the members of the strategic team.<sup>78</sup>
- Advertising and promoting the programme is adequate but could take better advantage of the opportunities social media afford to widen participation at Film Week, but also it was

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<sup>77</sup> Estimates from workshop 2 are ranked higher than the original survey scores for these four values. *Collaboration* even rises beyond 6, after scoring an average of 5.4 based on the answers from 4 survey delivery respondents.

<sup>78</sup> Data for 2016 indicates that Goethe-Institut screened 21 films with an overall audience of 7,100 people, and held 4 lectures/talks with up to 500 participants. Data for 2017 needed.

stressed, to promote better use of the Goethe-Institut archive. This is considered to be an underexploited resource.

- Those attending the debates after the film screenings highlighted the benefits of *dialogue* and expressed very open-minded opinions when discussing films about socio-political and ethical issues. But they also recognised that their open and tolerant views were not always shared or tolerated by the wider public. Some discussions after films depicting controversial issues were not, according to some workshop participants, handled particularly sensitively. Some audience members had felt compelled to leave.
- Film Week enables new (formal) *partnerships* to develop with a range of cultural institutions in Egypt, but as with (more informal) collaboration could do more to promote new partnerships via social media.
- Goethe-Institut tends to work with small groups of people in a focussed and intensive manner. They work on *-edgyø* projects and this is very valued by beneficiaries. What might appear to be relatively low levels of *participation* in the programme are in line with strategic teamsøexpectations (cf. p.15). They are acutely aware of political sensitivities and must therefore walk a tightrope between independent and activist cultural workers and other local cultural constituencies.

The strategy and delivery teams expressed differences in opinion about the fundamental objectives of the programme and whether the primary purpose was dialogue and/or cultural exchange and/or partnerships and/or reaching a large number of people. It was felt by delivery teams that Film Week needs a clearer identity ó it falls between two stools ó neither a film festival nor a programme and this is confusing for audiences. The growing competition for film events and festivals requires Goethe-Institut to re-think the programme and devise a new marketing strategy. These discussions were already underway. Nevertheless, what is clear is that a misalignment of goals may arise due to different aspirations but this creates confusion and tensions that inhibit impact. Goethe-Institut staff are well aware of this.

#### *Implications for research questions*

- To achieve the strategic goal of creating and sustaining intercultural *dialogue and cultural exchange* certain trade-offs are being carefully negotiated by Goethe-Institut - for example, striking the right balance between tackling contentious or taboo topics and respecting local cultural sensitivities. Opening cultural programmes up to wider publics might provoke debate and interactions between people holding opposing views about sensitive subjects like gender segregation or homosexuality. Further trade-offs are being negotiated between maintaining a foothold in Egypt, working on *-edgyø* projects, with cultural activists to promote pro-social change while not upsetting state authorities and censorship protocols.
- While Goethe-Institut is keen to support local initiatives in the aftermath of political instability in post-2011 Middle East, they also have to justify their activities and manage

their visibility and that of their beneficiaries with great tact and care so as not to expose cultural and film activists. As a result, it is sometimes difficult to fully communicate goals and activities without incurring diplomatic or reputational damage – and this can lead to a certain defensiveness that is counter-productive.

- Goethe-Institut manage these trade-offs very well on the whole but perhaps could perhaps do more to reduce hierarchical relations inside and outside the organisation, become more welcoming and approachable to more diverse groups, and to communicate goals and constraints to users and to manage expectations.
- There was plenty of evidence that the new Doqqi Goethe-Institut building though regarded as beautiful and modern did not lend itself to being accessible – symbolically or socially, geographically or materially. Finding ways to overcome this sense of social and physical remoteness and unapproachability will be important for the future success of achieving strategic goals.

### 5.3 Summary of Findings and Implications: Egypt

The context for cultural relations in Egypt is quite mixed.

- As seen in the Cultural Relations Diamond for Egypt (Figure 11), Egyptian cultural actors perceive their own work has having high levels of impact and consider themselves to practice, transfer and generate values significantly. The level of organisation within the cultural relations sector is moderate, as is the vibrancy of cultural relations, which is hindered by relatively low access to cultural goods and services. The environment in which cultural relations takes place is the weakest dimension, reflecting primarily an unfavourable political environment.
- The sharp distinction between state and independent cultural actors, especially noticeable in the art scene, as detected both through the cultural actors mapping process and CVM workshops, shapes to a great extent the way cultural relations play out in Egypt, the kinds of value that can be generated, and the capacity of cultural relations actors to have any impact on conflict reduction or leadership and civil society development. Foreign cultural relations organisations must walk the fine line between on the one hand, trying to build bridges between state and independent actors and facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation (and thereby generating value), and on the other hand, protecting potentially controversial independent artists from state interference and providing them with safe spaces for cultural expression.

In this context, what value can cultural relations create?

- The main benefits of cooperation with international cultural organisations identified across our research in Egypt are more interest from the general public and better outreach for programmes and events.
- Though funding was not perceived as the main benefit in CRD research, a large majority of respondents in Egypt agreed that international cultural relations organisations support projects that would not receive support from domestic institutions.
- Opportunities for working with business or with the state were far down the list of perceived benefits, probably less reflecting a desire to cooperate than the ability or success of cultural relations to achieve it in the Egyptian context. It could also be that cultural actors are unaware of the benefits of properly conducted collaboration and simply lack good models to follow.
- CVM participants valued the cultural relations programmes and projects they worked with primarily for funding, followed by networking opportunities and learning new skills. While CVM respondents raised caveats to all of these benefits (seed corn funding not enough, networks not sustainable beyond project or skills not wholly appropriate to Egyptian or context), all users highly appreciated their relationship with the international cultural relations organisations and participation in cultural relations activities.

Given that these are the values that are generated through cultural relations, how can cultural relations help reduce conflict and strengthen civil society and future leaders?

- In Egypt, the environment is not entirely favourable on several fronts. The population's access to cultural goods overall is hampered, mainly due to cost, location and time factors, as well as educational level and cultural capital. Interest in cultural activities provided by foreign cultural relations organisations and/ or independent cultural actors might be difficult to harness. If international cultural relations institutions intend to have a positive effect, they need to be mindful of barriers to access to culture and work on a better matching between cultural form and target audience.
- Although cultural relations activities target a variety of vulnerable groups in society and cover different types of cultural forms, there is a perception among a sizeable minority of CRD survey respondents that there is a degree of socio-economic and geographical exclusivity, as well as a tendency to favour certain organisations as partners (though less so than in Ukraine).
- More work could be done to change the public perception of culture's positive effects on society and international understanding, in order to generate a more favourable environment for cultural relations.
- Cultural relations activities may contribute to improving dialogue, but given the Egyptian political context, they cannot resolve or reduce conflicts on their own. While more longitudinal studies are needed, our research highlights that the very presence of foreign cultural relations organisations – not only as non-state actors, but also as providers of opportunities and witnesses of the independent cultural scene – is symbolically highly significant and appreciated.
- While there seem to be fewer cultural relations activities in Egypt that target civil society or are designed to empower future leaders, the majority of organisations responding to the CRD survey agree that cultural relations organisations are contributing to the development of civil society and supporting future leaders (84% of all responding organisation in Egypt agree). Participants in cultural relations activities, whether local staff employed by the foreign actor or beneficiaries of programmes, already act as cultural brokers, building on and enhancing their cultural and social capital. Moreover, the fact that more than half of the Egyptian population thinks that both religious organisations and NGOs support the development of Egyptian culture provides a favourable basis for cultural relations organisations to engage in projects that could further empower future leaders and civil society.

## 6 General findings and recommendations

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This section brings findings from both countries into dialogue, highlighting the main implications for our research questions. As we shall see, the political, social and economic environment shapes what does and can occur in the cultural sector and in cultural relations, more specifically. International cultural relations organisations do not necessarily share the same objectives in Egypt and Ukraine or the same understanding of desired outcomes. Different factors emerge as distinctive to each context, but there are also some significant common patterns. Below we highlight divergences and convergences in the value attributed to cultural relations by different stakeholders and their role and potential in promoting stability and security and supporting civil society and future leaders and offer recommendations.

### 6.1 How do cultural relations create value?

- Cultural value is a matter of perspective: Our research demonstrates that, despite some shared goals, cultural relations activities create different forms of value for organisations and users. The purpose and priorities of cultural relations are often perceived quite differently, but this fact was not always fully appreciated or taken into account at the activity level.
- Trade-offs between different forms of value are inevitable: With each form of value come difficult trade-offs that have to be negotiated. Typical trade-offs include: high reach can undermine quality, while a primary emphasis on quality can create a perception of exclusivity; while local organisations in both countries seek and highly appreciate increased exposure for their work, some artists and organisations, especially in difficult or hostile political environments, prefer invisibility and the safe spaces that foreign cultural organisations like Goethe-Institut can provide (given the diplomatic immunity afforded on their premises).
- Who benefits? This question was raised repeatedly at CVM workshops and debated extensively, not only in terms of instrumental versus intrinsic value of cultural relations activities, but also in terms of the extent to which new opportunities were opened up for a range of users.
- Exclusive or inclusive? Participants across the CVM workshops focussing on British Council and Goethe-Institut activities perceived a certain exclusivity in those benefitting from cultural relations that tends towards cities, the wealthier and more educated, and high-profile organisations. This pattern was also repeated in interviews in both Egypt and Ukraine. This perception of exclusivity was less pronounced in CRD surveys that covered a wider spectrum of cultural organisations and activities. In a country like Egypt, for example, where access to cultural goods and services beyond television is quite limited for most people, reaching broader audiences (in terms of location, socio-economic status, educational and cultural

capital, gender, and so on) with activities geared toward reducing social or political tensions and enhancing understanding requires either significant resources or capacious ingenuity and remarkable creativity.

- Greater interest from the general public and better outreach for their own programmes and events are frequently cited benefits by the CRD organisational survey respondents who had cooperated with international cultural organisations, though these benefits were cited more frequently by Egyptian survey respondents than Ukrainian ones. Extending audiences in this way can contribute to longer-term organisational sustainability.
- Funding is among the most important benefits, but perceived differently by various stakeholders. Among local organisations involved in cultural relations activities, financial support was the most frequently cited benefit by Ukrainian CRD survey respondents and the fourth most cited by those in Egypt. Clearly, the funding provided through cooperation with international organisations gives a boost to local partner organisations and assists them in meeting their organisational goals. According to users in CVM workshops, funding provided through the cultural relations programmes under study helps them achieve their personal objectives. Yet, the type of funding available is often necessarily short-term because seed corn funding helps to avoid the disempowering forms of dependency that can accompany foreign aid. The downside is a lack of sustainability that was observed in certain case studies (Luhansk& ART & FACTs, Film Week).
- Occasional difficulty acquiring funding. Among CRD organisational survey respondents, more respondents reported that it was difficult to obtain funding from cultural relations organisations than reported that it was easy (and about half said that it was neither easy nor difficult). In both Ukraine and Egypt, CVM research suggests that those individuals and groups that do succeed in gaining funding (and sometimes repeated funding) usually possess knowledge of funding concepts (buzzwords) and processes (completing the forms appropriately), or they have an intermediary to do so on their behalf.
- Acquiring new skills was mentioned as a key benefit by some two-thirds of organisations engaged in cultural relations that responded to the CRD survey, even though skills development per se was rarely the main focus of cultural relations activity. Although the nature of the skills acquired was not specified, local organisations seem to benefit in terms of organisational capacity by engaging with cultural relations organisations. However, the suitability of skills was also at times questioned. In Kulturakademie, for example, skills training was deemed to be based on European models of cultural entrepreneurship and unsuited to the Egyptian context.
- The opportunity to network with people and organisations in the arts and culture is highly valued by CRD organisational survey respondents in both countries. Among those participating in CVM research in Egypt, the main benefit was seen as international

networking across the MENA region, but also internationally. In Ukraine, enhanced national networking was prioritised as a key benefit.

- Sustainability of networks. Participants in many of the activities studied here called for further and more sustainable opportunities to network with their peers within the country and outside it. In this respect, across the CVM workshops, it was noted that better use of digital media to support international and cross-regional networking would afford greater connectivity and sustainability, but skills development in this area is required.
- Working with businesses and working with the state were not deemed by CRD survey respondents in either country as significant benefits of collaborating with foreign actors in cultural relations activities. Whether this was not achieved or was simply not considered is unclear. In the case of cooperation with business, participants in both CRD and CVM workshops discussed the desirability of attracting interest from the business sector, especially with regard to sponsorship and fundraising, but many obstacles seem to prevent this. In terms of working with the state, the views of local organisations involved in cultural relations in Egypt differ from those in Ukraine: the share of Ukrainian respondents that saw chances of working with state agencies as a bonus was twice that of Egyptians. This difference stems from the different relationships between independent and state cultural actors in each country. Effective cross-sectoral collaboration is clearly important to successful cultural relations.
- The work of cultural relations organisations is highly valued as building bridges between countries. In addition, a large majority of CRD survey respondents in both countries saw their own work as leading to deeper international relationships and thus generating significant value, even though not all respondents had been involved in cultural relations activities with foreign actors.
- Partnerships and collaboration are valued among the Egyptian research participants in case study research. Dialogue was perceived in different ways. While Kulturakademie participants emphasised how partnerships and collaboration were the main benefits of improved dialogue. Film Week participants focussed more on the value of intercultural dialogue and participatory and inclusive debate about controversial issues.
- Cross-regional dialogue was valued among the Ukrainian research participants in case study research. Encouraging cross-regional dialogue to combat conflicts and divisions inside Ukraine was seen as a main objective. Even though CVM participants rated the importance of promoting dialogue highly, they questioned whether it was being realised.
- Challenges of promoting intercultural dialogue faced by cultural relations organisations identified at CVM workshops include: finding ways to deliberately pursue intercultural dialogue with their cultural relations activities; considering whether the opening up of spaces for dialogue between conflicted groups (within and across domestic sectors of the population or regions) is enough; curating and managing that dialogue, as well as its consequences.

- Unclear rules of engagement and failure to set clear expectations at the outset can lead to misalignment of goals between foreign actors, delivery teams and local participants. For example, partner organisations and users involved in programmes researched in our case studies did not always understand the limited nature of the funding or the terms of engagement with foreign cultural relations organisations. Often the result was a sense of disappointment at expectations that were not met ó sometimes on all sides.
- Lack of follow-up support: Delivery teams and users in CVM workshops bemoaned the lack of follow-up support, as noted above, and stated that even some form of post-project support network would be helpful. Clearly, foreign cultural relations organisations have a difficult trade-off to manage between offering financial support while avoiding disabling dependency and promoting autonomy. They wish to support their users and to help initiate local projects, but they also have to work within budget constraints. The most successful projects are deemed by beneficiaries such as Active Citizens facilitators to be those that are sustainable either through opportunities to apply for further funding or through some form of continued support.
- Local cultural brokers create value and play a key role in managing various trade-offs and tensions: mediating social relations via their multilingual skills; brokering arrangements and agreements with different parties; exchanging knowledge and know-how; training peers in skills; and introducing technological innovation. They are essential to the work of good cultural relations.
- Organisational hierarchies can mitigate against the development of good cultural relations. The hierarchical nature of foreign cultural relations organisations relegate local cultural relations professionals and brokers to the lower echelons of the organisation while their European peers tend to head up or take lead roles in the organisations, while enjoying higher salaries. As a result, local brokers do not always feel fully valued and rewarded by foreign cultural relations organisations with equal opportunities, recognition and pay. Local cultural brokers can also precipitate tensions or cause conflicts if personal interest and proprietorial behaviour (around a programme) trump cultural relations goals.
- Power relations: Cultural relations like all social relations involve power relations and divisions across social, ethnic, cultural and linguistic boundaries. Case study research found that some users, though appreciative of the opportunities afforded to them by project, did not feel sufficiently valued as professionals on an equal footing with European colleagues, or respected as equal members of the partnerships. The expression of such attitudes was often associated with a perceived lack of reciprocity or mutuality. Cultural relations work best when the organisations demonstrate the values that they seek to promote, for example, ethic and linguistic diversity and equality of opportunity.
- Cultural relations as cultural exchange? When cultural exchange or mutuality is a core goal (and it is not always), an expectation of some form of reciprocal exchange is set up that can

easily be disappointed, especially if there is a perception of instrumentality. Differences emerged between policy and strategic teams about what they aspire to, what delivery teams do and what users expect in terms of a meaningful cultural exchange ó i.e. while some cultural relations organisationsøunderstanding of mutuality might not be to expose local culture abroad, but to ensure that both countries can learn from the engagement and that the relationship is based on mutual respect, our research shows that the concept of mutuality raises expectations of cultural exchange and reciprocity among users.

- Cultural relations beneficiaries describe a lack of reciprocity and exchange in the relationship. For Ukraine, the CRD survey suggests that mutuality (understood in this sense) is either not being achieved or not perceived as particularly important. Only a third of all respondents thought that cultural relations activities contributed to sharing Ukrainian culture abroad. In Egypt, by contrast, nearly half believed that the presence of cultural relations organisations brought greater exposure of Egyptian culture abroad. Nevertheless, at the level of specific cases in Egypt, the mutuality of relationships in this sense was also brought into question by some local partners, project staff, and also beneficiaries. Al-Azhar participants, for example, reported a sense of being treated as passive recipients of British culture, while having limited access to it ó either though opportunities to travel to the UK, communicate with British people, or consume cultural and artistic products. And, as previously mentioned, while Kulturakademie and Film Week participants experienced a greater sense of mutual exchange with German culture, it was not always deemed relevant or appropriate.

## 6.2 How can and do cultural relations contribute to strengthening security and civil society in ‘societies in transition’?

- The ‐elephant in the room‐ For independent sector users and beneficiaries, the ‐elephant in the room‐in workshop discussions of cultural relations in ‐societies in transition‐like Egypt is the political environment that limits the freedom and opportunities available for users ó actual and potential. For example, the artists and cultural entrepreneurs with whom Kulturakademie works seek visibility but at the same time visibility can endanger them if their work publicly contests or opposes the state or status quo. Foreign cultural actors too are caught in a double-bind. They want to respond to local needs but must not create tensions with the government of the day or with state organisations if they are to achieve long-term aspirations towards conflict reduction. In Egypt, in particular, current laws restrict the space for civil society and some foreign actors to engage in cultural relations activities.
- Managing the relationship between the state and non-state cultural actors can be among the most difficult diplomatic dances that cultural relations are required to perform in ‐societies in transition‐. Difficult decisions and trade-offs have to be negotiated about whether and to what extent to support the state in its efforts to reinvigorate the independent cultural sector and decentralise in Ukraine. Or, as in Egypt, negotiation over whether bridging divisions between

the state and independent sector is even the role of cultural relations was an important question raised in the CVM workshops on Kulturakademie.

- Perceptions matter: Perceptions of foreign cultural relations organisations shape how users approach and even engage with organisations. Perceptions of Britain and Germany were very clearly articulated and expressed in all CVM workshops. They are evidently historically shaped, deep-seated and hard to budge. For example, Britain's imperial history in Egypt looms large in the public imagination and nurtures fears of neo-colonial domination by large organisations like British Council among some cultural actors, especially activists. Perceptions of Germany and the Goethe-Institut as efficient but unapproachable were also voiced in workshops. Such perceptions, accurate or not, can and do influence how local users interact with cultural relations organisations.
- Clarifying explicit and implicit goals: Cultural relations cannot resolve or reduce conflicts directly but can contribute to doing so over time. The very presence of cultural relations in societies in transition like Egypt and Ukraine is symbolically significant. Maintaining a visible presence and respectful relations with local stakeholders (citizens and governments who may be at odds with one another) is seen as of primary importance by foreign cultural relations organisations. It can take a very long time to build trust and establish a partnership, but relations of trust can be very quickly broken as British Council staff realise in managing the Al-Azhar partnership. Tact and diplomacy may at times have to over-ride the exigencies of a programme or sacrifice the imperatives of a particular project, for example, to improve state-independent sector relations (Kulturakademie) or to promote cross-cultural dialogue about Islam (Al-Azhar). This might be the ultimate goal but clearly stating it can pose difficulties for the organisation (Kulturakademie).
- Managing visibility and invisibility of cultural relations actors and organisations as well as safeguarding the privacy and security of partners and beneficiaries is crucial. In our case study research, we observed that a good deal of sensitivity (in Kulturakademie, Film Week and Luhansk's ART & FACTs) in knowing who and when and how to make people or artworks visible or audible requires the utmost tact and diplomacy and a deep understanding of the local political context.
- The obscure language of cultural relations: The strategic goals of foreign cultural relations organisations change in response to state foreign cultural relations policies and priorities. Funding success is dependent on achieving goals that are often couched in a language that does not resonate with local circumstances and can be seen as imposing western European models of cultural development and entrepreneurship in societies in transition where the security or political context over-determines what is possible in the public cultural sphere.
- Creating safe spaces: International cultural relations organisations play an essential role in societies in transition in offering safe spaces and opportunities for cultural actors, especially activists, to work together and network, independent of state oversight. This is

hugely appreciated as expressed by users in Egypt and Ukraine in Cultural Value Workshops. The provision of secure places can enable sustainable dialogue to flourish and partnerships to develop that can certainly, in the long-term, help reduce conflict.

- Good enough: Some cultural relations project goals are necessarily modest with low reach but still very important (Luhansk& ART & FACTs or Film Week). The opening up of spaces of dialogue between conflicted groups may be a ‘good enough’ achievement especially when dialogue is well managed. Such bridge-building between opposing factions is especially fruitful when goals can be clearly communicated and shared.
- Cross-generational dynamics in ‘societies in transition’ can impact the success of cultural relations activities. For example, the focus on targeting youth in Luhansk& ART & FACTs in Ukraine was aimed at cultivating future leaders, but in doing so it created tensions with older generations who saw themselves as equally capable of being future leaders.
- Promoting the independent cultural sector: Cultural relations can help strengthen civil society by promoting the development of the independent cultural sector and civil society projects, in particular when they offer avenues for expression and open up new opportunities for users. From the case studies, we know that such projects work best when they are locally initiated, user-centred and involve local actors at each stage of development – at conception, creation, design, enactment and assessment stages.
- The visibility of foreign cultural relations organisations is limited. Cultural relations organisations and other foreign cultural actors occupy significant space in the Ukrainian cultural scene, as is evident in the CRD cultural actors’ map, and in Egypt they are placed between the state and the independent culture scene. CVM interviewees in Ukraine noted in particular that most foreign cultural relations organisations are hardly visible, making for limited awareness and audiences. In Egypt, interviewees noted that legacy cultural relations organisations struggled to maintain their reputation, status and visibility in an increasingly competitive cultural relations field. As noted above, invisibility is a bonus for activists and those working in the cultural underground who are at risk from state surveillance, violence or imprisonment. But greater visibility is eagerly desired among artists and organisations who are able to work out in the open.
- Image management. Perceptions of foreign cultural organisations as unapproachable (Goethe-Institut) or chaotic and imperialising (British Council) matter whether accurate or not, and can influence how local users interact with cultural relations organisations. We observed a low profile among cultural relations organisations like British Council and Goethe-Institut in our case study research. Marketing did not always manage to reach target audiences.
- Other factors influence the ability of cultural relations to have an impact. Generally speaking, strengths and weaknesses in organisational capacity on the ground, especially financial sustainability and skills, may influence whether cultural actors have the wherewithal to

engage in cultural relations activities with broader aims, including conflict prevention and resolution. Furthermore, the economic, social and, above all, political environment can either enable or constrain cultural actors of all sorts in their efforts to reduce conflict and its socioeconomic effects.

- Cultural relations has the potential to strengthen civil society and future leaders, but its impact cannot be pinpointed in a definitive way. A majority of CRD organisational survey respondents in Egypt and to a slightly lesser extent Ukraine report that cultural relations organisations succeed in strengthening future leaders and/or civil society organisations, despite differences in the cultural and civil society landscapes of the two countries. In Egypt, for example, civil society space is limited by legal and other constraints, and, as shown in the cultural actors map, civil society actors engage in a rather circumscribed, yet important, set of cultural activities. These limits are reflected in the cultural relations activities that the cultural relations mapping has identified, which mainly involve performance and mass events rather than broader value creation, which could attract unwanted attention. In Ukraine, by contrast, civil society actors occupy the most space across the cultural actors map, suggesting high levels of activity and much potential. That the majority of cultural relations activities identified on the Ukrainian cultural relations map revolve around broader value generation in general, and education and training of professionals, in particular, indicates greater leeway in what can and is done.

At the case study level, however, CVM participants at Kulturakademie and Film Week workshops in Egypt acknowledged that while opportunities to develop leadership skills may exist, they were not personally aware of them. There was limited evidence available to substantiate such claims about promoting civil society and leadership in both Al-Azhar in Egypt and Active Citizens in Ukraine – at least in the sense of achieving a publicly visible profile. In any case, the fear for many people is that to do so in Egypt could pose a personal security threat. This highlights the difficulty of answering this research question in a definitive way. However, our research sheds light on the conditions that would be favourable to training and promoting cultural brokers, to identifying and building future leaders, and to strengthening civil society.

### 6.3 What types of cultural relations works best?

Three models of cultural relations were identified during the course of the research.

- Network model: Some cultural relations focus on particular individuals and their networks. Mobilising the networks of influencers can be a highly pragmatic and effective approach in some contexts. However, this network model (working in a horizontal fashion around key nodes in a non-hierarchical network) may come at the expense of sacrificing deeper and longer-lasting relationships with organisations and may lead to a perception of exclusivity – no matter how unjustified. Non-hierarchical models allow for diffuse forms of power and

influence but can become inefficient with no central lead organiser. (Luhansk& ART & FACTs)

- Diffusion model: Partnering with strong and stable local and national institutions reaps benefits in terms of sustainability and longevity. It can allow for a diffusion of key values over time that serve the strategic interests of cultural relations. Such a diffusion model of cultural relations (working in unilineal fashion) from institutional centres to peripheries, however, can be perceived as neo-colonial and may unwittingly support what are perceived as entrenched hierarchies and power relations in legacy cultural relations organisations (Al-Azhar).
- Cascade model: Training programmes, like British Council& Active Citizens, that involve a cascading of knowledge and skills via a system of local and regional, peer-to-peer support work very well. This cascade model (that works in top down fashion) helps increases the impact of a project or allows a programme to grow organically. Trainees become trainers and pass on skills to other local participants and even across regions.

In practice, these models of cultural relations are not mutually exclusive but they forge different relations of power and influence. Active Citizens for example involves a hybrid network and cascade model that avoids the pitfalls of both models.

#### 6.4 General recommendations

##### 1. *How can cultural relations create added value?*

- Taking diverse perspectives into account at the outset of a programme or activity, while difficult to achieve in practice, is essential for successful cultural relations.
- Determining clear rules of engagement and expectations from the beginning can help mitigate the misalignment of goals between cultural relations organisations, delivery teams and local participants.
- Optimising value creation for users when projects are locally inspired, initiated and led: Cultural relations organisations have to carefully consider how to best agree with local actors and users on their mutual interests and decide on which gaps to plug, particularly, as in the case of Egypt, in a political environment that is not conducive to cultural relations. Balancing the programme& broader societal goals, the local partners& organisational aims, and the participants& individual goals and needs is also part of the daily work of cultural relations organisations.
- Managing difficult trade-offs (as outlined above, for example, reach v quality, financial support v autonomy) is vital if cultural relations are to contribute to long-term strategic goals

- Monitoring diversity among beneficiaries and users systematically and over time ó within specific activities or programmes, as well as among the entire portfolio of activities ó is crucial if long-term strategic goals are to be achieved.
- Widening participation in inclusive ways is important to users and foreign cultural relations organisations alike but poses difficult challenges, especially in engaging hard-to-reach audiences. Foreign and local cultural actors should share innovative approaches and best practices (for example →blended programmes← involving vibrant digital as well as face-to-face translocal and transnational connectivity) in order to overcome obstacles to reaching these audiences.
- Providing post-programme support in some form, however limited, would help to ensure that seed corn funding works as it should and actually leads to some degree of local independence and autonomy.
- Forging sustainable networks: Networks are easy to initiate around influential individuals but it is more difficult to expand them organically and sustain them over time. International cultural relations organisations would do well to continue supporting and extending already existing networks (both face-to-face and digital) and to invest in creating and managing new and sustainable ones.
- Enhancing connectivity: Cultural relations create value when they afford improved connectivity via regional, national and transnational networking that open up opportunities for participants. Digital media is currently underexploited and a much more assertive strategy would benefit cultural relations in →societies in transition←
- Fostering professional career development: Cultural relations institutions should further examine whether some local cultural brokers are over-stretched in what they are expected to do and whether specific skills in conflict resolution or intercultural communication are necessary and/or expected of local teams.
- Encouraging cross-sectoral collaboration: Should strategic goals and institutional rules allow, international cultural relations organisations could help identify models of good cross-sector collaboration and support or encourage efforts to adapt and follow them.

2. *How can cultural relations improve its contribution to strengthening security and civil society in 'societies in transition'?*
- Addressing and managing tensions, rather than avoiding conflict, is seen as an essential part of the brokerage role that cultural relations organisations can play. Managing local social and political tensions is clearly difficult, and organisations are caught in a double-bind. They must respond to local needs but must not create tensions with the government of the day or with state organisations if they are to achieve their goals. Where staff need to manage conflicts, they should be trained to do so.

- Fostering professional skills in cultural brokerage: Local brokers can be cultivated as trusted partners in conflict resolution that require local know-how, provided they are viewed as equal partners. The vital skills of cultural brokers are and should be fostered and developed more systematically.
- Managing diversity: Perceptions of exclusivity regarding ‘usual suspects’ or typical beneficiaries of cultural relations in CVM workshops indicates at least an image problem that might hamper the capacity of conflict-oriented cultural relations activities to achieve their goals. To avoid missing opportunities to engage with audiences that have the potential to ameliorate conflict, foreign cultural relations organisations need to closely examine the extent to which their own portfolio of activities is exclusive and, if it is, whether such exclusivity helps or hinders them in achieving their strategic goals.
- Managing cross-generational dynamics in ‘societies in transition’ needs to be handled with care to avoid marginalising and alienating older generations by focusing too extensively on youth.
- Equipping actors with organisational skills essential for sustainability. To extend the pool of future leaders and independent civil society actors beyond the ‘usual suspects’, foreign cultural relations organisations could do more to equip target groups with skills in applying for funding, as well as other key skills. This might open up opportunities for new leaders and up-and-coming organisations to instil change within and beyond their local communities.
- Determining when actions are ‘good enough’: When international cultural relations organisations seek to enhance dialogue, they need to consider whether the opening up of spaces for dialogue between conflicted groups (within and across domestic sectors of the population or regions) is enough. When the aim goes beyond providing space for dialogue, cultural relations organisations need to find appropriate mechanisms for curating and managing that dialogue, as well as its consequences.

## 6.5 Conclusion

For some international cultural relations organisations conflict resolution and social change are important medium and long-term goals. But whether and how such goals are reached requires further research. The research we report on here offers insights into conditions that are fertile for conflict management, however.

As the CRD analysis has shown, the cultural relations landscape in Ukraine and Egypt differs in many respects, as it will of course in any country in which international cultural organisations are active. Generally, however, strengths and weaknesses in organisational capacity on the ground, especially financial sustainability, may influence whether cultural actors have the wherewithal to engage in cultural relations activities with broader aims, including conflict prevention and resolution. Furthermore, the economic, social and, above all, political environment can either

enable or constrain cultural actors of all sorts in their efforts to reduce conflict and its socioeconomic effects.

The CVM case studies provided further detail at the level of selected cultural relations activities, suggesting that important strategic decisions require review with regard to desired reach, intended audience, shared expectations and goals, and access to such activities. As we have seen, goals are not always aligned, and the language of cultural relations can be obtuse and so prevent clear communication of expectations.

Both views revealed some evidence that international cultural relations organisations might be missing out on opportunities to engage with key actors and audiences that have the potential to play a role in preventing and/or ameliorating conflict. Working with a narrow band of trusted insiders and their networks may concentrate impact, but determining how to cascade impact to wider audiences is a key challenge.

Finally, managing risks by avoiding controversy and conflict may not be the best long-term solution, but whether it is necessary in the short to medium term depends on the environment in which international actors are working.

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## Appendix 1: CRD Organisational Survey and Workshop Statistics

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### Survey provider

The survey was conducted online by the German survey provider SoSciSurvey (<https://www.soscisurvey.de/>)

### Survey duration

Start date: 09.02.2018

End date: 10.05.2018

Time in field: 91 days

### Survey reach

#### ***Number of survey invitations sent out by the Hertie School team:***

Egypt: 333

Ukraine: 241

The names of potential participants were assembled on the basis of the extensive lists of cultural actors prepared by regional consultants in the mapping processes, given to us by participants in the cultural actors mapping workshops, and complemented by desk research by the Hertie School team.

Aside from the organisations which were contacted directly, we asked survey recipients to pass the survey along to other organisations in the field. In Ukraine, we also had Oleksandr Butsenko of the Ukrainian Centre of Cultural Studies whose organisation distributed the questionnaire within its own network. In Egypt, finding such multipliers was more difficult, but we contacted several academic and cultural leaders, and an intern at the Goethe-Institut Cairo conducted follow-ups by phone to gather additional replies. Moreover, a handful of Facebook groups in both countries posted the call to participate in the survey on their pages.

#### ***Limitations:***

As it was an online survey, it could be sent only to those organisations who had email accounts and whose address we could find.

In Egypt in particular, though the responses are anonymised, there was some concern about participation. Respondents might have been overworked, over-researched or afraid that, despite of our assurance that survey data remain would remain anonymised, participating in the survey might have adverse consequences for them. Moreover, workshop participants told us that Egyptians might be sceptical towards answering any survey without some kind of personal relationship with those people running the survey.

## Survey responses

Country	Survey page visits	Surveys started <sup>79</sup>	Surveys completed <sup>80</sup>
Egypt	203	62	41
Ukraine	467	187	141

Note: All responses to a particular question, whether the survey was completed by the respondent or not, were used to calculate scores for the Cultural Relations Diamond and to create graphs found throughout the report.

## Basic data about responding organisations

Variable	Egypt	Ukraine
Year of establishment	Median: 2012 Mean: 2001 Standard deviation: 27.23 Oldest: founded in 1903 Youngest: founded in 2017	Median: 1994 Mean: 1975 Standard deviation: 42.49 Oldest: founded in 1830 Youngest: founded in 2016
Number of employees	Median 8.5 Mean: 542.0 Standard deviation: 2980.03 Most employees: 16872 Least employees: 1	Median: 6 Mean: 63.16 Standard deviation: 166.09 Most employees: 1309 Least employees: 0
Number of volunteers	Median: 6 Mean: 103.23 Standard deviation: 423 Most volunteers: 2000 Least volunteers: 1	Median: 6 Mean: 25.27 Standard deviation: 83.70 Most volunteers: 600 Least volunteers: 1

<sup>79</sup> This counts the number of page visits of the first page of the CRD survey, after the introductory welcome page.

<sup>80</sup> This counts the number of respondents who reached the CRD survey exit page after they clicked *next* on the last questionnaire page.

## Geographical distribution of respondents

### *Egypt*


City/Town	Number of organisations
Alexandria	3
Cairo	17
Giza	3
Haram	1
Luxor	1
Mellawi City	1
Minya	1
New Cairo	1
St. Catherine (Sinai)	1
Not indicated	25

### *Ukraine*

City/Town	Number of organisations
Chernihiv	2
Chernivtsi	3
Chigrin	1
Dnipro	3
Ivano-Frankivsk	2
Kamianka	1
Kharkiv	7
Khmelnitsky	2
Khorol	1
Koziatyn	1
Kremenchuk	1
Krolevets	1
Kyiv	34
Lutsk	2
Lviv	13
Marganets	1
Mariupol	2
Mezhov	1
Mykolaiv	2
Myrhorod	2
Odessa	2
Pervomaisk	1
Petrykivka	1
Poltava	3
Reshetilivka	1
Rivne	1

Rozhniativ	1
Selo	1
Sumy	3
Teplodar	1
Turiisk	1
Uzhhorod	1
Vinnytsia	3
Zaporizhzhia	9
Zhytomyr	1
Not indicated	75

### Geographical scope of work conducted by responding organisations



Source: Hertie School Survey 2018

## **Share of organisations that cooperated with international cultural organisations (cultural relations organisations)**

Question: In the past year (2017), did your organisation take part in projects with international cultural organisations or not?

	Neither organisation nor employees participated	Organisations didn't cooperate, but some employees took part as individuals	Our organisation cooperated with cultural relations organisations from other countries
Egypt	11.5%	15.4%	73.1%
Ukraine	26.6%	17.0%	56.4%

## **Cooperation between local and cultural relations organisations: types of cooperation**

(Answered only by those that said they had cooperated with cultural relations organisations in 2017)

Question: Did such projects mostly involveí (check the most appropriate category)

Type of cooperation	Egypt		Ukraine	
	Number of organisations	Percent	Number of organisations	Percent
Logistical support	0	0%	0	0%
Funding only	7	43.75%	5	9.80%
Joint activities, programmes	3	18.75%	34	66.67%
Skills development	2	12.50%	1	1.96%
Language courses	1	6.25%	1	1.96%
Information / communication support	1	6.25%	4	7.84%
Other:	2	12.5%	6	11.76%
<b>Total (answering this question)</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>100%</b>

Note: Some manual coding was done here, as some organisations used words rather than numerals (e.g. «two projects»), or gave ranges. In the first case, text was translated to numerals. Where organisations entered a range, the middle value was taken and rounded (e.g. 5-10 was manually coded as 8).

## **Number of joint projects in 2017 per organisation**

(Answered only by those that said they had cooperated with cultural relations organisations in 2017)

Type of cooperation	Egypt		Ukraine	
	Number of organisations	Percent	Number of organisations	Percent
1 project	7	52.63%	8	17.02%
2 projects	1	5.26%	9	19.15%
3 projects	2	10.53%	11	23.40%

4 projects	2	10.53%	6	12.77%
5 projects	0	0%	6	12.77%
More than 5 projects	7	21.05%	7	14.89%
<b>Total (answering this question)</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>

Note: Some manual coding was done here, as some organisations used words rather than numerals (e.g. ‐two projects‐), or gave ranges. In the first case, text was translated to numerals. Where organisations entered a range, the middle value was taken and rounded (e.g. 5-10 was manually coded as 8).

## CRD Workshop Statistics

### Ukraine

#### *Expert Workshop 1*

Thursday, 6 July, 2017, 10am to 1pm

Goethe-Institut Kyiv office

Participants: 6 (not including CVP or Goethe-Institute/ British Council staff), of which 5 cultural managers and 1 CVP local consultant.

#### *Expert Workshop 2*

Wednesday, 7 March, 2018, 1pm to 4pm

Mystetskiy Arsenal, Kyiv

Participants: 13, of which 7 from Arsenal, 4 cultural managers, and 2 staff members of foreign cultural actors (not British Council or Goethe-Institute).

### Egypt

#### *Expert Workshop 1*

Thursday, 11 May, 2017, 10am to 12:30pm

Goethe-Institut Cairo office

Participants: 8 (not including CVP or Goethe-Institut/ British Council staff), of which 6 cultural managers, 2 CVP local consultants

#### *Expert Workshop 2*


Monday, March 12, 2018, 6pm to 9pm

Studio Emad Eddin, Cairo


Participants: 10 (not including CVP researchers), of which 3 cultural managers, 4 staff of foreign cultural actors (not British Council or Goethe-Institut), and 2 others (writer/ researcher)

## Appendix 2: Cultural relations maps

### Cultural Relations Map: selected projects and events in Ukraine, 2015–17



## Cultural Relations Map: selected projects and events in Egypt, 2015-17



## Appendix 3: Hertie School of Governance Organisational Survey Questionnaire (Egypt, English)

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### **Instructions**

Dear participant,

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in the survey for the “The Cultural Value Project Cultural Relations in Transition Societies”.

The Cultural Value Project is a joint research project commissioned by the British Council and the Goethe-Institut (January 2017-June 2018) and conducted by 2 academic institutions: The Hertie School of Governance (Berlin, Germany) and the Open University (London, UK).

It aims to build a better understanding of the value of culture and cultural relations, particularly in societies in transition. The project is run simultaneously in the Ukraine and Egypt and it is the first ever project of this size to understand experiences, needs, opinions and expectations of the organisations that work in the fields of culture and creativity, education, research, social development, advocacy, media etc. The results of the project will be widely disseminated in the Ukraine, Egypt and internationally.

Before filling out the questionnaire, please read the instructions below carefully:

1. The survey will take 30 minutes of your time. You can answer in English, Ukrainian, Arabic and Russian
2. As we survey organisations, please always answer the questionnaire from the perspective of your organisation, not your personal opinion
3. We guarantee a strict confidentiality of your answers. Only two researchers from the Hertie School of Governance (Berlin, Germany) will have access to individual results. We will only share and publish aggregated results of the survey, which will make identification of the answers of specific organisations impossible. However, should you feel uncomfortable with any question, please feel free to skip it.

If you have any further questions, would like to receive a final project report or take part in the preliminary project results discussions (in Kyiv and Cairo) please get in touch with [Malte Berneaud-Kötz](#)

**1. Name of the organisation**

Please enter the name of your organisation [free text]

**2. Description of the organisation**

Which of the following descriptions apply to your organisation? (Please check all that apply)

Performing arts organisation (dance, theatre, music, orchestra, choir, singing group, etc.)

Visual arts organisation (Gallery, exhibition space, etc.)

Museum / historical site / historical organisation / library / archive

Artist studio / workshops

Publishing house

School / teaching facility / academic institution / research facility

Other educational organisation

Cultural center / incubator / hub / residency

Advocacy group / platform

Film / media production

Media outlet (newspaper, magazine, digital media, TV, radio, etc.)

Health organisation

Social services organisation

Environmental organisation

Social development organisation

Professional organisation

Foundation

Religious organisation

International organisation

Other:

Don't know

**3. Location of organisation**

Please state the town/city/village your organisation is located in. [Free text]

**4. Year of establishment**

In what year was your organisation established/founded? [Free text]

**5. Respondent's position within the organisation**

What is your position within your organisation? [Only one selection possible]

Board member

Management

Specialist

Artistic/cultural staff

Administrative staff

Volunteer

Other:

Don't know

**6. Geographical scope of the organisation**

At what geographic level does your organisation operate mostly? [Only one selection possible]

Local community/neighbourhood  
City/town/village  
Region within the country  
Country  
International  
Don't know

### **7. Number of employees**

How many paid employees does your organisation have? (full-time and part-time)  
(Enter -1 if you don't know, -2 if you don't want to answer this question) [Free text]

### **8. Volunteers**

Does your organisations have volunteers? [Only one selection possible]

Yes  
No  
Don't know

### **9. Number of volunteers**

Please write the number of volunteers working at your organisation into the box (e.g., 3, 12, etc.)

(If you don't know, enter -1, if you do not wish to answer, enter -2) [Free text]

### **10. Important to organisation**

What is important for your organisation? (check all that apply)

To get people to imagine the world differently  
To be an outlet for creativity  
To foster freedom of expression  
To meet other people  
To share ideas  
To learn more about other cultures  
To help people in need  
To bring different people together  
To foster education  
Other:  
Don't know  
Don't want to answer

## **11. Closer relations**

Please indicate which statement(s) you agree with most. Multiple selections possible.

Culturally, we at our organisation think that our country should work more closely with...

Europe as a whole

United Kingdom

Germany

France

USA

China

Russia

Middle East

Africa

Asia

Latin America

We need/have our own way

Don't know

None of the above

## **INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL ORGANISATIONS**

Now we would like to ask your opinion about the work of international cultural organisations operating in your country. By "international cultural organisations" we mean organisations like the British Council, Goethe Institute, Instituto Cervantes, Alliance Française, etc. You may have experience conducting projects with these organisations, receiving funding for your programmes, receiving services or advice from them or attending events/meetings/festivals organised by these international cultural organisations. Or you may have only heard of these organisations or work in your country but were never directly involved with them.

## **12. Presence of international cultural organisations**

The presence of international cultural organisations like the British Council, Goethe Institute, Instituto Cervantes, etc. in your country... (choose one statement)

Supports organisations like ours in meeting our goals

Opens up new opportunities for organisations like ours

Hasn't made a difference for organisations like ours yet

Unlikely to change anything for organisations like ours in the future

Brings in too much outside influence into organisations like ours

Creates risks for organisations like ours

Don't know

Don't want to answer

### 13. Statements about international cultural organisations

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding international cultural organisations...

	Fully disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Fully agree	Don't know enough about these organisations	Don't want to answer
Such international cultural organisations provide high quality educational/language programmes					
Such international cultural organisations build bridges between our country and other countries					
Such international cultural organisations support projects that are aimed at the most educated and/or wealthiest audiences mostly					
Such international cultural organisations support projects mainly in the capital or big cities in our country					
Such international cultural organisations provide many opportunities for the exposure of our culture abroad					
Such international cultural organisations tend to cooperate mostly with high-profile organisations in our country					
Such international cultural organisations tend to concentrate mostly on projects that promote Western values in our country <sup>81</sup>					
Such international cultural organisations tend to cooperate on projects benefiting a variety of vulnerable groups (youths, elderly, minorities)					
Such international cultural organisations contribute to the development of civil society and support future leaders in our country					
Such international cultural organisations support programmes/projects that are					

<sup>81</sup> Question not used for analysis because of imprecision of terminology.

unlikely to be supported by the domestic institutions					
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#### **14. Cooperation with international cultural organisations**

In the past year (2017), did your organisation take part in projects with international cultural organisations or not? [Only one selection possible]

Neither our organisation nor individual employees/volunteers took part in projects by cultural organisations from other countries

Our organisation didn't- some of the employees/volunteers took part as individuals by cultural organisations from other countries

Our organisation took part in cultural relations projects by cultural organisations from other countries

Don't know

\*\*\*

*[Those who answered Q14 with 'Our organisation took part in cultural relations project by cultural organisations from other countries' continued to Q15. Those who answered otherwise were forwarded to Q24.]*

\*\*\*

Now please think about only the projects/programmes your organisation conducted/took part in collaboration with international cultural organisations in 2017. This could be funding you received from such organisations, co-production, joint programmes, educational services and other types of support.

#### **15. Number of projects**

How many such projects/programmes/courses did your organisation conduct over the past year (2017)? (Enter -1 if you don't know, -2 if you don't want to answer this question.) [Free text]

#### **16. Type of projects**

Did such project/programmes/courses mostly involve... (check the most appropriate category) [Only one selection possible]

Logistical support

Funding only

Joint activities, programmes

Skills development

Language courses

Information / communication support

Other:

Don't know

Don't want to answer

#### **17. Field of joint projects**

Thinking about the projects you cooperated on with international cultural organisations, which field(s) of cultural activity did they belong to? [Multiple selections possible]

Cultural and natural heritage (museums, archeological and historical places, cultural landscapes or natural heritage)

Performance and celebration (performing arts, music, festivals, fairs and feasts)  
Visual arts and crafts (fine arts, photography, crafts, film and video, TV and radio, podcasting)  
Books and the press / design and creating services (books, newspapers and magazines, libraries, fashion/graphic/interior design)  
Language  
Education / training / research  
Community service / civil society development / protection of vulnerable groups  
Other:

#### **18. Total number of participants**

Still thinking only about such projects/programmes/courses your organisation took part in over the past year (2017) with international cultural organisations, how many people attended or were involved IN TOTAL? (If you have done multiple projects, give us the best estimate of participants across all such projects.) [Only one selection possible]

Less than 50  
51-100  
101-300  
301-500  
501-1000  
1001-2000  
>2000  
Not applicable  
Don't know  
Don't want to answer

#### **19. Target groups**

Did such projects/programmes/courses your organisation conducted in 2017 focused on any particular group? (Check all groups that were emphasized.) [Multiple selections possible]

Children  
Young people  
Students  
Women  
Senior citizens  
Ethnic minorities  
Religious minorities  
Disabled persons  
Migrants / refugees / internally displaced people  
People with little education  
People with little income  
Unemployed people  
Other vulnerable groups:  
Don't know  
Don't want to answer

#### **20. Satisfaction with international cultural organisations**

Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with...

	Very dis- satisfied	Somewhat dis- satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied	Don't know	Don't want to answer	Not applicable
... the social impact of projects/ programmes you did with international cultural organisations								
... the cultural impact of projects/ programmes you did with international cultural organisations								
... the economic impact of projects/ programmes you did with international cultural organisations								
... the environmental impact of projects/ programmes you did with international cultural organisations								

## 21. Statements about joint projects

Still thinking about the programs/projects/courses your organisation conducted in 2017 together with international cultural organisations, would you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know	Don't want to answer	Not applicable
The programmes/ projects/ courses met our expectations								
The programmes/ projects/ courses made a difference to the general public								
The programmes/ projects/ courses made a difference in the art community								
The programmes/ projects/ courses made a difference to other organisations like ours								
The programmes/ projects/ courses made a difference at the international level								

## 22. Benefits through cooperation

Based on your organisation's experience working with international cultural organisations, to what extent did your organisation benefit through...

	Not at all	To some extent	To a moderate extent	To a great extent	Don't know	Don't want to answer	Not applicable
More interest from the general public							
Financial support							
Learning new professional skills							
Better outreach							
Opportunities to network with other arts, cultural and/or educational organisations in MY country							
Opportunities to network with other arts, cultural and/or educational organisations in OTHER countries							

Opportunities to work with for-profit sector							
Opportunities to work with state agencies							

### 23. Difficulty of obtaining funding from international cultural organisations

Please select the most appropriate response.

	Very difficult	Neither easy nor difficult	Very easy	Don't know	Don't want to answer	Not applicable
For your organisation, receiving funding from the these organisations (Goethe-Institut, British Council, etc) was ...						

### 24. Future cooperation with international cultural organisations

What is the most important area in which you would like your organisation to cooperate with international cultural organisations (like the Goethe Institute, Institute Cervantes, British Council) in the next 5 years? [Only one selection possible]

Developing new projects together

Helping to finance our current programs/projects

Helping to open channels to other funders (within the country and internationally)

Helping to collaborate with state and for-profit organisations within the country

Helping to collaborate with nonprofit organisations within the country

Achieving better outreach WITHIN the country

Achieving better outreach OUTSIDE the country

Developing professional skills within our organisation

Getting more international contacts

We don't see ourselves cooperating with international cultural organisations in the next 5 years

Other:

Don't know

Don't want to answer

## **25. Values of your organisation**

Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below.

Cultural activities offered by our organisation if	Fully disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Fully agree	Don't know	Don't want to answer
lead to more and deeper international relationships					
lead to better dialogue between people within Egypt/Ukraine (consider only the country you are based in) <sup>82</sup>					
enable participation from a diverse range of people (gender geography, ethnicity) and thereby widen social inclusion in Egypt/Ukraine (consider only the country you are based in) <sup>83</sup>					
facilitate mutual exchange of cultural goods or knowledge between our country and Egypt/Ukraine (consider only the country you are based in) <sup>84</sup>					
contribute to cultural innovation and development					
make best use of interactive technologies and social media					

## **26. Follow-up with final report**

If you wish to receive a copy of the final report outlining the findings of the study in Ukraine, please submit an email address here. If you do not wish to receive anything, please leave the field blank. [Free text]

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! We would like to thank you very much for helping us.

As we aim to reach as many different organisations as possible with our questionnaire, we would be extremely happy if you could aid us in broadening the audience in either of these ways:

1. Forwarding the questionnaire to colleagues in other organisations that work in the field of culture and creativity, education, research, social development, advocacy, or media.
2. Sharing our survey link via your mailing list or newsletter
3. Posting a link to our survey on social media
4. Contacting Malte Berneaud-Kötz via email and have him contact additional organisations.

Your answers were transmitted, you may close the browser window or tab now.  
Malte Berneaud-Kötz, Hertie School of Governance ó 2017

<sup>82</sup> Question not used for analysis because of error in survey translation.

<sup>83</sup> Question not used for analysis because of error in survey translation.

<sup>84</sup> Question not used for analysis because of error in survey translation.

## Appendix 4: CRD Aggregation Codebook

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### General aggregation method

Aggregation happens on three levels, essentially funneling from the questions to the sub-dimensions and then to the CR dimensions:

**Indicator level:** Generally, each indicator that is listed in the ‘indicator’ column is first standardised in a way that creates a score between 0 and 1 for that particular indicator. How that is done is indicated in the column named ‘Indicator aggregation’. For most measures, the share of respondents that answered in a certain way is taken. Some questions in the questionnaire contain multiple statements, each of these rated on a Likert-scale or some other scale. While these different statements are grouped under a single question in the questionnaire, they are often broken up and included into different sub-dimensions. Therefore, some question IDs appear multiple times in the ‘Questions’ column. Also, whenever the aggregation column talks about ‘the share of organisations’, the recorded share is the share of organisations who answered that particular question. Missing observations are not included in the calculation.

**Sub-dimension level:** After aggregation on the indicator level, these scores are used to calculate means within the sub-dimensions. Given that the indicator scores range from 0 to 1, the resulting sub-dimension means range from 0 to 1 also.

**Dimension level:** After aggregation of the scores along the sub-dimensions, the scores of the sub-dimensions are used to calculate the mean score within each dimension. The resulting score, which ranges from 0 to 1, is rescaled to range between 0 and 100 to make for easier readability in the diamonds.

Note: The CRD organisational survey questionnaires for Egypt and for Ukraine differed by one question. In the Egyptian questionnaire, a question relating to statements regarding government support was removed. As a result the numbering in the codebook below of the CRD survey questions from 12 on refers first to the Egyptian questionnaire, then to the Ukrainian one (Egyptian/Ukrainian).

### Aggregation codebook

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
Profiling variable. Not a part of the CRD		<b>1. Name of the organisation (IN01)</b> Please enter the name of your organisation	Profiling variable. Not aggregated
		<b>2. Description of the organisation (IN08)</b> Which of the following descriptions apply to your organisation? (Please check all that apply)	Profiling variable. Not aggregated
		<b>3. Location of organisation (IN02)</b> Please state the town/city/village your organisation is located in	Profiling variable. Not aggregated
		<b>4. Year of establishment (IN03)</b> In what year was your organisation established/founded?	Profiling variable. Not aggregated
		<b>5. Respondent's position within the organisation (IN05)</b> What is your position within your	Profiling variable. Not aggregated

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		organisation?  <b>6. Geographical scope of the organisation (IN07)</b> At what geographic level does your organisation operate <u>mostly</u> ?  <b>7. Number of employees (IN11)</b> How many paid employees does your organisation have? (full-time and part-time)  <b>8. Volunteers (IN12)</b> Does your organisations have volunteers?  <b>9. Number of volunteers (IN15)</b> Please write the number of volunteers working at your organisation into the box (e.g. 3, 12, etc.)  <b>24/25. Future cooperation with international cultural organisations</b> What is the most important area in which you would like your organisation to cooperate with international cultural organisations (like the Goethe-Institute, Institute Cervantes, British Council) in the next 5 years?	Profiling variable. Not aggregated
LEVEL OF ORGANISATION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS	External sustainability	<b>22/23. Benefits through cooperation (LO01)</b> Based on your organisation's experience working with international cultural organisations, to what extent did your organisation benefit through... <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• More interest from the general public</li><li>• Better outreach</li></ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 'to a moderate extent' or 'to a great extent' per country for the two items on the left.
	Internal sustainability	<b>22/23. Benefits through cooperation (LO01)</b> Based on your organisation's experience working with international cultural organisations, to what extent did your organisation benefit through... <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Financial support</li><li>• Learning new professional skills</li></ul> <b>23/24. Difficulty of obtaining funding from international cultural organisations (LO02)</b> For your organisation, receiving funding from these organisations (Goethe-Institut, British Council, etc.) was ... (very difficult, neither easy nor difficult, very easy)	The score for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 'to a moderate extent' or 'to a great extent' for the two items listed on the left.
		<b>12/13. Presence of international cultural organisations (EV04)</b> The presence of international cultural organisations like the British Council, Goethe-Institute, Instituto Cervantes, etc. in your country...(choose <u>one</u> statement)	The score for this indicator is the share of organisations who answered with 'supports organisations like ours in meeting our goals' or 'Opens up new opportunities for organisations like ours'.

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
	Sectoral communication	<p><b>22/23. Benefits through cooperation (LO01)</b></p> <p>Based on your organisation's experience working with international cultural organisations, to what extent did your organisation benefit through...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunities to network with other arts, cultural and/or educational organisations in MY country</li> <li>• Opportunities to network with other arts, cultural and/or educational organisations in OTHER countries</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 'to a moderate extent' or 'to a great extent' for the two items listed on the left.
	Collaboration with other sectors / External linkages	<p><b>22/23. Benefits through cooperation (LO01)</b></p> <p>Based on your organisation's experience working with international cultural organisations, to what extent did your organisation benefit through...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunities to work with for-profit sector</li> <li>• Opportunities to work with state agencies</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 'to a moderate extent' or 'to a great extent' for the two items listed on the left.
<b>VALUES</b>	Practice of values	<p><b>10. Important to organisation (VA01)</b></p> <p>What is important for your organisation? (check all that apply)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To get people to imagine the world differently</li> <li>• To be an outlet for creativity</li> <li>• To foster freedom of expression</li> <li>• To meet other people</li> <li>• To share ideas</li> <li>• To learn more about other cultures</li> <li>• To help people in need</li> <li>• To bring different people together</li> <li>• To foster education</li> <li>• Other:</li> </ul>	Items on the left are scored as share of organisations who checked a particular item (from 0 to 1). The score for this indicator is the difference between the second-most-mentioned item and the second-least-mentioned item subtracted from one. As a result, scores are high if all items are mentioned similarly often and low if the distribution of important goals of the organisations is more skewed.
	Transfer of values	<p><b>13/14. Statements about international cultural organisations (VI06)</b></p> <p>Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding international cultural organisations...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Such international cultural organisations build bridges between our culture and other cultures</li> <li>• Such international cultural organisations programs contribute to the development of civil society and support future leaders in our country</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 4 or 5 on a scale from 'fully disagree' (1) to 'fully agree' (5) for the two items listed on the left.
	Generation of	<b>25/26. Values of your organisation (VA06)</b>	The score generated for

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
	values	<p>Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below (options: fully disagree, neither agree nor disagree, fully agree, don't know, don't want to answer):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• lead to more and deeper international relationships</li> <li>• contribute to cultural innovation and development</li> </ul>	this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 4 or 5 on a scale from 'fully disagree' (1) to 'fully agree' (5) for the two items listed on the left.
<b>PERCEIVED IMPACT OF CULTURAL RELATIONS</b>	Output of Cultural Relations	<b>BL.10 To what extent do you value the cultural heritage of (OUR COUNTRY)?</b> By cultural heritage we mean tangible culture (such as buildings, monuments, landscapes, books, works of art, artefacts, ...) and intangible culture (such as folklore, traditions, language, knowledge, ... ) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A lot</li> <li>• To some extent</li> <li>• Not really</li> <li>• Not at all</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied 'a lot' or 'to some extent'.
		<b>13/14. Statements about international cultural organisations (VI06)</b> Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding international cultural organisations... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Such international cultural organisations provide high quality educational/language programmes</li> <li>• Such international organisations provide many opportunities for the exposure of our culture abroad</li> <li>• Such international cultural organisations support programs/projects that are unlikely to be supported by the domestic institutions</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 4 or 5 on a scale from 'fully disagree' (1) to 'fully agree' (5) for the three items listed on the left.
	Outcome of Cultural Relations	<b>21/22. Statements about joint projects (PI05)</b> Still thinking about the programs/projects/courses your organisation conducted in 2017 together with international cultural organisations, would you agree or disagree with the following statements? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The programmes/projects courses met our expectations</li> <li>• The programmes/projects courses made a difference to the general public</li> <li>• The programmes/projects courses made a difference in the art community</li> <li>• The programmes/projects courses made a difference to other organisations like ours</li> <li>• The programmes/projects courses made a difference at the international level</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 'agree' or 'strongly agree' to the statements on the left. Responses were recorded on a five point Likert scale containing the options 'strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'agree' and 'strongly agree'.
		<b>20/21. Satisfaction with international</b>	The score for this indicator

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		<b>cultural organisations (VI04)</b> Overall, how satisfied is your organisation with... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The social impact of projects/programmes you did with international cultural organisations</li> <li>• the economic impact of projects/programmes you did with international cultural organisations</li> <li>• the cultural impact of projects/programmes you did with international cultural organisations</li> </ul>	is the share of respondents who indicated that they are 'somewhat satisfied' or 'very satisfied'.
<b>VIBRANCY OF CULTURAL RELATIONS</b>	Inclusiveness of CR	<b>13/14. Statements about international cultural organisations (VI06)</b> Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding international cultural organisations... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Such international cultural organisations support projects that are aimed at the most educated and/or wealthiest audiences mostly (<i>reversed</i>)</li> <li>• Such international cultural organisations support projects mainly in the capital or big cities in our country (<i>reversed</i>)</li> <li>• Such international cultural organisations tend to cooperate mostly with high-profile organisations in our country (<i>reversed</i>)</li> <li>• Such international cultural organisations tend to cooperate on projects benefiting a variety of vulnerable groups (youths, elderly, minorities etc.)</li> </ul>	The score generated for this indicator is the mean share of organisations who replied with 4 or 5 on a scale from 'fully disagree' (1) to 'fully agree' (5) for the four items listed on the left. In case the statements had a negative connotation, the coding of responses were reversed prior to the score calculation, essentially measuring the share of respondents who disagreed with the negative statements about CROs work. Reversal is indicated next to the item.
		<b>19/20. Target groups (VI03)</b> Did such projects/programmes/courses your organisation conducted in 2017 focused on any particular group? (Check all groups that were emphasised.) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Children</li> <li>• Young people</li> <li>• Students</li> <li>• Women</li> <li>• Senior citizens</li> <li>• Ethnic minorities</li> <li>• Religious minorities</li> <li>• Disabled persons</li> <li>• Migrants / refugees / internally displaced people</li> <li>• People with little education</li> <li>• People with little income</li> <li>• Unemployed people</li> <li>• Other vulnerable groups:</li> </ul>	Items on the left are scored as share of organisations who checked a particular item (from 0 to 1). The score for this indicator is the difference between the second-most-mentioned item and the second-least-mentioned item subtracted from one. As a result, scores are high if all items are mentioned similarly often and low if the distribution of target groups is more skewed.
	Variety of CR	<b>17/18. Field of joint projects (VI09)</b> Thinking about the projects you cooperated	Items on the left are scored as share of

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		<p>on with international cultural organisations, which field(s) of cultural activity did they belong to?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural and natural heritage (museums, archeological and historical places, cultural landscapes or natural heritage)</li> <li>• Performance and celebration (performing arts, music, festivals, fairs and feasts)</li> <li>• Visual arts and crafts (fine arts, photography, crafts, film and video, TV and radio, podcasting)</li> <li>• Books and the press / design and creating services (books, newspapers and magazines, libraries, fashion/graphic/interior design)</li> <li>• Language</li> <li>• Education / training / research</li> <li>• Community service / civil society development / protection of vulnerable groups</li> <li>• Other (free text)</li> </ul>	organisations who checked a particular item (from 0 to 1), The score for this indicator is the difference between the second-most-mentioned item and the second-least-mentioned item subtracted from one. As a result, scores are high if all items are mentioned similarly often and low if the distribution of fields of joint projects is more skewed.
	Cultural participation	<p>CULTURAL PARTICIPATION from the Neighbourhood Barometer</p> <p><b>BL.4 How many times in the last twelve months have you...?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen a ballet, dance performance or opera</li> <li>• Watched a film in a cinema</li> <li>• Seen a play in a theatre</li> <li>• Been to a concert</li> <li>• Gone to a public library</li> <li>• Visited a historical monument (palaces, castles, gardens, etc.)</li> <li>• Visited a museum or art gallery</li> <li>• Watched/ listened to cultural programmes on TV or on the radio</li> <li>• read books</li> </ul>	The score of this indicator is the mean share of respondents who indicated that they participated in the activities in the left column at least once in the past twelve months.
		<p><b>BL.6a&amp;b Sometimes people find it difficult to access culture or take part in cultural activities. Which of the following, if any, are the main barriers for you when considering access to [cinemas, historical monuments, museums/galleries or theatres]?</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lack of interest</li> <li>2. Too expensive</li> <li>3. Lack of information</li> <li>4. Limited choice or poor quality of cultural activities in the area</li> <li>5. Too far from where I live</li> </ol>	The score of this indicator is the mean across cultural goods (cinemas, monuments, museums/galleries, theatres) of people who said that access is made difficult by either one of the barriers listed on the left. Before aggregation, individual respondents were coded 1 for a particular cultural good, if

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		<p>6. Lack of knowledge or cultural background</p> <p><b>BL2 I am going to read you a list of cultural activities. To what extent do you think it is easy to access to these cultural activities in (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p> <p>7. Attend a ballet, dance performance or opera</p> <p>8. Watch a film in a cinema</p> <p>9. Attend a play in a theatre</p> <p>10. Attend a concert</p> <p>11. Got to a public library</p> <p>12. Visit a historical monument</p> <p>13. Visit a museum or art gallery</p> <p>14. Watch/listen to cultural programmes on TV or on radio</p> <p>15. Read books</p>	they said that access was made difficult by either of the barriers, and 0 if they did not.
		<p><b>BA4a (Wave 5) What is your favorite kind of TV/Radio programmes?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• News (Information)</li> <li>• Talk shows</li> <li>• Cultural programmes (documentaries, arts, science)</li> <li>• Sport</li> <li>• Entertainment (movies, reality shows, readings, variety shows)</li> <li>• Music programmes</li> <li>• Other (SPONTANEOUS)</li> <li>• Don't know (SPONTANEOUS)</li> </ul>	The score for this question is the mean across cultural activities (listed on the left) of people who said that access to activities is 'easy' or 'fairly easy' to access these activities on scale that contains the options 'very easy access', 'fairly easy access', 'fairly difficult access', 'very difficult access'.
<b>EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS</b>	Political environment	<p><b>AB7 And for each of the following areas, please tell me whether or not you think the European Union should have a greater role to play in (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education</li> <li>• Culture</li> </ul> <p><b>AC5 In your opinion, from the following list, which are the most important areas of cooperation between the European Union and (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culture and education</li> </ul> <p><b>AC6 In which areas should the European Union development aid be more focused on in (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p>	The score for this question is the mean between the share of respondents who said that the EU should play a bigger role in education, and the share of respondents who said that the EU should play a bigger role in culture.
			The score for this question is the share of respondents who mentioned 'culture and education' (grouped together in the answer options) among the most important area of cooperation (multiple choice; max 5 answers)
			The score for this question is the share of respondents who mentioned 'culture and education' (grouped together in the answer options) among the most important area of cooperation (multiple choice; max 5 answers)

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culture and education</li> </ul> <p><b>BL.7 To what extent do you think each of the following local actors contributes or not to the cultural development of (OUR COUNTRY)? (A lot, to some extent, not really, not at all)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The (NATIONALITY) government (NOT IN MA, JO)</li> <li>• The Presidency</li> <li>• Regional public authorities</li> <li>• Local public authorities</li> </ul>	education' (grouped together in the answer options) among the areas where more EU development aid should be invested (multiple choice; max 2 answers)
		<p><b>AB6 Could you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning the European Union?</b></p> <p>(4) (OUR COUNTRY) and the European Union have sufficient common values to be able to cooperate.</p>	The score for this question is the mean share of people that said that government, presidency, regional and local administration contribute to cultural development of their country 'a lot' or 'to some extent' on a scale that contains 'a lot', 'to some extent', 'not really' and 'not at all' as options. Mean share was taken across the different local actors.
		<p><b>v2cseeorgs:</b> To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organisations (CSOs) into public life?</p> <p>0: Severely 1: Substantially 2: Moderately 3: Weakly 4: No.</p>	The variable was scored between 0 and 1 relative to the scores of all other countries in the data set in the year of observation (2017). It measures the percentile the country's score falls in for that particular question. E.g. a score of 0.23 means that only 23% of countries have achieved a worse score in 2017.
		<p><b>v2csreprss:</b> Does the government attempt to repress civil society organisations (CSOs)?</p> <p>0: Monopolistic control 1: Substantial control 2: Moderate control 3: Minimal control 4: Unconstrained</p>	The variable was scored between 0 and 1 relative to the scores of all other countries in the data set in the year of observation (2017). It measures the percentile the country's score falls in for that particular question. E.g. a

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
			score of 0.23 means that only 23% of countries have achieved a worse score in 2017.
		<b>v2clacfree</b> <b>Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?</b> 0: Not respect by public authorities 1: Weakly respected by public authorities 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities 3: Mostly respected by public authorities 4: Fully respected by public authorities	The variable was scored between 0 and 1 relative to the scores of all other countries in the data set in the year of observation (2017). It measures the percentile the country's score falls in for that particular question. E.g. a score of 0.23 means that only 23% of countries have achieved a worse score in 2017.
		<b>v2mecenefm</b> <b>Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?</b> 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished	The variable was scored between 0 and 1 relative to the scores of all other countries in the data set in the year of observation (2017). It measures the percentile the country's score falls in for that particular question. E.g. a score of 0.23 means that only 23% of countries have achieved a worse score in 2017.
		<b>v2mecenefi</b> <b>Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?</b> 1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content 2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls. 3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues. 4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.	The variable was scored between 0 and 1 relative to the scores of all other countries in the data set in the year of observation (2017). It measures the percentile the country's score falls in for that particular question. E.g. a score of 0.23 means that only 23% of countries have achieved a worse score in 2017.

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
		<p><b>Freedom in the World 2018</b>  <b>Country score for section E: Associational and Organisational Rights.</b>            Rated on a 0-12 scale that adds up scores from 3 sub-sections of 0-4 points each:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is there freedom of assembly?</li> <li>• Is there freedom for nongovernmental organisations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights- and governance-related work?</li> <li>• Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labour organisations?</li> </ul>	The variable was taken as-is from the Freedom in the World 2018 dimension, which ranges from 0-12. It was scaled to be between 0 and 1 by dividing the country scores by the maximum score (12).
		<p><b>BL.7 To what extent do you think each of the following local actors contributes or not to the cultural development of (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The (NATIONALITY) private companies</li> <li>• The (NATIONALITY) banks</li> <li>• The international private banks</li> <li>• The international / multinational private companies</li> </ul>	The score for this question is the mean share of people who said they 'totally agree' or 'tend to agree' across the statements on the left, where agreement was measured on a scale containing 'totally agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', 'totally disagree'.
	Economic environment	<p><b>BL.8 Please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with the following statements.</b></p> <p>(1) Cultural activities contribute to the economic development of (OUR COUNTRY).</p>	The score for this question is the share of people who said they 'totally agree' or 'tend to agree' to the statement on the left, where agreement was measured on a scale containing 'totally agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', 'totally disagree'.
		<p><b>Gallup World Poll</b>  <b>Feelings about household income</b>            Which of these phrases comes closest to your own feelings about your household income these days?</p>	The score for this question is the share of respondents that said they are either 'living comfortably' or 'getting by on' present income. The Gallup data is measured in share of the respondents, so it was included into the framework as is.
	Social environment	<p><b>BL.7 To what extent do you think each of the following local actors contributes or not to the cultural development of (OUR COUNTRY)?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)</li> <li>• Religious organisations</li> </ul>	The score for this question is the mean share of people that said that NGOs and religious organisations contribute to cultural development of their country 'a lot' or 'to some extent' on a scale

Dimension	Sub dimension	Indicator	Indicator aggregation
			that contains 'a lot', 'to some extent', 'not really' and 'not at all' as options. The mean share was taken across the different local actors.
		<p><b>BL.8 Please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with the following statements.</b></p> <p>(2) Cultural activities contribute to the social well being of (OUR COUNTRY).</p>	The score for this question is the mean share of people who said they 'totally agree' or 'tend to agree' across the statements on the left, where agreement was measured on a scale containing 'totally agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', 'totally disagree'.
		<p><b>BL.3 To what extent are you interested in the following cultural activities?</b></p> <p>Would you say you are very interested, fairly interested, not very interested or not at all interested in...?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attend a ballet, dance performance or opera</li> <li>• Watch a film in a cinema</li> <li>• Attend a play in a theatre</li> <li>• Attend a concert</li> <li>• Got to a public library</li> <li>• Visit a historical monument</li> <li>• Visit a museum or art gallery</li> <li>• Watch/listen to cultural programmes on TV or on radio</li> <li>• Read books</li> </ul>	The score for this question is the mean across cultural activities (listed on the left) of people who said that they are 'very interested' or 'fairly interested' in these activities, where interest was measured on a scale containing 'very interested', 'fairly interested', 'not very interested', and 'not at all interested'.
		<p><b>BL.8 Please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with the following statements.</b></p> <p>(3) Culture and cultural exchanges can play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance in the world, even where there are conflicts or tensions.</p>	The score for this question is the mean share of people who said they 'totally agree' or 'tend to agree' across the statements on the left, where agreement was measured on a scale containing 'totally agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', 'totally disagree'.

Colour key:

Red = [Organisational Survey](#)

Blue = [Neighbourhood Barometer \(Wave 6 unless noted\)](#)

Orange = [Varieties of Democracy \(V-Dem\)](#)

Green = [Gallup World Poll 2017](#)

Yellow = [Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2018](#)

## Appendix 5: Data sources for CVM

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Ukraine

### Active citizens

#### Workshops

Workshop	Date	Place	# Participants
<b>Workshop 1</b>	04/07/2017	BC Kyiv	14
<b>Workshop 2</b>	30/10/2017	BC Kyiv	14

#### Survey

<b>Participants</b>	Strategic	Delivery/Users
<b>Number</b>	3	160
<b>Date</b>	18/10/2017-26/10/2017	19/10/2017-30/11/2017

### Luhansk's ART & FACTs

#### Workshops

Workshop	Date	Place	# Participants
<b>Workshop 1</b>	05/07/2017	GI Kyiv	47
<b>Workshop 2</b>	31/10/2017	GI Kyiv	41

## Survey

Participants	Strategic	Delivery	Users
Number	0	12	7
Date	17/10/2017- 31/10/2017	19/10/2017- 29/10/2017	18/10/2017-24/10/2017

## Expert Interviews in Ukraine

1. Unnamed Active Citizens Program Director, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
2. Unnamed Active Citizens Program Manager, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
3. Unnamed Deputy Director, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
4. Unnamed Director 1, British Council, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
5. Unnamed Director 2, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
6. Unnamed Strategy Team Member 1, German, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
7. Unnamed Strategy Team Member 2, Ukrainian, Goethe-Institut, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
8. Unnamed Cultural Diplomacy Insider 1, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
9. Unnamed Cultural Diplomacy Insider 2, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
10. Unnamed Cultural Manager 1, Kenan Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
11. Unnamed Cultural Manager 2, Foreign Cultural Institute, and EUNIC Member, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
12. Unnamed Cultural Manager 3, Involved in Literature, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
13. Unnamed Cultural Manager 4, Lviv, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
14. Unnamed Cultural Manager 5, Mystetskyi Arsenal, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
15. Unnamed Cultural Manager 6, Mystetskyi Arsenal, Interview Kyiv, July 2017
16. Unnamed Cultural Manager 7, Mystetskyi Arsenal, Informal Interview Kyiv, July 2017
17. Unnamed Cultural Manager 8, National Museum, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
18. Unnamed Cultural Manager 9, Renaissance Foundation, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
19. Unnamed Cultural Manager 10, Ukrainian residing in Germany, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
20. Unnamed Cultural Manager 11, Ukrainian Institute, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
21. Unnamed Curator and Artist, works closely with various German and British cultural institutions, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
22. Unnamed Donetsk Artist, works closely with various German and British cultural institutions, Informal Interview Kyiv, November 2017
23. Unnamed Former Deputy Minister of Culture in Ukraine, Interview Kyiv, January 2018
24. Unnamed Journalist, Hromadske TV, Interview Kyiv, January 2018

## Interview Question Schedule for Expert Interviews in Ukraine

### INTERVIEW QUESTION SCHEDULE KYIV JAN 2018

Prepared by O. Onuch

*January 17, 2018*

#### INTRO:

Thank you for meeting me today.

If you do not mind I will record our conversation. This is only for myself and our research team. If you want anything off the record please just let me know and I will pause the recording.

Do you agree that the content of this research is used to inform the consulting project myself and my research partners are conducting for the British Council and GI and may be published in the form of a policy report, academic journal articles and or an academic book?

#### INTERVIEW:

1. Can you please state your name, title, employment for the record?
  - a. How would you like us to refer to you if and when we quote content from this interview?
2. First, some questions about the terms we use to describe different kinds of cultural activities.
  - a. When referring to foreign-funded/supported cultural projects in Ukraine or events ó what terms do you/others use? ó or what are these examples of? [offer examples if doesn't know]
    - i. cultural relations
    - ii. cultural diplomacy
    - iii. cultural politics
    - iv. public diplomacy
    - v. international relations?
3. What do you understand the term cultural relations to mean?
  - a. Others use the term/s: cultural diplomacy/public diplomacyí what do you understand these to mean?
    - i. Is there a difference in how these terms are used?
    - ii. What do these concepts mean in the Ukrainian context?
    - iii. Is this different from is meant by this/these concept/s in contexts abroad/internationally?
  - b. What are the main goals driving cultural relations?
4. What sort of events, activities, interactions are part of -cultural relations?ó
  - a. Please give examples.
5. And who are the key actors involved in cultural relations/cultural diplomacy?
  - a. On the Ukrainian side?
    - i. Where in Ukraine?
    - ii. Across all of Ukraine or regionally specific?
  - b. On the International side?
  - c. Who benefits? What kind of different forms of value do different people derive from cultural relations?

6. Can you please give examples of what you consider to be ~~best~~ practices of, or ~~good~~ cultural relations/cultural diplomacy and indicate why?
  - a. In Ukraine specifically?
  - b. Internationally more broadly?
7. Can you please give examples of what you consider to be ~~worst~~ practices of/ or ~~bad~~ cultural relations/cultural diplomacy and why?
  - a. In Ukraine specifically?
  - b. Internationally more broadly?
8. And what are the key obstacles to ~~good~~ cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - a. In Ukraine specifically?
  - b. Internationally more broadly?
9. Can cultural relations empower citizens? Do cultural relations empower citizens?
  - a. If so how please give examples.
10. Can cultural relations reduce conflict?
  - a. OR do they just as easily cause or precipitate conflict?
    - i. Please give examples.

#### **ABOUT BRITISH COUNCIL AND GI:**

**The following two sets of questions will be asked interchangeably - half of the sample will be asked about British Council first the other about GI.**

11. How about the GI? What role do they play in this process?
  - a. In Ukraine specifically and internationally?
12. Have you ever worked with the GI were directly involved in any of their programmes? Or worked for a partner of the GI?
  - a. If yes - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this work/cooperation/involvement?
    - ii. Was this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If no skip to the next question.
13. What [if was involved in the GI ask: What other...], if any, activities, events, programs organized/ led by the GI do you know of?
  - a. If knows of activities - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this work/cooperation/involvement?
    1. Was this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If knows of none skip to the next question.
14. Now let us speak of one particular project the 'Luhansk Art and Facts' an online/digital museum ... have you heard of this program?
  - a. If knows of the program - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this program?
    - ii. Is this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If does not know skip to the next question.
15. How about the British Council?

- a. What role do they play in the process of cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. In Ukraine specifically and internationally?
16. Have you ever worked with the British Council/ were directly involved in any of their programmes? Or worked for a partner of the British Council?
- a. If yes - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this work/cooperation/involvement?
    - ii. Was this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If no skip to the next question.
17. What [if was involved in the British Council ask: What other...], if any, activities, events, programs organized/ led by the British Council do you know of?
- a. If knows of activities - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this work/cooperation/involvement?
    - ii. Was this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If knows none skip to the next question.
18. Now, let us speak of one particular project the 'Active Citizens Program' a program working with youth across the country... have you heard of this program?
- a. If knows of the program - please detail...
    - i. How would you evaluate this program?
    - ii. Is this an example of good cultural relations/cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy?
  - b. If does not know skip to the next question.

**IF THERE IS TIME:**

19. What do you think foreign cultural institutes/ organisations/ NGOs etc. do well and do poorly in (in terms of cultural diplomacy) the Ukrainian context?
- a. What do you think can be improved and how?
  - b. Are foreign funding processes transparent and is there accountability?
20. What do you think about the concept of soft-power diplomacy? Do you think it is a useful concept to describe what we have been talking about today?
21. Do you have anything to add? Did we miss anything?

Egypt

## Al Azhar

### Workshops

Workshop	Date	Place	Participants	#	Notes
<b>Workshop 1</b>	09/05/2017	AA ETC	Strategic	8	BC (3), AA (4) and UK FCO (1)
			Delivery: AA teachers	18	T1 (5 women), T2 (6 men) and T3 (7 women)
			Users: alumni	5	S1 (4 men and 1 woman)
<b>Workshop 2</b>	07/11/2017	AA ETC	Strategic	1	BC Chair and other members of the BC strategic team joined later
			Delivery: Teachers	4	Sat with each of the groups and then left for students to talk freely
			Users: Students	25	19 male and 6 female students. Divided into four groups S1:men, S2:men, S3:men and S4: women

### Survey

Participants	Strategic	Delivery: AA teachers	Users: students and alumni
<b>Number</b>	6	20	50
<b>Date</b>	17/10/2017- 31/10/2017	12/10/2017- 17/10/2017	12/10/2017 ó 01/11/2017

## Kulturakademie

### Workshop

Workshop	Date	Place	Participants	#	Notes
<b>Workshop 1</b>	10/05/2017	GI Downtown Office, Cairo	Strategic: GI representatives and external experts	6	3 GI staff members; 3 external experts on Egyptian cultural sector
			Users: alumni	<i>KA NANO</i>	
				7	(6 females; 1 male); involved in a preliminary focus group conducted by GI strategic team
				<i>KA Egypt</i>	
				12	(6 females and 6 males)
<b>Workshop 2</b>	09/11/2017	GI Downtown Office, Cairo	Strategic: GI representatives and external experts	No Intervention	
			Users: alumni	<i>KA NANO</i>	
				11	(7 females and 4 males)
				<i>KA Egypt</i>	

### Survey

Participants	Strategic	Delivery: Trainers	Users: alumni
Number	2	2	12 (6 KA Egypt; 6 KA MENA)
Date	October 2017		

### Film Week

#### Workshops

Workshop	Date	Place	Participants	#	Notes
Workshop 1	11/05/2017	GI Doqqi Office, Cairo	Strategic: GI representatives	5	GI staff running FW (5 females)
			Delivery and Users	13	Film Producers, Filmmakers, distributors and students from the High School of Cinema

Workshop 2	08/11/2017	GI Downtown Office, Cairo	Strategic: GI representatives	5	Same as in Workshop 1
			External: delivery and users	5	1 Filmmakers and 4 students from the High School of Cinema (only males)

## Survey

Participants	Strategic	Delivery	Users
<b>Number</b>	6 (on-line)	7 (on-line)	149 (paper) <sup>85</sup>
<b>Date</b>	October 2017-February 2018		

## Expert Interviews in Egypt

1. Unnamed official in UK Embassy, Cairo, May 2017
2. Unnamed AAETC Teacher, Cairo, May 2017
3. Unnamed Activist, Youth Representative and Civil Society Actor (Male), close to the former Minister of Culture Emad Aboghaazy, Skype, February 2018
4. Unnamed Artist, Cairo, October 2017
5. Unnamed Civil Society Actor (Female), involved in local NGO that once partnered with the British Council, Skype, February 2018
6. Unnamed Cultural Activist and Manager, Cairo, May 2017
7. Unnamed Cultural Manager, Cairo, October 2017
8. Unnamed Deputy Director British Council, Cairo, May 2017
9. Unnamed Egyptian trainer KANANO, Skype, September 2017
10. Unnamed German Trainer KAE and KANANO, Skype, September 2017
11. Unnamed KA participants, (GI focus group), Cairo, May 2017
12. Unnamed Lecturer of Cultural Studies, Cairo, May 2017
13. Unnamed Project Manager British Council, Skype, March 2017; Cairo, May 2017
14. Unnamed Project Manager Goethe-Institut 1 Cairo, May 2017
15. Unnamed Project Manager Goethe-Institut 2, Cairo, May 2017

## Interview Question Schedule for Expert Interviews in Egypt

### INTERVIEW QUESTION SCHEDULE Cairo/Skype

Prepared by D. Mahlouly

<sup>85</sup> The CVM survey had no responses on-line for the user section (we labelled a combination of delivery and user segments as external and asked the question to what were strictly speaking members close to the GI, so delivery team). However, we had a large response (149 users) when handing out survey to attendees to other film screening at the GI. Surveys were collected during the biweekly Montags in Missaha movie screenings. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of March the GI screened the movie „Lola renntø(engl. „Run Lola Runø) and 79 responses were collected. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of March it was „Der Himmel über Berlinø(engl. „Wings of desiresø) and there were 70 responses collected. After the screenings thereøs usually a discussion, sometimes with specific guests (on the 19<sup>th</sup> they invited an Egyptian director). The event is free of charge. We used the scores for triangulation (see case study section on FW for scores)

1. How do you understand cultural relations in general and what do you think is the role of cultural relations, first in Egypt, and in the world in general?
2. Yes, I understand. So, when it comes to the foreign cultural agencies, such as the British Council, for instance, would you prefer to use a different term, like «cultural diplomacy» or «public diplomacy»? Do you think it might be more relevant to use these terms, or is the term «cultural relations» more appropriate?
3. In your opinion, how important are cultural relations in the Egyptian context more specifically?
4. And what do you think should be the goals of cultural relations, the main goals?
5. Do you have one or more example in mind of an activity that should, in your opinion, be part of cultural relations, I think you already alluded to this question, but maybe you have a specific example in mind, like an activity that already exists and has been successful in promoting one aspect of cultural relations?
6. Could you name some of the key actors, some institutions you consider to be the key actors in cultural relations in Egypt?
7. Do you have an example in mind of bad practice in cultural relations in the Egyptian context?
8. What do you think are the obstacles or challenges to cultural relations in Egypt? What makes it particularly difficult in Egypt in your opinion?
9. Do you mean state media or private media? In general, everywhere in the world?
10. So you think this is not specific to Egypt?
11. Do you think that cultural relations, I mean between foreign institutions and audiences in Egypt, can empower citizens?
12. Do you think that cultural relations can help reduce conflicts?
13. Are you familiar with the activity of the Goethe-Institut and do you know of a specific project they have been offering in Egypt?
14. Have you ever heard of the British Council Al Azhar language training centre? (They have a language training centre in Al Azhar University) Did you know about this before?
15. Have you heard before about the Goethe-Institut's Kultarakademie training Programme in cultural management?
16. Think you very much. Do you have anything else you would like to add about the concept of «soft power diplomacy»? This has to do with the role of cultural relations in diplomatic relationship between countries and the UK or Germany's relationships with Egypt. Is there any comment you would like me to report on this broader topic?

## Template workshop 1

### Task 1: Identifying the Value of Luhansk's ART & FACTs

#### Workshop Discussion Questions and Activities

Please give examples in your responses whenever and wherever possible

- “ Describe **your** experience of the Luhansk&FACTs ART & FACTs (LA&F) programme.
- “ Did it meet your expectations?
- “ What did **you** value most about it?
- “ **Who else** benefits from the LA&F programme? List the actors who benefit
- “ How would you describe the value of the programme for other beneficiaries?
- “ What are the main challenges faced or obstacles to the success of LA&F?
- “ How could improvements be achieved?
- “ What would you like to see happen in the future?

### Task 2: Defining the Value of Luhansk's ART & FACTs

- “ What are the **main types of value** identified by your group?
- “ Decide what are the key types of value or benefit of LA&F ó i.e. what matters most to you and your group
- “ Write 3-5 key types of value preferably as one or two keywords on a post-it
- “ Write a **definition** of each kind of value on a separate post-it
- “ Think about what success would look like
- “ Give examples of the evidence that would be needed to assess success

### Task 3 Visualising Cultural Relations in Ukraine

Draw a rich picture (or a collective mind map) of how you and your group perceives the wider cultural relations landscape in which Luhansk&ART & FACTs operates.

You might like to think about one or more of the following questions to capture an image of the group&s collective perception:

- “ How do you see the LA&F programme in relation to other state and/or independent cultural projects?
- “ How would you visualise hierarchies and/or power relations in Ukrainian cultural relations?
- “ If Ukraine is a «society in transition»(as all societies are) how do you see what is transitioning from and to?
- “ What would be your collective dream image of a truly innovative cultural relations programme for Ukraine?

## **Template workshop 2**

### **Assessing the Value of Cultural Relations in Egypt - Workshop Guide for Participants**

- **Group Discussion**

First of all, please appoint a Chair - someone who will manage the discussion and make sure the group sticks to time and ensures that all participants speak freely and fairly and that no one person dominates the conversation. You will also need to appoint a Rapporteur to take notes and report back to the whole group.

- **Activity 1 (30 mins)**

- **Objective:**

- to discuss and get your collective reactions to the preliminary research findings in the scored constellation

- **The Scored Constellation Diagram**

In Workshop 1 participants helped us to create the constellation diagram which shows what you value most about the project. We have scored a constellation diagram using survey monkey data only. Some of you will have completed the survey. This is an opportunity to discuss the results. Scores are based on an average of all results. Scores of 1-2 are disappointing and fail to meet expectations. Scores of 3-5 are good, sustainable and appropriate. Scores of 6-7 are beyond expectation, excellent or outstanding. The constellations diagram is a visual snapshot of results. The scores are preliminary and provisional. Scores are subject to negotiation and amendment over time as new data comes in. Conversations about the shape of the constellation at any one moment are an important part of the research process. We are still gathering data. The constellation will be amended as we go. Now we would like to ask you some further questions

1. Are the components OK? Do they reflect and express what the project is about?
2. Do you find the scores accurate/ surprising? Why or why not?
3. What scores does your group agree with and/or disagree with? Why?
4. Focusing on lower scores (1-2) ó what needs to be done to improve those scores or should the objective be redefined?
5. Focusing on higher scores (6-7) ó can those high scores continue at that level? Are they sustainable?
6. Focusing on mid-range scores (3-5) ó what evidence would push the scores up or down?
7. Have we missed anything? Is there something that we didn't ask about?

- **Activity 2 (45mins)**

- **Objectives:**

- to discuss and collectively to offer your assessment of the overall value of this project according to agreed expectation and criteria of assessment
- to give examples and offer evidence to back up your judgement or assessment
- to offer a score that matches the evidence that the group provides
  - **Instructions for Scoring**

We invite you to score each question on a scale from 1 (disappointing) to 7 (better than expected), with the middle scores representing a good and sustainable level of achievement. It is really important that before scoring each question you provide comments, evidence and/or examples in English or Ukrainian or Russian. The score should reflect the example or evidence that you offer. If you cannot agree upon a score, then please give the reasons for the disagreement and the divergent scores.

- **Activity 3: Feedback Session (one hour)**
  - **Objectives**
- to offer a clear overview of the outcome of your group's discussion and responses to the questions of *Activity 1* in which points of agreement and disagreement are noted and explained.
- to explain the results of the scored constellation *Activity 2* offering insights into high, low and average scores and, again, noting and explaining points of agreement and disagreement about what the project does well and how it should improve in the future.

to bring together in a final discussion involving all participants all the key findings and *points of convergence and divergence* about whether and how this project, its successes and failures, might shed light on *what makes for good cultural relations in Egypt today and in the future*.

## Appendix 6: CVM Survey Data: Components, Questions and Scores

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### Active Citizens

#### Стратегічні (Strategic)

##### Партнерства (Partnerships)

*The CRIs are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between BC/GI and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships. For AC: The key partnerships are between BC and the ACs involved in the programme*

S1.1	/	"	?	Is there a good mutual relationship between the British Council and the facilitators and trainers involved in the Active Citizens programme?	6.7
S1.2	,	"	a	Do you think the relationship should continue in its present form?	6.0
S1.3	(	)	?	Is the partnership likely to lead to a closer relationship between the British Council and other cultural institutions in Ukraine?	6.0

Average score: 6.2

Scores come from the 3 Strategic respondents, who all gave high scores.

#### Діалог (Dialogue)

*The interventions lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding. For AC: Key terms are 'consensus' and 'tolerance'.*

S2.1	"	"	?	Does the project promote consensus-building and mutual tolerance between people with different opinions?	5.4
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S2.2	"	"	Does the project contribute to better mutual understanding between people in Ukraine and other countries?	5.5
	?			
S2.3	"	"	Does the project contribute to better mutual understanding between people in different regions within the Ukraine?	5.3

Average score: 5.4

Scores come from Delivery/Users (121-132) and Strategic (3). The Strategic respondents all scored 7 on all three questions but are heavily outweighed by the Delivery/Users.

Scores here were generally good amongst Delivery and Users with only a small number in range 1-3; the most (19) was for S2.3

### Участь (Participation)

*The CRIs target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised. For AC: The key term is inclusion, in Ukrainian ‘inklusyvnist’. The programme needs to reach a range of people with different needs, including those who may have been overlooked by other cultural or NGO projects.*

S.3.1	"	"	Does the Active Citizens programme reach a good range of people with different backgrounds and needs?	7.0
	?			
S3.2	"	"	Does the Active Citizens programme adequately reach people who may have been overlooked by other cultural projects?	5.0

/

?

S3.3	"	Is enough being done to increase public awareness of the existence and benefits of the Active Citizens programme?	4.6
	"?		

Average score: 5.6

S3.1 was asked only of the 3 Strategic respondents, who all scored 7.

Amongst Delivery/Users there were a significant minority of low (1-3) scores - 22 for S3.2 and 32 for S3.3. Quotes below over-represent this minority.

### Постачання (Delivery)

### Професіональність (Professionalism)

*Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the CRI. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the CRI contributes to career development. For AC: People who participate in the programme are enabled to launch new initiatives themselves.*

D1.1	"	" Has the Active Citizens programme given you opportunities to work creatively?	5.5
D1.2	"	Has there been a good level of collaboration between people working on the programme?	5.1
D1.3	"	Has the amount of time you have spent on the programme been appropriate for you?	5.4
D1.4	i "	Have you been enabled and encouraged through the programme to launch new Active Citizens initiatives yourself?	5.2
?			Average score: 5.3

Scores come from 126-130 Delivery/Users. Generally favourable, with 9-21 low scores.

### **Якість (Quality)**

*Staff consider content/activities of the CRIs to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget.*

*For AC: Key terms are creativity, pro-activeness and openness; also responsibility, understood as ensuring that tasks are completed on time and within budget, of high quality and meeting the expectations of BC.*

D2.1	,	From your experience, would you say that people working on the Active Citizens programme have a good understanding of the needs of people in Ukraine?	5.1
D2.2	,	Do people working on the Active Citizens understand the expectations of the British Council for the programme and work well to meet those expectations?	5.1
?			Average score: 5.1

Scores come from 128-130 Delivery/Users. Again generally favourable, with only 14-16 low scores.

### Співробітництво (Collaboration)

*There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of CRIs. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally. For AC: The key relationships are between different partners involved in the projects, and between the local communities/beneficiaries and the ACs.*

D3.1		Is there good communication between 5.1 the different groups working on the Active Citizens programme?
	"?	
D3.2		Is there good communication between 4.6 the people working on the Active Citizens programme and the local communities that the programme aims to benefit?
	" , " , ?	
		Average score: 4.9

Scores come from 122-127 Dleivery/Users. D3.1 had 18 low responses, D3.2 had 31.

### Користувачі (Users)

#### Вдячність (Appreciation)

*Users praise the quality of outputs; they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The CRIs meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others. For AC: As with Quality, key terms are creativity, pro-activeness and openness.*

U1.1		Thinking about the Active Citizens 5.9 activities that you have taken part in, did you find them enjoyable and stimulating?
	" , " , ?	
U1.2		Do you think that the activities 5.6 showed creativity and innovation?
	" , " , ?	
U1.3		Did the activities allow and encourage 6.0 open dialogue amongst participants?
	" , " , ?	
		Average score: 5.8

Scores from 131-132 Delivery/Users. Generally high scoring, with only 5-12 low scores.

### **Корисність (Utility)**

*Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the CRIs has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life. For AC: An indicator of success of the programme is the number of people who go on to develop their own initiatives.*

U2.1	"	Has your involvement in the Active Citizens programme opened up new opportunities for you in your work, education or cultural life?	5.2
U2.2	"	Has your involvement in the Active Citizens programme encouraged you to launch new initiatives yourself?	5.2
Average score:			5.2

Scores from 129-132 Delivery/Users. Generally favourable but a somewhat wider range than for U1, with 14-20 low scores.

### **Можливість (Opportunity)**

*The activities/outputs of the CRIs do not stand in isolation but provide a progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment. For AC: The term 'sustainability' was used in the workshops. ACs need to have continuing support after their initial projects are completed.*

U3.1	"	Did the organisers of the Active Citizens programme provide continuing support to you after your initial involvement in the programme?	4.9
	"		

Scores come from 130 Delivery/Users. Again generally favourable, but there were 35 low scores.

**Are there any other relevant aspects of Active Citizens that you want to highlight?**

**Is there anything Active Citizens could do differently?**

### Luhansk's ART & FACTs

We have 20 responses: 1 from Strategic (not included here); 12 from Delivery and 7 from Users. Some Strategic and Delivery questions were asked of Delivery and User respondents. The maximum response for any question is 12. It appears that 7 of the 12 Delivery respondents answered only D1.1.

### **Стратегічні (Strategic)**

## **Партнерства (Partnerships)**

*The CRIs are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between BC/GI and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships.*

S1.1	(GI)	Do the Goethe Institut (GI) and the LAF development team have a good mutual relationship?	6.2
S1.2	,	Do you think the relationship should continue in its present form?	5.8
	(GI)	a	
		?	
S1.3	( )	Is the partnership likely to lead to a closer relationship between GI and other cultural institutions in Ukraine?	No score
	'		
	(GI)		
	?		

Scores are based on 5 Delivery respondents. S1.3 was asked in the Strategic questionnaire which we are not yet reporting.

## **Діалог (Dialogue)**

*The interventions lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding.*

S2.1	?	To what extent, in your opinion, does the project increase understanding of the diversity of Ukrainian culture among Ukrainians?	5.4
S2.2	?	To what extent does the project contribute to better mutual understanding between people in Ukraine and in other countries?	5.8

Based on 10-11 responses from Delivery and Users. For S2.1, there was a lower average score from Users (4.8) than Delivery (6.0).

## **Участь (Participation)**

*The CRIs target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised. For*

**LAF:** The site should allow and encourage participation from a range of people within and outside the Luhansk region.

S3.1	- , ?	Does the website allow and encourage participation from a range of people within and outside Luhansk?	4.4
S3.2	, - A ?	Is enough being done to increase public awareness of the website?	3.5

Based on 11 responses from Delivery (5) and Users (6). Low scores from Users including 3 scoring 1 or 2.

### **Постачання (Delivery)**

#### **Професіональність(Professionalism)**

*Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the CRI. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the CRI contributes to career development.*

D1.1	i A ?	Have you had opportunities to work creatively on the project?	5.6
D1.2	, A ?	Has there been a good level of collaboration between people working on the project?	5.4
D1.3	i A ?	Do you consider that your experience of working on the project has been or will be useful for your career?	6.0
D1.4	A ?	i Has the workload on the project been appropriate for you?	5.6

Scores based on Delivery: 12 responses for D1.1, 5 for remainder.

### **Якість (Quality)**

*Staff consider content/activities of the CRIs to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget. For LAF: Key values are creativity (innovation), objectivity and breadth (ie covering the whole spectrum of culture in Luhansk).*

D2.1	?	Do you think that the virtual museum shows a good level of creativity and innovation?	5.8
D2.2	a?	Does the virtual museum cover the whole spectrum of culture in Luhansk?	4.6

D2.3		Do you think that the virtual ? museum is politically objective?	4.4
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Scores for D2.2, D2.3 based on 5 Delivery respondents. Scores for D2.1 also based on 6 Users.

Relatively low score for D2.2 and D2.3., mainly because of one person scoring 2 for these.

### **Співробітництво (Collaboration)**

*There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of CRIs. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally. For LAF: There is an issue of whether the development team adequately consulted with a good range of potential contributors.*

D3.1		Do you think that communication amongst team members is based on mutual respect and a shared ? understanding of the aims of the project?	6.4
------	--	--	-----

D3.2		Do you think that the development team reached out to and consulted adequately with a good range of ? potential contributors?	5.2
------	--	--	-----

Scores for 3.1 based on Delivery (5 respondents), for 3.2 based on Delivery (5) and Users (6). For 3.2, Delivery scored higher (6.2) than Users (4.3).

### **Користувачі (Users)**

All scores in Users section based on 567 Users.

### **Вдячність (Appreciation)**

*Users praise the quality of outputs; they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The CRIs meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others. For LAF: The apolitical character of the site is important.*

U1.1	-	A ?	Do you think that the Luhansk& ART & FACTs website has an appealing design?	4.9
U1.2	-	A ?	Do you think that the website encourages creative responses among users to defining Lukhansk culture?	3.8
U1.3	-	A ?	Is the website easy to use?	5.8

U1.4	-	A	To what extent do you think that the website is inclusive of different cultures and interests in the region?	3.5
	/			

Low scores for U1.2 and U1.4, with half the scores in the range 163 for each.

### **Корисність (Utility)**

*Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the CRIs has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life. For LAF: Usefulness here is to do with providing a platform to express and preserve regional identity.*

U2.1	-	A	Do you think that the website works well as a platform to express, define and preserve a culturally and socially diverse regional identity?	3.8

U2.2	-	A	Does the website give you an opportunity to showcase material or activities that is not easily available elsewhere?	5.7

Low score for U2.1. Comments relating to the fact that material is not being updated.

### **Можливість (Opportunity)**

*The activities/outputs of the CRIs do not stand in isolation but provide a progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment. For LAF: The site should have the capacity to develop.*

U3.1	-	A	Does the website provide appropriate links to other relevant material on other websites?	3.4
	/			

U3.2	-	A	Does the website give you enough information about where to find other related cultural material or events?	3.4
	,			

U3.3	-	A	Do users have good opportunity to contribute to developing the website?	5.8
	?			

Low scores for U3.1 and U3.2.

## استراتيجي (Strategic)

### شراكات (Partnerships)

The Cultural Relations Interventions (CRIs) are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between BC/GI and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships. **For AA:** the key partnership is between BC and AA.

S1.1	Do the British Council and Al Azhar have a good mutual relationship?	هل هناك بين المجلس الثقافي البريطاني وجامعة الأزهر علاقه حسنة؟	6.2
S1.2	Do you think the relationship should continue in its present form?	هل تعتقد أن العلاقة يجب تدويم كما هي الان؟	5.5
S1.3	Is the partnership likely to lead to a closer relationship with other British Higher Education institutions?		4.2
S1.4	Is enough being done to raise public awareness of the existence and benefits of the programme?		2.8

Average score: 4.7

Scores come from 5 of the 6 Strategic respondents. 3 low scores (1 or 2) for S1.4.

### حوار (Dialogue)

The interventions lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding. **For AA:** the specific aspects to be considered are: expanding horizons of students; exposure to and generating interest in non-Muslim cultures; tolerance; critical thinking.

S2.1	Has the project expanded the opportunities of students (e.g. study, travel, work)?	هل يوسع المشروع الامكانيات الاستقبلية للطلاب؟	5.0
S2.2	Has the project increased exposure to and generated interest in cultures and societies around the world?	هل ينجب المشروع اهتماما في الثقافات الأخرى من كل العالم؟	4.6
S2.3	Has the project fostered tolerance and critical thinking?	هل يشجع المشروع على التسامح والتفكير النقدي؟	5.0

Average score: 4.9

Scores come from 5 of the 6 Strategic respondents. Some low scores (2-3) from one respondent.

### مشاركة (Participation)

*The CRIs target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: size and scope of programme; promotion; proportion of female students.*

S.3.1	Is student enrolment in the programme at an appropriate level?	هل الطلاب مسجلون في البرنامج بمستوى (اللغة الانجليزية) مناسب؟	3.5
S3.2	Is there a good balance of male and female students in the programme?	هل هناك توازن جيد بين الجنسين بين الطلاب في البرنامج؟	2.5
S3.3	Is there a good balance of Egyptian and non-Egyptian in the programme?	هل هناك توازن بين طلاب مصرىين وطلاب غير مصرىين في البرنامج؟	2.1
S3.4	Does the teaching and learning take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by digital resources and social media?	هل يستخدم التعليم وتعلم مزايا كاملة للموارد الرقمية ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعى؟	4.5

Average score: 3.2

Scores come from 4 Strategic respondents, plus 15-18 Delivery respondents for S3.2 and S3.3. Both Strategic and Delivery gave low scores for these questions.

S3.1 seems to have been translated or interpreted differently from what we intended. The question appears to have been 'Do people come in to the courses with an appropriate level of English?'

### تسليم(Delivery)

#### احترافية (Professionalism)

*Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the CRI. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the CRI contributes to career development. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: training, qualification and accreditation of teachers; usefulness of training for future career; level of workload; motivation for teachers.*

D1.1	Have you received appropriate on-going training and opportunities for continuing professional development on the Al Azhar-British Council partnership at the English Training Centre (AAETC)?	3.8
D1.2	Have you received appropriate qualifications and/or accreditation for your work for the AAETC?	3.7
D1.3	Do you consider that your experience of working with at the AAETC has been or will be useful for your career?	5.0
D1.4	Is the workload appropriate for you?	4.1
D1.5	Do you think AAETC offers you sufficient career incentives and motivates you to progress in your work?	3.4

Average score: 4.0

Scores come from 20 Delivery respondents. Scores are well spread between 1 and 6, with 9 low scores (1-3) for D1.1, 9 for D1.2, 3 for D1.3, 7 for D1.4 and 12 for D1.5.

### جودة (Quality)

*Staff consider content/activities of the CRIs to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget. For AA: the specific aspects of quality that are considered important are: quality of teaching; quality of teaching materials; use of different teaching methodologies; level of attainment by students relative to entry level; value of teaching in providing useful skills for students.*

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| D2.1 Is the teaching at the AAETC of high quality?  | 5.6 |
| D2.2 Are the teaching materials of high quality?  | 5.3 |
| D2.3 Are a range of different teaching methods used at AAETC?   | 5.5 |
| D2.4 Do the students at AAETC reach a good level of progression and attainment relative to their entry level?                             | 4.2 |
| D2.5 Do the students gain useful transferable skills through studying at AAETC?   | 4.0 |
| D2.6 Do students and teachers together gain greater knowledge and a deeper understanding of UK Culture directly as a result of the AAETC? | 3.0 |

Average score: 4.6

Scores come from 20 Delivery respondents. Scores are well spread between 1 and 7. D1.1-D1.3 have generally good scores. D2.6 has 12 low scores.

### تعاون (Collaboration)

There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of CRIs. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: opportunities for teachers and organizers to offer feedback to the AA-BC partnership; the nature of the relationship between AA and BC staff in terms of equity.

- |  |     |
|--|-----|
| D3.1 Do teachers and managers at AAETC have sufficient opportunities to offer feedback and comments directly to the British Council? | 3.2 |
| D3.2 Do you think that teachers at AAETC are valued and treated equally, professionally and with due respect?                        | 3.3 |
| D3.3 Are teachers offered enough opportunities to learn about and/or visit the UK?   | 1.6 |
| D3.4 Does the teaching and learning take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by digital resources and social media?         | 3.7 |

Average score: 2.9

Scores come from 19-20 Delivery respondents. A lot of low scores here, especially for D3.3 where all respondents except one gave low scores.

### المستخدمين (Users)

#### الرضا (Appreciation)

*Users praise the quality of outputs; they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The CRIs meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: quality of teaching; use of varied teaching methodologies; relationship with teachers.*

U1.1 Is the teaching at the Al Azhar English Training Centre (AAETC) of high quality? U1.1 : 5.5

U1.2 Are the materials provided with the course of high quality? U1.2 : 5.4

U1.3 Is there a good relationship between students and teachers? U1.3 : 6.4

Average score: 5.8

Scores from 48-49 Users. Generally appreciative, with few low scores.

### الاستفادة (Utility)

*Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the CRIs has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: value of courses for employability and career development; opportunities for participants to make contact with other people working or studying or working in their field, to develop or join networks.*

U2.1 Have your experience and learning English at AAETC been useful for your career? U2.1 : 5.6

U2.2 Has studying with AAETC given you opportunities to make contact with other people studying or working in the same field? U2.2 : 5.0

U2.3 Have the AAETC courses expanded your international networks e.g. opened up contacts and communication with others abroad in Britain or the English-speaking world? U2.3 : 4.1

U2.4	Have your studies with AAETC helped you to think about the role of inter-faith dialogue in avoiding and resolving conflicts and promoting security and stability?	U2.4	:	4.5
U2.5	Does the teaching and learning take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by digital resources and social media?	U2.5	:	4.9
Average score:				4.8

Scores come from 42-46 Users. Again generally favourable with a few low scores, particularly on U2.3 (11 low scores).

### **فرصة(Opportunity)**

*The activities/outputs of the CRIs do not stand in isolation but provide a progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment. For AA: the specific aspects to be considered are: links between courses and further educational opportunities.*

U3.1	Are there sufficient links between the AAETC programmes and other courses in Egypt and beyond?	U3.1	:	4.6
U3.2	Are there sufficient educational opportunities that enable progression once you complete the programme?	U3.2	:	4.2
U3.3	Are you offered any kind of support once you complete the programme? (e.g. provided with opportunities to network with other students of English in Egypt and beyond)?	U3.3	:	3.3
Average score:				4.0

Scores come from 37-45 Users. Again a good spread with some low scores, especially for U3.3 (8 for U3.1, 9 for U3.2, (22 for U3.3). Few comments.

Kulturakademie

### **Strategic**

#### **Partnerships**

*The Cultural Relations Interventions (CRIs) are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between BC/GI and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships. For KA: There is a*

*good relationship between GI and the state organisations, between GI and the independent organisations, and (perhaps most importantly) between the state and independent organisations.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
S1.1	Has the partnership between the Goethe-Institut and state organisations during the Kulturakademie Egypt (KA Egypt) Programme been effective and sustainable?	7.0	7.0
S1.2	Has the partnership between the Goethe-Institut and independent organisations during Kulturakademie NANO (KA NANO) been effective and sustainable?	0.0	7.0
S1.4	Has KA NANO contributed to promoting cooperation between German and Arab (Egyptian) cultural institutions?	0.0	5.5
	Mean score	7.0	6.2

Scores come from just two Strategic respondents. Data merged from different versions of questionnaire. Same results used for Egypt and MENA.

### Dialogue

*The interventions lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding. For KA: Participation leads directly to the professional development of cultural managers; there is an opening of public debate about matters of social or common concern.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
S2.1	Has KA NANO helped strengthen regional ties?	6.0	6.0
S2.2	Does Kulturakademie contribute to the strengthening of the cultural sphere in Egypt?	6.0	4.8
S2.3	Do you think that the Programme has contributed to the dialogue and sharing of expertise between cultural managers working in different kinds of cultural organisations?	5.0	4.8
S2.5	Does Kulturakademie open opportunities for inter-cultural dialogue?	5.3	5.7
S2.6	To what extent is KA NANO enabling participants to reflect changes in the Egyptian society?	5.5	5.5
S2.7	Has KA Egypt helped participants expand their national and international cultural networks?	7.0	7.0
S2.9	How would you rate the impact of the Kulturakademie in	5.0	5.0

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
	strengthening the Egyptian cultural sector?		
	Mean score	5.7	5.3

Scores for S2.1, S2.6, S2.7, S2.9 come from 2 Strategic respondents, for S2.2, S2.3, S2.5 from 10 Users. No questions answered by both groups.

### Participation

*The CRIs target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised. For KA: KANANO reaches the specific targets set for projects and numbers of applications*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
S3.1	Has KA NANO achieved the target number of applicants?	7.0	7.0
S3.3	Has KA NANO achieved the target number and reach expected of projects?	7.0	7.0
S3.4	Do participants in KA Training of Trainers (ToT) act as multipliers in their home institutions, transferring knowledge acquired through training courses?	5.0	5.0
	Mean score	5.0	6.3

Scores come from one Strategic respondent.

## **Delivery**

### **Professionalism**

*Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the CRI. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the CRI contributes to career development.*

<b>Question number</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>MENA</b>
D1.2	Have you had the opportunity to contribute to the design, the method and content of the training courses?	5.0	5.0
D1.3	Is your participation in Kulturakademie useful to your professional development?	5.0	5.0
	Mean score	5.0	5.0

Scores for D1.1 come from two Delivery respondents, for D1.3 from just one.

### **Quality**

*Staff consider content/activities of the CRIs to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget.*

<b>Question number</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>MENA</b>
D2.1	Is the training appropriate for the professional development of the participants?	7.0	7.0
D2.2	How would you rate the effect of KA NANO on the professional development of the independent sector cultural managers?	7.0	7.0
D2.3	How would you rate the effect of KA Egypt on the professional development of state sector cultural managers?	5.0	5.0
D2.4	Do KA trainers have a good understanding of the professional needs and challenges faced by participants?	5.6	4.9
D2.5	Does Kulturakademie help to foster equality and collaborative styles of learning in the training workshops through participatory formats?	5.5	5.6
	Mean score	5.8	6.1

Scores come from a mix of Strategic, Delivery and User respondents. The questions with the most responses are D2.4 (7 responses each for Egypt and MENA) and D2.5 (10 responses each for Egypt and MENA). The Egypt and MENA Users are not the same people.

### **Collaboration**

*There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of CRIs. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
D3.1	Do you think that the relationship between the Programme organizers and trainers is clearly defined and based on a shared cultural understanding?	6.0	6.0
D3.2	Do you think that the KA Training of Trainers (ToT) workshops will improve steadily the professional relationship between cultural managers in the state and independent sectors	4.8	4.8
D3.3	Do Kulturakademie NANO and Kulturakademie Egypt help build bridges between the state and independent cultural sectors in Egypt?	4.0	4.0
D3.4	Does Kulturakademie make good use of internet and social media, integrating them effectively in ways that may open up new kinds of partnerships and modes of participation?	5.2	4.0
	Mean score	5.0	4.7

Scores come from a mix of Strategic, Delivery and User respondents. The questions with the most responses are D3.2 and D3.4, which have 9 responses each for Egypt and MENA. The Egypt and MENA Users are not the same people.

## Users

### Appreciation

*Users praise the quality of outputs; they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The CRIs meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others. For KA: aspects covered in GI evaluation include: duration of Programme; quality of materials; overall methodology and teaching efficiency; balance between theory and practice; co-operation and communication with trainers; trainers' qualifications; working atmosphere within group; whether objectives of course were achieved; overall approval. It is not clear whether GI had established that all these issues were important to users.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
U1.1	Do you consider the teaching in Kulturakademie to be of high quality?	5.6	5.3
U1.2	Did the training cover an appropriate range of topics (e.g. good balance between theory and practice)?	5.7	4.7
U1.3	Was the Programme enjoyable, with good working relations	6.7	6.3

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
	and atmosphere?		
U1.4	Was the process of admission appropriate?	6.0	4.7
U1.5	Were your expectations met by the Programme?	6.0	5.7
U1.6	How would you rate the communication with the Goethe-Institut before, during and after KA workshops?	5.7	6.2
	Mean score	5.9	5.5

Scores come from 12 User respondents, 6 each for Egypt and MENA. Scores for Egypt are generally but not universally higher than scores for MENA. Generally high scores, with only one below 4.

### Utility

*Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the CRIs has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life. For KA: GI evaluation of training covered usefulness of each module; whether it was easy to adapt the knowledge gained to local context; whether skills and contacts gained helped user to get funding; relevance to user's work.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
U2.1	Did you consider the Kulturakademie training to be relevant and useful to you (e.g. did it cover your needs as a cultural manager)?	6.7	5.3
U2.2	Did the training give you the opportunity to learn from professionals working in different cultural environments?	4.7	5.0
U2.3	Have you been able to apply the new skills learned through KA in your daily work or in your home institution?	4.7	5.0
	Mean score	5.3	5.1

Scores come from 12 User respondents, 6 each for Egypt and MENA. Again generally high scores, with only three scores (2-3).

### Opportunity

*The activities/outputs of the CRIs do not stand in isolation but provide a progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment. For KA: A key issue is the opportunity to develop better contacts between the state and independent sectors.*

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA

Question number	Question	Egypt	MENA
U3.1	Has the Kulturakademie Programme helped you to develop useful contacts with people outside your own networks?	6.3	6.2
U3.2	Have you maintained contact with these networks once the Programme finished?	5.7	5.8
U3.3	Have you had any assistance from the Goethe-Institut in applying what you learnt in the Programme to your own professional life and development?	2.5	4.2
U3.4	If you participated in ToT, have you been able to apply your skills in your home institution or by organizing workshops?	6.0	5.0
	Mean score	5.1	5.3

Scores come from 12 User respondents, 6 each for Egypt and MENA. Generally high scores except for U3.3, where there are three scores of 1.

## Film Week

### Strategic

#### Partnerships

*The Cultural Relations Interventions (CRIs) are carried out through effective and sustainable partnerships between BC/GI and in-country organisations, and between the in-country organisations themselves, leading to more and deeper relationships. For Filmwoche: the key partnerships are between GI and in-country film institutes; film distributors can also be considered as partners.*

- S1.1 Has the partnership between the Goethe-Institut and film distributors been effective and sustainable? 4.7
- S1.2 Has Filmwoche enabled new partnerships with other cultural institutions in Egypt? 5.4

Average score: 5.0

Scores come from 5 Strategic respondents. Generally high scores.

### Dialogue

*The interventions lead to enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures. Knowledge and understanding of British and German, Egyptian and Ukrainian culture are increased. The activities serve to foster better mutual understanding. For Filmwoche: the film screenings provide access to ideas from outside the country, particularly to people in*

*small cities and rural areas; events alongside the screenings provide an opportunity for discussion and debate; there is an aim to challenge censorship whilst respecting sensitivities.*

- |      |  |     |
|------|--|-----|
| S2.1 | Has Filmwoche provided small towns and rural areas with access to films that they would not otherwise have had the opportunity to watch?         | 5.8 |
| S2.2 | Has Filmwoche provided an opportunity for public discussion and debate?  | 5.5 |
| S2.3 | Has Filmwoche successfully challenged censorship about important social and political issues whilst respecting sensitivities?                    | 4.9 |
| S2.4 | To what extent can the Goethe-Institut serve as a mediator in-between the producers and the audiences, able to better negotiate with censorship? | 4.5 |

Average score: 5.2

Scores for S2.1, S2.2 come from 5-6 Strategic respondents. S2.3 has 5 Strategic and 4 Delivery responses and S2.4 is based on just the 4 Delivery respondents. Strategic and Delivery scores are generally high.

## Participation

*The CRIs target specific groups and reach an appropriate number and range of users in those target groups. Participation is active and interactive. Activities are well publicised. For Filmwoche: target groups for screenings are: General public; film students; People who are interested in culture; German language students. Other events are more narrowly targeted at film producers, film students etc. One of the main goals was to extend the geographical reach of Filmwoche. There are issues of promotion and of the image of GI.*

- |      |   |     |
|------|---|-----|
| S3.1 | Has Filmwoche achieved an appropriate number of people and level of active participation?   | 5.7 |
| S3.2 | Has Filmwoche reached an appropriate range of different target groups such as younger audiences, rural population, the general public, new audiences, film students, German students? | 5.5 |
| S3.3 | Is Filmwoche adequately advertised and promoted, taking full advantage of the opportunities social media afford?  | 5.5 |
| S3.4 | Is the GI film archive sufficiently used and promoted?  | 4.4 |
| S3.5 | Does Filmwoche make best use of interactive technologies and social media, integrating them effectively in ways that open up new kinds of partnerships and modes of participation?    | 3.0 |

Average score: 4.8

Scores for S3.1, S3.2, S3.5 come from 4-6 Strategic respondents. S3.3 and S3.4 also have 4 Delivery responses and S3.3 has 73 User responses.

Strategic and Delivery scores are generally high with one or two low responses (1-3), except for S3.5 where responses are all in range 2-4.

## Delivery

## **Professionalism**

*Staff have received adequate training, support and resources to meet demands and expectations of the CRI. Staff have opportunities to work creatively and collaboratively. Involvement in the CRI contributes to career development. For Filmwoche: the training, workshops etc. that take place in association with the screenings are of benefit to film producers. The opportunities to connect with people in the film industry offer potential for career development.*

- |      |   |     |
|------|---|-----|
| D1.1 | Have the Filmwoche training and workshops been useful to you? Please specify which training and workshops.  | 5.8 |
| D1.2 | Has Filmwoche opened up opportunities for you to connect with relevant people in the film industry and increased potential for your career development? | 5.0 |

Average score: 5.4

Scores come from 4 Delivery respondents. All in range 4 to 7.

## **Quality**

*Staff consider content/activities of the CRIs to be of high quality according to shared criteria. Content is delivered on time and within budget. For Filmwoche: the specific aspects of quality that are considered important are: choice of films; quality of infrastructure in screening locations*

- |      |  |     |
|------|--|-----|
| D2.1 | Has the choice of films for Filmwoche been appropriate and relevant especially in tackling key social and political issues in Egypt? | 4.9 |
| D2.2 | Have the locations/venues of the screenings been appropriate and enabled good levels of participation?                               | 5.6 |

Average score: 5.3

Scores come from 4 Delivery respondents and 65/73 Users. All in range 4 to 7. No comments

## **Collaboration**

*There is a good flow of communication between centres, regions and international networks. Communication between internal and external actors is clear and based on a shared understanding of fundamental aims of CRIs. Relationships on all sides of the production process are mutual, respectful and reciprocal and well-informed culturally. For Filmwoche: film makers potentially benefit from GI being able to facilitate screening of material which might otherwise be censored, and from access to renowned filmmakers in other countries.*

- |      |   |     |
|------|---|-----|
| D3.1 | Has Filmwoche facilitated screening of films which might otherwise have been censored (e.g. dealing with conflicts and their resolution)? | 5.8 |
|------|---|-----|

D3.2 Do you consider that Filmwoche has provided access to important Egyptian, 5.0 Arab or German film-makers in different countries (please state which countries below)?

D3.3 Do you find the Goethe institute locations easy to access? 5.3

D3.4 Do you find the Goethe institute staff and project managers open, accessible 6.2 and welcoming?

Average score: 5.5

Scores come from 4 Delivery respondents, except D3.4 which also has 76 User responses. All in range 4 to 7 except for one score of 3 for D3.2. Users scored higher than the Delivery team for D3.4.

## Users

### Appreciation

*Users praise the quality of outputs; they describe them as enjoyable and pleasurable and high quality. The CRIs meet expectations and users would recommend participation to others. For Filmwoche: users may value the opportunity to see films that they would not otherwise have access to. We would also expect films to be entertaining, engrossing etc.*

U1.1 Do you consider that Filmwoche has given you the opportunity to see films 5.5 which you might otherwise not have had access to?

U1.3 Would you recommend Filmwoche to others? 6.1

U1.4 How does Filmwoche compare to other film festivals that you have attended? 5.4

Average score: 5.7

Scores come from Delivery respondents 6 7 for U1.1, 4 for the other questions - and Users (76/78/59). All Delivery scores in range 4 to 7 except for a score of 3 for U1.1 from the one respondent who did not answer any further questions. Users scored higher than Delivery respondents for all three questions.

### Utility

*Users say that the activities/outputs were relevant and useful to them, that they were useful and instrumental in improving their well-being and cultural life, and that involvement in the CRIs has opened up new opportunities for them in their work, education or cultural life. For Filmwoche: users learn about other cultures as well as have the chance to discuss relevant issues*

U2.1 Has Filmwoch contributed to widening your knowledge and deepening your 5.7 understanding of Egyptian, German and other cultures?

U2.2 Does Filmwoch provide a public space to discuss issues that are relevant to 5.4 you and to the Egyptian and/or German context?

Average score: 5.6

Scores come from 4 Delivery respondents and 72-75 Users. All Delivery scores in range 4 to 7. Users scored slightly lower than Delivery on both questions.

## Opportunity

*The activities/outputs of the CRIs do not stand in isolation but provide a progression of educational and/or cultural enrichment. For Filmwoche: relevant issues are continuing commitment by GI and possible follow-up events after workshops.*

U3.1 Are you likely to attend future screenings/workshops of Filmwoche? 6.4

U3.2 Does Filmwoche provide enough follow-up activities after the workshops and/or screening to benefit fully from them? 5.3

Average score: 5.8

Scores come from 4 Delivery respondents and, for U3.1, 75 Users. All Delivery scores in range 4 to 7.

## Appendix 7: Rich pictures

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### Active Citizens

The following figure is a user depiction of Ukraine as a target of values from our CVM Active Citizens workshop: we find a set of values moving from outside Ukraine towards its borders. The Goethe-Institut, like the British Council, are in a non-space outside Ukraine, which is represented as a set of targets for those incoming values in the first map. In the second, users represented a call to «switch on» to embrace those values as part of Ukrainian culture (written in Ukrainian in this instance) through the collaborative work of what were before separate individuals. The way to «switch on» is through programmes like Active Citizens, but primarily through technology, creativity and cooperation, which were perceived as providing a route to a more connected, united and peaceful society.



Figure 19: Rich Picture: Active Citizens, workshop 1, Kyiv, July 2017, users

## Luhansk's ART & FACTs

The delivery team used an interesting metaphor for the state of cultural relations in Ukraine. The components of good cultural relations are all held in a basket, but the basket is sitting on a swamp. The *squid of war* in the swamp represents the conflict with Russia, political corruption and crisis, and the basket is at constant risk of being pulled down by it. The LAF project leader thus, argued that it is vital to take the basket out of the swamp. The only way we can do this is by grabbing the handle of the basket. But the handle of the basket (which is to represent the diverse people and regions of Ukraine) can only be held by an (invisible) hand. This invisible hand is understood to represent foreign funders and specifically the Goethe-Institut who with adequate funding and support can ensure that Ukraine and all the values of good cultural relations do not get pulled down by the squid into the swamp. The delivery team explained: *somebody needs to help us to take this basket away from this dangerous situation because, unfortunately, not everything is possible inside the system*



Figure 20: Rich picture: Luhank's ARTS & FACTs, workshop 1, Kyiv, July 2017, delivery team

## Al-Azhar

In the picture below the teachers illustrated their views on how they help their students achieve their goals, but also on how they need to be constantly working to do so. While the students rise up the ladder of opportunity, the teachers feel themselves to be moving down it.




Figure 21: Rich Picture: Al-Azhar Workshop 1, Cairo, May 2017, teachers

## Kulturakademie MENA

KA MENA users' representation of their place in the Egyptian cultural landscape. Independent cultural managers are at the (very bottom), while the state cultural managers feature as one of the three large (red) stones that represent an impediment to accessing resources.




Figure 22: Rich Picture: KA MENA Workshop 1, Cairo, May 2017, users

In contrast, the state cultural managers had a more optimistic view of the possibilities of working together with the independent sector by building bridges. The CVM workshops at the Goethe-Institut were reported by many stakeholders as one step in the right direction.




Figure 23: Rich Picture: KA Egypt Workshop 1, Cairo, May 2017, users

## Film Week

Delivery teams and some users feared that the Goethe-Institut might be perceived by the general public as a friendly, but stiff and perhaps intimidating giant. People don't really know what it does (they argued that it is often not well publicised) and therefore turn away. On the other side, there are the many opportunities and access to resources that the Goethe-Institut offers for those who come in and join.




Figure 24: Rich picture: Film Week, workshops I, Cairo, May 2017, delivery and users