Motivated by the recent surge in union drives, we present a theoretical model of unionization. A leader assembles an organizational team to persuade coworkers to vote for unionization. If unionization benefits workers, it more likely succeeds when the organizers are credible. Credibility depends on the organizers not being overly pro-union biased and/or bearing significant organizational costs. Hence, we explain why grassroots action is often more effective than professional campaigners in unionizing workplaces. The likelihood of unionization is non-monotonic in organizational costs. With low costs, firms targeting organizers may unintentionally boost unionization. However, sufficiently strong firm opposition renders unionization efforts ineffective.
No prior registration necessary. If you have any questions, please contact Amanda Slater at slater[at]hertie-school[dot]org.
This event is part of the Political Economy Lunch Seminar series.